Malta

So what your saying essentially is that the > 2300 Axis merchant and military ships sunk by the British sea and air forces stationed out of Malta had little to due with the Allied victory over the German Africa Corps. I'll have vanilla.


Malta was ONE of the factors that were influencing the axis transports to NA.

Let's assume that Rommel needed monthly 50000 tons (although he was probabling asking to much to receive enough: a very old trick).

1)The problems started with the following : was this amount (50000 tons) available ?


2) If it was : was it possible to transport every month 50000 tons from Germany to Naples ,considering the fact that it took 2 weeks for a train (carrying 400 tons) to go to Naples and to return.

3) Next problem :stockage capacity of Naples : if the depots of Naples could receive daily only 1500 tons for NA (Naples was used also for other aims),this means that monthly not 50000 tons could arrive at Naples but only 45000

4)Following problem :the unloading capacity of the port of Naples :if it was only 1000 tons (for NA) ,only 1000 tons could leave Naples,which results that only 1000 tons could arrive at Naples

5) Next :the convoys :it took a convoy (sometimes a convoy was ONE merchant ship) a week to go to Tripoli and to return (loading,unloading and waiting included) : Naples -tripoli : 2 days and 15 hours

6) A convoy could only leave when there was fuel available and protectin by the Italian war fleet

7)Attacks on the convoy by aircraft and submarines from Malta and elsewhere

8) Stockage capacity of Tripoli :the same problems as in Naples

9)Unloading capacity of Tripoli:idem

10) Transport to the front : sometimes it took a truck a month for going and coming


The following figures are giving the monthly amounts of supplies that were leaving for NA in 1942 in thousands of tons ;

First column : the months (numbered).Second column :what was sent. Third column : what arrived .Fourth column : what was "lost" ,including what was delayed or returned .


1(january) : sent : 66000/ delivered :66000/ lost : 0

2 : :59000/ :58000/ :1000

3: : :57000/ :47000/ : 10000

4: :152000/ :150000/ : 2000

5: :93000/ :86000/ :7000

6: :41000/ :32000/ :9000

7: :98000/ :91000/ :7000

8 : 76000/ : 51000/ :25000

9 : :96000/ :77000/ :19000

10 : :86000/ :46000/ :40000

11: :117000/ :97000/ :20000

12 : :95000/ : 66000 : 290000
 
Other points :

The loss of a ship does not mean automatically the loss of a cargo,as a lot of ships were lost when they returned empty to Italy.


The arrival of a lot of supplies in NA does not automatically result in the strengthening of the Axis position : 47000 tons arrived in march,97000 in november,when the axis was retreating .

How much of the 97000 tons that arrived in NA in november 1942 reached the front during the same month ?
 
When it comes to the desert campaign, the Italians were beaten by the Brits and they got a bad reputation after their shortcomings.

Was the Italian army really that bad? If so, why? Didn't they use the German doctrine? Was their training much lesser than their German colleagues?


The Italians were not bad : giving their situation they performed well,especially the navy and merchant ships,but the Germans needed a scape-goat for their defeat .

The Germans were also beaten by the British and the WWII forums are still swarming with fanboys and admirers of Rommel the Great .
 
The Italians were not bad : giving their situation they performed well,especially the navy and merchant ships,but the Germans needed a scape-goat for their defeat .

The Germans were also beaten by the British and the WWII forums are still swarming with fanboys and admirers of Rommel the Great .

In the early years, most countries were beaten by the new military doctrine developed by the Germans. The Italians seem to have been stuck as so many others in the doctrines from the previous war. Meanwhile the allies learned the lessons from 1939-1941, the Italians seem to have not learned fast enough. Especially, when Mussolini preferred to have loyal top brass officers rather than competent ones. Remove the talented commanders and the development of doctrines disappears.
 
In that month, 1⁄3 of supplies and 41% of fuel were delivered. In September 1942, Rommel received only 24% of the 50,000 tons of supplies needed monthly to continue offensive operations. During September, the Allies sank 33,939 tons of shipping at sea.


This is misleading: the convoys were not sailing to Alamein, thus if Rommel only received 12000 tons, this was not caused by Malta .

Besides,your figures are not correct : in september,the following supplies were sent to NA for the Axis (Germans AND Italians):

fuel : 40200 tons of which 31061 were delivered

other supplies :56703 tons of which 46425 were delivered

Total :96903 of which 77526 arrived and 19377 were lost or delayed .

The source is : La Marina Italia della Secunda Guerra Mondiale P134
cited in Christos military and intelligence corner : Ultra Intelligence and Rommel's convoys .
 
In the early years, most countries were beaten by the new military doctrine developed by the Germans.

This is more than questionable

1)There was nothing new on this doctrine

2) The doctrine was not developped by the Germans

3) German victories were not caused by this doctrine
 
This is more than questionable

1)There was nothing new on this doctrine

2) The doctrine was not developped by the Germans

3) German victories were not caused by this doctrine

Wrong, and wrong again.

