Team Infidel
Forum Spin Doctor
Marine Corps Times
March 3, 2008
Pg. 18
By Kimberly Johnson
The Corps did not intentionally delay the purchase of blast-proof vehicles, the assistant commandant said Feb. 20, calling accusations to the contrary “incorrect.”
The service has faced criticism on the subject recently, sparked by a scathing internal report saying the Corps refused urgent requests for Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles made by battlefield commanders in 2005.
“I don’t think [the study] stands up to the facts about what we did, about what the industry was capable of doing and why we did what we did,” said Gen. Robert Magnus, assistant commandant of the Marine Corps. “I just don’t think that’s accurate.”
The study, compiled by former civilian science adviser to the Corps and former Marine officer Franz Gayl, has prompted calls for a congressional investigation.
The report reflected Gayl’s personal view, but initial media reports painted it as a Marine Corps study. The Corps took the unusual step Feb. 21 of issuing a statement condemning early reporting on the subject by the Associated Press, in response to widespread coverage of the subject.
“There is no doubt that MRAPs have saved many lives in horrendous [improvised explosive device] explosions, but to accuse the Marine Corps of knowingly and intentionally jeopardizing the safety of fellow Marines on the battlefield is a very serious charge,” George Lisicki, national commander of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the U.S., wrote in a letter to House and Senate Armed Services Committee leadership.
The Corps’ approach to buying MRAPs has evolved along with enemy tactics, Magnus said.
In late 2004 and early 2005, the main threat Marines faced in Iraq was the side-panel blast from a roadside bomb, Magnus said.
“The most rapid way the [Army and Marine Corps] could protect against side blasts of the vehicle, for the thousands and thousands of vehicles that we had over there, was to armor them,” he said in reference to the Corps’ decision to up-armor its Humvee fleet.
As the enemy shifted tactics from side blasts to underbelly attacks, the Corps responded by purchasing 122 of the MRAP-type vehicles — distinctive, with their V-shape hull and raised chassis — for explosive ordnance disposal and road clearance teams, he said.
“In January 2007, Marine Forces Central Command asked us specifically for a large number of very specifically designed vehicles with the V-shaped hulls, the ability to withstand 15- and 30-pound charges,” he said.
“Within 30 days, we went from having a requirement for a couple hundred vehicles — that was being met by an industry that was not very capable of producing large quantities of vehicles — to having the front end of a $20 billion program to buy what’s now over 15,000 vehicles for the Marine Corps and the Army,” Magnus said. The vehicles then had to be tested before production, he said.
The program’s procurement has undergone internal service and Navy audits, he added.
Magnus denied that the Corps waylaid the MRAP program for fear of jeopardizing other programs, such as the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle.
“This was all supplemental money. This didn’t jeopardize anything,” Magnus said. “We are getting what is now going to be almost $20 billion outside of the budgets in the emergency supplemental appropriations. This doesn’t jeopardize a single F-22 [Raptor], a single tank, a single rifle. In fact, if we needed to get more rifles, we could also get them the same way, too,” he said.
MRAPs can cost about $750,000 each, as much as four times the price of a Humvee, Magnus said. “It didn’t even jeopardize the procurement of Humvees, much less other things,” he said. “We never had to trade anything.”
The Associated Press contributed to this report.
March 3, 2008
Pg. 18
By Kimberly Johnson
The Corps did not intentionally delay the purchase of blast-proof vehicles, the assistant commandant said Feb. 20, calling accusations to the contrary “incorrect.”
The service has faced criticism on the subject recently, sparked by a scathing internal report saying the Corps refused urgent requests for Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles made by battlefield commanders in 2005.
“I don’t think [the study] stands up to the facts about what we did, about what the industry was capable of doing and why we did what we did,” said Gen. Robert Magnus, assistant commandant of the Marine Corps. “I just don’t think that’s accurate.”
The study, compiled by former civilian science adviser to the Corps and former Marine officer Franz Gayl, has prompted calls for a congressional investigation.
The report reflected Gayl’s personal view, but initial media reports painted it as a Marine Corps study. The Corps took the unusual step Feb. 21 of issuing a statement condemning early reporting on the subject by the Associated Press, in response to widespread coverage of the subject.
“There is no doubt that MRAPs have saved many lives in horrendous [improvised explosive device] explosions, but to accuse the Marine Corps of knowingly and intentionally jeopardizing the safety of fellow Marines on the battlefield is a very serious charge,” George Lisicki, national commander of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the U.S., wrote in a letter to House and Senate Armed Services Committee leadership.
The Corps’ approach to buying MRAPs has evolved along with enemy tactics, Magnus said.
In late 2004 and early 2005, the main threat Marines faced in Iraq was the side-panel blast from a roadside bomb, Magnus said.
“The most rapid way the [Army and Marine Corps] could protect against side blasts of the vehicle, for the thousands and thousands of vehicles that we had over there, was to armor them,” he said in reference to the Corps’ decision to up-armor its Humvee fleet.
As the enemy shifted tactics from side blasts to underbelly attacks, the Corps responded by purchasing 122 of the MRAP-type vehicles — distinctive, with their V-shape hull and raised chassis — for explosive ordnance disposal and road clearance teams, he said.
“In January 2007, Marine Forces Central Command asked us specifically for a large number of very specifically designed vehicles with the V-shaped hulls, the ability to withstand 15- and 30-pound charges,” he said.
“Within 30 days, we went from having a requirement for a couple hundred vehicles — that was being met by an industry that was not very capable of producing large quantities of vehicles — to having the front end of a $20 billion program to buy what’s now over 15,000 vehicles for the Marine Corps and the Army,” Magnus said. The vehicles then had to be tested before production, he said.
The program’s procurement has undergone internal service and Navy audits, he added.
Magnus denied that the Corps waylaid the MRAP program for fear of jeopardizing other programs, such as the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle.
“This was all supplemental money. This didn’t jeopardize anything,” Magnus said. “We are getting what is now going to be almost $20 billion outside of the budgets in the emergency supplemental appropriations. This doesn’t jeopardize a single F-22 [Raptor], a single tank, a single rifle. In fact, if we needed to get more rifles, we could also get them the same way, too,” he said.
MRAPs can cost about $750,000 each, as much as four times the price of a Humvee, Magnus said. “It didn’t even jeopardize the procurement of Humvees, much less other things,” he said. “We never had to trade anything.”
The Associated Press contributed to this report.