good, bad or irrelevant?

August 3rd 1941 a decision is taken to stop the drive on Moscow and send the bulk of Panzergruppe 2 under Generaloberst Heinz Guderian and the 2nd Army under General Maximilian Reichsfreiherr von Weichs from Army Group Centre and send it on a drive South to support Army Group South and cut off the Russian South West Front.

The end result was the capture of Kiev and the taking of around 600,000 Russian POWs however it also prevented the possible capture of Moscow.

The effect of the Lotzen decision has been raised here many times but it has never really had its own thread to my knowledge so now is our chance, many believe this decision was the turning point of the war in the East I personally am not so sure as I do not believe the Soviet Union would have surrendered even with the fall of Moscow.

I also tend to believe that the huge salient's both North and South of Moscow would have left Army Group Centre vulnerable to encirclement during the Russian counter attacks of December 1941 much in the same way the 6th Army was encircled at Stalingrad a year later therefore the decision to head South was the right one.

Anyone have an opinion on this?

Already in august 1941,there was a strategic crisis on the eastern front :the German attack had failed .A continuation of the advance was impossible,the Soviets were counter-attacking on the whole front,and logistics made a further advance impossible .
IMHO,the Kiew decision was the only logical one and the only possible .

Originally Posted by lljadw

Already in august 1941,there was a strategic crisis on the eastern front :the German attack had failed .A continuation of the advance was impossible,the Soviets were counter-attacking on the whole front,and logistics made a further advance impossible .
IMHO,the Kiew decision was the only logical one and the only possible .

I agree yet people still seem to think that it was the turning point in the war (at least on the Eastern front) apparently Guderian thought this as well.

To me this could only be the case if the Russians would have surrendered with the fall of Moscow which I don't see happening, I do not disagree that Moscow was a major strategic hub especially for transport, communication and logistics but I do not believe it was the key stone of Russian defence.

An attack on Moskow only could start on 1 september,and the result would be a failure
1)Guderian is telling nonsense :he only commended a small part of AGC,and without the aid of the ID,he never would get it to Moscow
2)The Germans already were very weakened:losses for june,july and august :
tanks :1200,replacements :100,the PzD had lost 30 % of their tanks,and,how many were still operational
trucks :26000,replacements and booty :6000
men :400000(without sick,etc),replacements :none
Most divisions had lost 2500 men,and,as most losses happened with the infantry,the infantry batallions were down 40 %
Source :Va Banque
3)Logistics:in july,the Ostheer needed 12000 tons of fuel per day,9000 were planned,in september the need was 5000/6000
A PD needed 300 tons of supply per day,an ID 200 tons
Source:books on eastern front logistics (available on the net)
Ammunition supply:
june :23000 tons
juky:101000
august:108000
september:108000
october:90000
november:68000
one train carried 400/500 tons
Source:eastern front victory conditions
AGC got in july daily 24 trains with 10700 tons,in august 22.7 with 10215,in september 26 with 11700
Source :AHF :for the statistic and logistic buffs on the forum
4)Guderian:
tank status report on 4 september 1941 of the 2 PG
3 PD :41 available,147 under repair
4 PD :49/120
17 PD :38/142
18:62/138
Total:25 % available,75 % under repair
For the 3 PG:it was 40%/60 %
If we are adding the very weaken ID,it is obvious that Guderian never would make to Moscow .
Source :same source on the AHF .

In my opinion they could have conquered Moscow. The Russians had more manpower but the Germans controlled the skies and had more armor. The fall of Moscow would be a huge psychological blow to the Russians. Stalin was already packing to leave and if I'm not mistaken he even considered surrendering if Moscow fell. It was worth the risk.

While I have no idea about Stalin's state of mind regarding Moscow falling to the Germans, I wonder if the rest of the Soviet leadership would have been willing to surrender? I personally don't believe the Soviets would have surrendered if Moscow was lost.

With many of the factories producing war materials located beyond the reach of German airpower, the Soviets could have kept making weapons and kept fighting (the Germans never seemed to accept the need for strategic bombers, sure they had a few few but it was too little too late).
The Germans would have to constantly capture airfields close to their targets to be able to stop the Soviet factories with airpower thereby further extending the German supply lines while the Soviets could still relocate yet further to the east.

I tend to think that conquering the Ukraine was one thing but conquering Russia, even if they had captured Stalingrad, Leningrad and Moscow, was a case of "a bridge too far".

Originally Posted by KevinTheCynic

While I have no idea about Stalin's state of mind regarding Moscow falling to the Germans, I wonder if the rest of the Soviet leadership would have been willing to surrender? I personally don't believe the Soviets would have surrendered if Moscow was lost.

With many of the factories producing war materials located beyond the reach of German airpower, the Soviets could have kept making weapons and kept fighting (the Germans never seemed to accept the need for strategic bombers, sure they had a few few but it was too little too late).
The Germans would have to constantly capture airfields close to their targets to be able to stop the Soviet factories with airpower thereby further extending the German supply lines while the Soviets could still relocate yet further to the east.

