Ollie Garchy
Active member
Military Friction and/or Asymmetry: The US War on Terror
I want to argue that combat friction and/or asymmetry represents the most important complicating factor in war, and place far less emphasis on (a) Underestimating Enemy, (b) Unfit Leaders, (c) Planning Disasters, (d) Intelligence Blunders, and (e) Political Influence. I would also like to make an argument concerning why the United States is losing the war on terror, and perhaps get some ideas on how the US can win without retreating to fortress America.
I originally wrote this response for another thread dealing with "blunders and the blunderers". I think that it is actually more appropriate to post this stuff in a new thread. It looks like that thread is going to run in the usual "the losers were stupid" direction. No disrespect is intended.
Sorry, but the categories listed above are flawed. A military organization is not necessarily responsible for the political decisions that lead the soldiers to difficult wars. As in the case of Napoleon's Russian campaign or the current American military operations in Iraq, "poor" military results were a product of political decision-making (that invariably lead to the conclusion I make below). In both cases, the enemy fought (or is fighting) asymetrically for the simple reason that they had (have) no other choice. Napoleon and Rumsfeld (sorry for the comparison) had no reason to think that military operations would not unfold in their favour. After the fact, both looked (look) incredibly stupid. Borodino-Moscow and the capture of Baghdad were solid military victories. The problem is that subsequent "failures" takes on the veneer of the "blunderer" and the critics take over.
As it stands, these categories are used for a reason. They can be mobilized in the following manner: the political outcome of war determines the "blunderer" from the "genius". But nobody in their right mind would denigrate Napoleon or the US military. Think about Vietnam, for example. There are historical moments when an exceptional military organization loses. Was that organization therefore composed of "blunderers". No way. Napoleon and his commmanders were brilliant beyond description. The same for the US in Vietnam. They made no really dreadful mistakes in their operations and it is a banality to point out that certain things could have been done better.
I can only say one thing: "friction" or operational asymmetry (not to be confused with military force asymmetry). "Strategy, Luttwak points outs, involves actual or possible armed conflict between thinking humans and thus is dominated by a paradoxical logic based on the coming together and even the reversal of opposites. What appears best, more effective, or most efficient, in other words, often is not". You cannot with any precision forecast how an enemy will react. All planning, intelligence assessments, etc. are therefore only rough estimates or guides. All war plans can be tossed into the garbage once the guns start firing...and then the frictions of combat take over.
In my opinion, all of the usual categories mask one basic military determinant: unless one side is hopelessly outclassed in terms of technology or education, all military success or failure can be understood in terms of troop strength. Napoleon ran out of men. The US army cried out for more soldiers in Vietnam and is currently doing the same. Do not forget one thing, though. A military on the offensive can alter troop strength ratios by capturing enemy soldiers and therefore creating the conditions for eventual victory. Hitler's generals did so against France in 1940. Hitler tried to do the same in Russia and almost succeeded. What counts is killing the enemy...the old American concept of war of annihilation. Bring the enemy to battle and blow him to bits.
But what do you do when the enemy retreats and will not commit? How do we stop partisan or guerilla operations? How do we deal with this modern (and historical) friction? [Remember that Napoleon had to deal with guerilla tactics in Spain...the English in North America, etc.]
I want to argue that combat friction and/or asymmetry represents the most important complicating factor in war, and place far less emphasis on (a) Underestimating Enemy, (b) Unfit Leaders, (c) Planning Disasters, (d) Intelligence Blunders, and (e) Political Influence. I would also like to make an argument concerning why the United States is losing the war on terror, and perhaps get some ideas on how the US can win without retreating to fortress America.
I originally wrote this response for another thread dealing with "blunders and the blunderers". I think that it is actually more appropriate to post this stuff in a new thread. It looks like that thread is going to run in the usual "the losers were stupid" direction. No disrespect is intended.
Sorry, but the categories listed above are flawed. A military organization is not necessarily responsible for the political decisions that lead the soldiers to difficult wars. As in the case of Napoleon's Russian campaign or the current American military operations in Iraq, "poor" military results were a product of political decision-making (that invariably lead to the conclusion I make below). In both cases, the enemy fought (or is fighting) asymetrically for the simple reason that they had (have) no other choice. Napoleon and Rumsfeld (sorry for the comparison) had no reason to think that military operations would not unfold in their favour. After the fact, both looked (look) incredibly stupid. Borodino-Moscow and the capture of Baghdad were solid military victories. The problem is that subsequent "failures" takes on the veneer of the "blunderer" and the critics take over.
As it stands, these categories are used for a reason. They can be mobilized in the following manner: the political outcome of war determines the "blunderer" from the "genius". But nobody in their right mind would denigrate Napoleon or the US military. Think about Vietnam, for example. There are historical moments when an exceptional military organization loses. Was that organization therefore composed of "blunderers". No way. Napoleon and his commmanders were brilliant beyond description. The same for the US in Vietnam. They made no really dreadful mistakes in their operations and it is a banality to point out that certain things could have been done better.
I can only say one thing: "friction" or operational asymmetry (not to be confused with military force asymmetry). "Strategy, Luttwak points outs, involves actual or possible armed conflict between thinking humans and thus is dominated by a paradoxical logic based on the coming together and even the reversal of opposites. What appears best, more effective, or most efficient, in other words, often is not". You cannot with any precision forecast how an enemy will react. All planning, intelligence assessments, etc. are therefore only rough estimates or guides. All war plans can be tossed into the garbage once the guns start firing...and then the frictions of combat take over.
In my opinion, all of the usual categories mask one basic military determinant: unless one side is hopelessly outclassed in terms of technology or education, all military success or failure can be understood in terms of troop strength. Napoleon ran out of men. The US army cried out for more soldiers in Vietnam and is currently doing the same. Do not forget one thing, though. A military on the offensive can alter troop strength ratios by capturing enemy soldiers and therefore creating the conditions for eventual victory. Hitler's generals did so against France in 1940. Hitler tried to do the same in Russia and almost succeeded. What counts is killing the enemy...the old American concept of war of annihilation. Bring the enemy to battle and blow him to bits.
But what do you do when the enemy retreats and will not commit? How do we stop partisan or guerilla operations? How do we deal with this modern (and historical) friction? [Remember that Napoleon had to deal with guerilla tactics in Spain...the English in North America, etc.]