Team Infidel
Forum Spin Doctor
By David A. Fulghum and Robert Wall
China’s integrated air defenses—based on cheap, sometimes stolen digital technology—are now considered potentially more threatening to the U.S. than Russia’s. The wholesale use of commercial products has made Chinese networks flexible, easy to upgrade and tough to exploit.
That opinion, rapidly taking hold in the U.S. electronic warfare community, is part of the tsunami of air defense analysis following Israel’s demonstration of its ability to shut down Syria’s Russian-built air defenses long enough to conduct a bombing raid—and then allowed the radars to come back on in time to see the Israeli aircraft disappearing over the border (AW&ST Nov. 26, 2007, p. 2.
China’s air defense expenditures are calculated by aerospace officials as only one-tenth of what’s invested by the U.S. The Chinese systems are affordable, in part, because of the regular use of stolen U.S. technology—described as “Cisco in Chinese,” by one specialist. The telecom companies that conduct and exploit the thefts are run by former People’s Liberation Army generals. The low cost allows rapid updating and proliferation of these defenses, which is one of the best ways to confound attack planners.
“The Chinese, like many countries without billions to spend on defense, are figuring out how to leverage all that commercial technology into their military capabilities,” says Rance Walleston, BAE Systems’ director of information operations initiative and information warfare. “We’ve spent a lot of time looking at Chinese technologies. They’re not building many unique devices. Their integrated air defense system [IADS] uses commercial standards,” such as GSM and voice over Internet protocols (VOIP).
The Syrian raid—which involved air-to-ground and network-to-network electronic invasion of a Russian-built IADS—is convincing some that custom-built, highly specialized and expensive air defenses with long development times are decreasing in deterrent value. In fact, they have become victims of their own uniqueness. Because they were hard to develop and field, they aren’t often modified. That gives electronic warriors the time to conduct analysis and build countermeasures.
But last year’s events haven’t changed U.S. government views of the threat.
“A lot of the threat models used to evaluate whether new programs work are outdated,” says a participant in electronic warfare and network attack since the 1992-95 conflict in Bosnia. “They are Soviet-era models. Where are the people who are thinking about what the Chinese IADS really look like? The Israelis are already running up against different defenses now that they’ve highlighted some of the weaknesses in Syria’s air defenses.”
But some senior U.S. Air Force officials disagree.
“The Chinese have been spending significant amounts for years on their IADS, and while they do exploit commercial technologies, they also buy and co-develop advanced missiles and radars with the Russians and others,” says a former top USAF acquisition official. “Network attack has been an integral part of taking down an IADS for years and is integral to all of the major modeling activities.”
U.S. intelligence analysts point out that in air defense, like other areas, China is pursuing multiple paths that include embracing purchased systems as well as developing their own high- and low-end solutions. The same is the case in air defense, they note, where the Chinese are buying Russian systems and also developing their own versions based on what they learn from the acquired systems.
That inability to change quickly also is reflected in U.S. defense acquisition practices. For example, “the U.S. still insists on building a lot of unique radios when they could use the commercial infrastructure and then build their own gear to encrypt it for the last mile [of wireless communications in combat],” the EW specialist says.
“Why spend billions on [joint tactical radios and future combat systems] that they can’t make as well the commercial companies? Why build high-power, aerial standoff jammers when there are cheaper and more sophisticated ways to do that mission with finesse [using lower-power data streams packed with algorithms to disrupt, mislead or take over enemy systems]? If you believe the trend in insurgent or terrorist command and control is toward low-power communications, what is a B-52-based jammer going to do? If I stand off 100 mi., there’s no way I’m going to have any impact on these threats.”
Again, the Air Force official objects.
“Commercial standards have been an integral part of military systems for years,” he says. “The major standards coming out of the [Network-Centric Operations Industry Consortium] are all commercially rooted. The U.S. government builds unique radios for reliability and ruggedness, just as they buy unique computers that are commercial-based but rugggedized. Major programs like the Future Combat System are strongly network-based and fully exploit commercial technologies and standards.”
There also are some intrinsic benefits to using commercial technology for military networks.
The Chinese are using VOIP, which causes big problems for the U.S. because there’s no wireless signal transmitted that can be easily intercepted, say U.S. intelligence officials. Hezbollah has adopted the same system for communications in southern Lebanon so that they can’t be intercepted by Lebanese or Israeli analysts. The command-and-control network is then invisible in the RF spectrum. The move was necessary because the Israel Defense Forces have become adept at tracking cellular traffic.
European officials are watching the shift with interest, too, although with a broader concern about network vulnerabilities than specific VOIP issues. Military planners in Europe note that they may need to follow the U.S. Air Force lead in focusing resources on protecting against network attacks, particularly in the wake of last year’s efforts from Russia to shut down Estonia’s Internet connectivity over a political dispute.
But at some point, any tactical communication system has to go wireless. Therefore, another technology being pursued by the Chinese for military use is the High-Powered Cordless Phone. The country doesn’t regulate power output of the microwave-frequency phone. One benefit is that it can be used to communicate between buildings with just the cordless handset without bothering with a base station. That allows the devices to create private networks by using just the intercom mode. Because they can communicate over several miles, chains can be set up over long distances.