The doctrine was developed by the Germans and they got it to work. There were British and French officers thinking in terms of the mobile war, but they never implemented in the military thinking and practices. Zhukov was working on the Russian version of the doctrine and got it to work against the Japanese.

Maybe you don't know what a military doctrine is, but that is completely wrong to say the "new" military doctrine had nothing to do with the successes during the first years.
 
In August, Malta's strike forces had contributed to the Axis' difficulties in trying to force an advance into Egypt. In that month, 1⁄3 of supplies and 41% of fuel were delivered. In September 1942, Rommel received only 24% of the 50,000 tons of supplies needed monthly to continue offensive operations.

To "quote my earlier post" these are statics of supply reductions available to Rommel's forces in Egypt due to British sea and air attacks from forces based in Malta. I can't make it any more straightway other than to dig up more such statistics.
Levine, Alan (2008), The War Against Rommel's Supply Lines, 1942–43, Stackpole Books
 
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In the early years, most countries were beaten by the new military doctrine developed by the Germans. The Italians seem to have been stuck as so many others in the doctrines from the previous war. Meanwhile the allies learned the lessons from 1939-1941, the Italians seem to have not learned fast enough. Especially, when Mussolini preferred to have loyal top brass officers rather than competent ones. Remove the talented commanders and the development of doctrines disappears.

To clarify the theory of Blitzkrieg was originally developed by Heinz Guderian and fine tuned by Erick Von Manstein. However it was not an actual military doctrine. German historian Karl-Heinz Frieser summarized Blitzkrieg as simply the result of German commanders blending the latest technology in the most beneficial way with the traditional military principles and [employing] the right units in the right place at the right time.
The allies and Soviets did not modernize there approaches to warfare (early on) and as such were readily defeated.

I do believe some Italian's did sympathize with the allies having some many relatives in the states. Also many were not in favor of Hitler racial policies which he tried to push on Mussolini. Many fought very well in the Ukraine and southern Russia despite being under equipped.
 
To clarify the theory of Blitzkrieg was originally developed by Heinz Guderian and fine tuned by Erick Von Manstein. However it was not an actual military doctrine. German historian Karl-Heinz Frieser summarized Blitzkrieg as simply the result of German commanders blending the latest technology in the most beneficial way with the traditional military principles and [employing] the right units in the right place at the right time.
The allies and Soviets did not modernize there approaches to warfare (early on) and as such were readily defeated.

I do believe some Italian's did sympathize with the allies having some many relatives in the states. Also many were not in favor of Hitler racial policies which he tried to push on Mussolini. Many fought very well in the Ukraine and southern Russia despite being under equipped.

I disagree with the Blixtkrieg not being a military doctrine, from my years at the military college where the modern warfare was developed and the blixtkrieg was viewed as a doctrine among the officers and it has been developed further now. The AirLand Operations are also a military doctrine and it's father was these German guys you mentioned, actually it was a Russian idea but they couldn't get it to work, NATO could achieve it to work. The weakness with the Blixtkrieg was it required the control of the air and getting the infantry to keep up with the armor forces. Other countries had their armor to backup the infantry, but the Germans created new units with panzers and decided about certain locations for their armor forces to penetrate the defenders lines and encircle the enemy.
 
I disagree with the Blixtkrieg not being a military doctrine, from my years at the military college where the modern warfare was developed and the blixtkrieg was viewed as a doctrine among the officers and it has been developed further now. The AirLand Operations are also a military doctrine and it's father was these German guys you mentioned, actually it was a Russian idea but they couldn't get it to work, NATO could achieve it to work. The weakness with the Blixtkrieg was it required the control of the air and getting the infantry to keep up with the armor forces. Other countries had their armor to backup the infantry, but the Germans created new units with panzers and decided about certain locations for their armor forces to penetrate the defenders lines and encircle the enemy.


I do stand corrected on that one. Meticulous planning went into all those German attacks: Poland, France, the USSR. It was a doctrine as developed by Guderian and Von Manstein the always concentrated large numbers of AFV's at strategic points where they insured they would also have a massive advantage in airpower. Then they burst in driving deep either cutting off or surrounding enemy forces in a very efficient manner. Everyone else had their forces spread out and were basically sitting ducks. Didn't matter if they fought well or not next they knew they were either behind the lines or surrounded.
 
Wrong, and wrong again.

The doctrine was developed by the Germans and they got it to work. There were British and French officers thinking in terms of the mobile war, but they never implemented in the military thinking and practices. Zhukov was working on the Russian version of the doctrine and got it to work against the Japanese.

Maybe you don't know what a military doctrine is, but that is completely wrong to say the "new" military doctrine had nothing to do with the successes during the first years.


The German successes in the beginning of the war were caused not because they had developped a new doctrine (this doctrine existed already in WWI) but because the Germans had a numerical superiority .Besides the theory of the mobile warfare failed in the SU.
 