I tend to think that conquering the Ukraine was one thing but conquering Russia, even if they had captured Stalingrad, Leningrad and Moscow, was a case of "a bridge too far".

A capital as a symbolic value, and the lacking of a "strategic air force", and could not touch the industrial strength of Russia, when they relocate their industry. I doubt they had surrendered even if they had lost Moscow, if they had lost the supply line from Iran ( the US and the land lease agreement) well.. I dislike these what if things, the opponent had not responded as the history tells

Originally Posted by KevinTheCynic

While I have no idea about Stalin's state of mind regarding Moscow falling to the Germans, I wonder if the rest of the Soviet leadership would have been willing to surrender? I personally don't believe the Soviets would have surrendered if Moscow was lost.

With many of the factories producing war materials located beyond the reach of German airpower, the Soviets could have kept making weapons and kept fighting (the Germans never seemed to accept the need for strategic bombers, sure they had a few few but it was too little too late).
The Germans would have to constantly capture airfields close to their targets to be able to stop the Soviet factories with airpower thereby further extending the German supply lines while the Soviets could still relocate yet further to the east.

I tend to think that conquering the Ukraine was one thing but conquering Russia, even if they had captured Stalingrad, Leningrad and Moscow, was a case of "a bridge too far".

As I recall Stalin had stated he had no intention of leaving Moscow and was prepared to go down with the ship however when push came to shove I think he would have left "for the good of the country".

Personally I have often wondered how things would have gone had Germany tried a modification of the Schlieffen Plan by reinforcing Army Group South with Army Group Centre and carrying out a sickle cut following Army Group South's planned route with AGC driving up towards Moscow from around Kiev or Kharkov as it seems to me that this would have been far better ground for German operations.

(Basically an inverse of the Lotzen decision with Guderian driving North from Kiev to cut off Moscow instead of South to Kiev).

Originally Posted by MontyB

Personally I have often wondered how things would have gone had Germany tried a modification of the Schlieffen Plan by reinforcing Army Group South with Army Group Centre and carrying out a sickle cut following Army Group South's planned route with AGC driving up towards Moscow from around Kiev or Kharkov as it seems to me that this would have been far better ground for German operations.

(Basically an inverse of the Lotzen decision with Guderian driving North from Kiev to cut off Moscow instead of South to Kiev).

I don't think that would be a realistic option, for various reasons. For one, it would necessitate a lot of troop and logistical movements to have the forces in the correct places. It's one thing moving 2 Panzer Korps south but the best part of an Army Group? Also, Guderian historically drove northeast from Kiev anyway to link up with the rest of his Army. The city of Tula, which is south of Moscow, was the limit of Guderian's advance on Moscow. In your scenario he would have to drive east and then north, putting even more wear and tear on his forces.

Secondly, it would probably mean crossing the River Don as the country between Voronezh and Tula is quite hilly in places and not suitable for armour. You are basically forced down the corridor past Kharkov as it's open country and great for motorised forces. In order to drive north you need to first cross the Don north of Stalingrad which is a long damn way from Kiev. Then you have a very long drive north to reach Moscow. The only way you could do it would be as part of a 2 season campaign as the distance is too far to do it in one season. Indeed, this is exactly what was supposed to happen in 1942; the Germans would capture Stalingrad and drive north to Moscow.

Originally Posted by Doppleganger

I don't think that would be a realistic option, for various reasons. For one, it would necessitate a lot of troop and logistical movements to have the forces in the correct places. It's one thing moving 2 Panzer Korps south but the best part of an Army Group? Also, Guderian historically drove northeast from Kiev anyway to link up with the rest of his Army. The city of Tula, which is south of Moscow, was the limit of Guderian's advance on Moscow. In your scenario he would have to drive east and then north, putting even more wear and tear on his forces.

Secondly, it would probably mean crossing the River Don as the country between Voronezh and Tula is quite hilly in places and not suitable for armour. You are basically forced down the corridor past Kharkov as it's open country and great for motorised forces. In order to drive north you need to first cross the Don north of Stalingrad which is a long damn way from Kiev. Then you have a very long drive north to reach Moscow. The only way you could do it would be as part of a 2 season campaign as the distance is too far to do it in one season. Indeed, this is exactly what was supposed to happen in 1942; the Germans would capture Stalingrad and drive north to Moscow.

You are right I was thinking of a north easterly drive from the Kursk area and using the Donets and Don as a defensive line occupied by AG-South as AG-Centre headed North.

Essentially it would have been a giant hook through Western Russia with AG-North hopefully achieving close to its historical gains.

However I accept I know nothing of the terrain in the region and had assumed that the area was more suited to armoured warfare than the marshes of the north.