China’s integrated air defenses—based on cheap, sometimes stolen digital technology—are now considered potentially more threatening to the U.S. than Russia’s. The wholesale use of commercial products has made Chinese networks flexible, easy to upgrade and tough to exploit.
That opinion, rapidly taking hold in the U.S. electronic warfare community, is part of the tsunami of air defense analysis following Israel’s demonstration of its ability to shut down Syria’s Russian-built air defenses long enough to conduct a bombing raid—and then allowed the radars to come back on in time to see the Israeli aircraft disappearing over the border (AW&ST Nov. 26, 2007, p. 2.
China’s air defense expenditures are calculated by aerospace officials as only one-tenth of what’s invested by the U.S. The Chinese systems are affordable, in part, because of the regular use of stolen U.S. technology—described as “Cisco in Chinese,” by one specialist. The telecom companies that conduct and exploit the thefts are run by former People’s Liberation Army generals. The low cost allows rapid updating and proliferation of these defenses, which is one of the best ways to confound attack planners.
“The Chinese, like many countries without billions to spend on defense, are figuring out how to leverage all that commercial technology into their military capabilities,” says Rance Walleston, BAE Systems’ director of information operations initiative and information warfare. “We’ve spent a lot of time looking at Chinese technologies. They’re not building many unique devices. Their integrated air defense system [IADS] uses commercial standards,” such as GSM and voice over Internet protocols (VOIP).
The Syrian raid—which involved air-to-ground and network-to-network electronic invasion of a Russian-built IADS—is convincing some that custom-built, highly specialized and expensive air defenses with long development times are decreasing in deterrent value. In fact, they have become victims of their own uniqueness. Because they were hard to develop and field, they aren’t often modified. That gives electronic warriors the time to conduct analysis and build countermeasures.
But last year’s events haven’t changed U.S. government views of the threat.
“A lot of the threat models used to evaluate whether new programs work are outdated,” says a participant in electronic warfare and network attack since the 1992-95 conflict in Bosnia. “They are Soviet-era models. Where are the people who are thinking about what the Chinese IADS really look like? The Israelis are already running up against different defenses now that they’ve highlighted some of the weaknesses in Syria’s air defenses.”
But some senior U.S. Air Force officials disagree.
“The Chinese have been spending significant amounts for years on their IADS, and while they do exploit commercial technologies, they also buy and co-develop advanced missiles and radars with the Russians and others,” says a former top USAF acquisition official. “Network attack has been an integral part of taking down an IADS for years and is integral to all of the major modeling activities.”
U.S. intelligence analysts point out that in air defense, like other areas, China is pursuing multiple paths that include embracing purchased systems as well as developing their own high- and low-end solutions. The same is the case in air defense, they note, where the Chinese are buying Russian systems and also developing their own versions based on what they learn from the acquired systems.
That inability to change quickly also is reflected in U.S. defense acquisition practices. For example, “the U.S. still insists on building a lot of unique radios when they could use the commercial infrastructure and then build their own gear to encrypt it for the last mile [of wireless communications in combat],” the EW specialist says.
“Why spend billions on [joint tactical radios and future combat systems] that they can’t make as well the commercial companies? Why build high-power, aerial standoff jammers when there are cheaper and more sophisticated ways to do that mission with finesse [using lower-power data streams packed with algorithms to disrupt, mislead or take over enemy systems]? If you believe the trend in insurgent or terrorist command and control is toward low-power communications, what is a B-52-based jammer going to do? If I stand off 100 mi., there’s no way I’m going to have any impact on these threats.”
Again, the Air Force official objects.
“Commercial standards have been an integral part of military systems for years,” he says. “The major standards coming out of the [Network-Centric Operations Industry Consortium] are all commercially rooted. The U.S. government builds unique radios for reliability and ruggedness, just as they buy unique computers that are commercial-based but rugggedized. Major programs like the Future Combat System are strongly network-based and fully exploit commercial technologies and standards.”
There also are some intrinsic benefits to using commercial technology for military networks.
The Chinese are using VOIP, which causes big problems for the U.S. because there’s no wireless signal transmitted that can be easily intercepted, say U.S. intelligence officials. Hezbollah has adopted the same system for communications in southern Lebanon so that they can’t be intercepted by Lebanese or Israeli analysts. The command-and-control network is then invisible in the RF spectrum. The move was necessary because the Israel Defense Forces have become adept at tracking cellular traffic.
European officials are watching the shift with interest, too, although with a broader concern about network vulnerabilities than specific VOIP issues. Military planners in Europe note that they may need to follow the U.S. Air Force lead in focusing resources on protecting against network attacks, particularly in the wake of last year’s efforts from Russia to shut down Estonia’s Internet connectivity over a political dispute.
But at some point, any tactical communication system has to go wireless. Therefore, another technology being pursued by the Chinese for military use is the High-Powered Cordless Phone. The country doesn’t regulate power output of the microwave-frequency phone. One benefit is that it can be used to communicate between buildings with just the cordless handset without bothering with a base station. That allows the devices to create private networks by using just the intercom mode. Because they can communicate over several miles, chains can be set up over long distances.