I do stand corrected on that one. Meticulous planning went into all those German attacks: Poland, France, the USSR. It was a doctrine as developed by Guderian and Von Manstein the always concentrated large numbers of AFV's at strategic points where they insured they would also have a massive advantage in airpower. Then they burst in driving deep either cutting off or surrounding enemy forces in a very efficient manner. Everyone else had their forces spread out and were basically sitting ducks. Didn't matter if they fought well or not next they knew they were either behind the lines or surrounded.

This is the old traditional but wrong point of view,besides the role of Guderian and Manstein is very much overstated .
 
I do stand corrected on that one. Meticulous planning went into all those German attacks: Poland, France, the USSR. It was a doctrine as developed by Guderian and Von Manstein the always concentrated large numbers of AFV's at strategic points where they insured they would also have a massive advantage in airpower. Then they burst in driving deep either cutting off or surrounding enemy forces in a very efficient manner. Everyone else had their forces spread out and were basically sitting ducks. Didn't matter if they fought well or not next they knew they were either behind the lines or surrounded.

The Germans had a huge advantage over their enemies when they developed this "new" idea. The two officers developing this "new" idea were Generals, while similar ideas had occurred among lower ranked officers. The hierarchy in the military worked against the French and the British. We cannot underestimate the impact of the depression either. The Western allies did not have the resources to develop new ideas and never really believed in the threat of a new conflict until it was too late to react. The Russians were better off when it comes to the development of the new mobile warfare, but Stalin destroyed a huge part of what the top brass are doing between wars. Zhukov was their Guderian, and maybe he saved them from destruction.

It seems the Germans never shared the new doctrine with the Italians, but according to the article provided by Brit, they did something similar as Stalin (not apprehending and executing the officers) and couldn't learn fast enough to change the concept of the modern warfare.
 
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The German successes in the beginning of the war were caused not because they had developped a new doctrine (this doctrine existed already in WWI) but because the Germans had a numerical superiority .Besides the theory of the mobile warfare failed in the SU.

Yes, it was. Do you homework or take a trip to any defense college in the world. The Russians used the same concept when they reached Berlin
 
The German successes in the beginning of the war were caused not because they had developped a new doctrine (this doctrine existed already in WWI) but because the Germans had a numerical superiority .Besides the theory of the mobile warfare failed in the SU.

In the west the British force combined with the French forces outnumbered the Germans considerable. In the East the Red army of 6 million plus outnumbered the Axis by > 2:1 from the start of the invasion.
The key difference was that the Germans outnumbered them only where they chose too out number them. That is where they concentrated their forces for the Blitzkrieg attack. It failed after penetrating ~ 1200 miles from the Polish border to the Volga. It finally failed in Stalingrad as the Germans let themselves get caught up in a 6 months battle of attrition.
 
In the west the British force combined with the French forces outnumbered the Germans considerable. In the East the Red army of 6 million plus outnumbered the Axis by > 2:1 from the start of the invasion.
The key difference was that the Germans outnumbered them only where they chose too out number them. That is where they concentrated their forces for the Blitzkrieg attack. It failed after penetrating ~ 1200 miles from the Polish border to the Volga. It finally failed in Stalingrad as the Germans let themselves get caught up in a 6 months battle of attrition.

Something to take a closer look at is how the Germans conquered Norway, the terrain doesn't allow a high speed mechanized warfare. The doctrine of air, land, and amphibious operation worked rather well. The Germans used more or less the same concept when they took Crete.
 
Something to take a closer look at is how the Germans conquered Norway, the terrain doesn't allow a high speed mechanized warfare. The doctrine of air, land, and amphibious operation worked rather well. The Germans used more or less the same concept when they took Crete.

The Germans were quite innovative. Your example testifies to that. The allies weren't ready for this at this point in the war, although they still put up a good fight.
Later when the Wehrmacht was outnumbered and outgunned in the USSR and western front they continued to be resourceful. making the best possible use of their fewer numbers of supplies, AFV's, artillery and personal.
 
The Germans were quite innovative. Your example testifies to that. The allies weren't ready for this at this point in the war, although they still put up a good fight.
Later when the Wehrmacht was outnumbered and outgunned in the USSR and western front they continued to be resourceful. making the best possible use of their fewer numbers of supplies, AFV's, artillery and personal.

The Germans worked pretty well on the tactical level, but not on the strategical level. They also faced the problem of success, keeping the conquered areas in control. They were successful on Crete, why didn't they do the same on Malta?
 
The Germans worked pretty well on the tactical level, but not on the strategical level. They also faced the problem of success, keeping the conquered areas in control. They were successful on Crete, why didn't they do the same on Malta?

How do you define successful?
The Fallschirmjäger were so badly mauled that they never operated again in an airborne capacity.

The wife's grandfather was a 1942 replacement for those lost on Crete and spent the last 3 years of the war as a fancily dressed infantryman in Italy.
 
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