Team Infidel
Forum Spin Doctor
Washington Post
January 7, 2008
Pg. 15
Fine Print
By Walter Pincus
In 1996, the Marine Corps Combat Development Command determined that its expeditionary forces needed an agile and mobile weapon to fire over the enemy's front lines, a concept quickly dubbed Dragon Fire.
More than 11 years later, full production of the system that officials chose still has not been approved and the decision has been delayed yet again, until spring. In the intervening years, its cost has risen modestly but could increase much more.
The tale of the project, officially named the Expeditionary Fire Support System (EFSS), provides a short course on how new and costly weapons systems evolve. Its journey through the bureaucracy is described in a Dec. 21, 2007, Government Accountability Office report prepared for Sen. Carl M. Levin (D-Mich.), chairman of the Armed Services Committee.
In 1999, the Marines conceived of the EFSS as one vehicle towing a 120mm mortar and another towing an ammunition trailer. Both would be transportable aboard the CH53E helicopter, as well as the V-22 Osprey vertical lift aircraft, which itself was being developed.
The idea was that with its four- to 12-mile range, the 120mm mortar would give a mobile Marine expeditionary force the ability to fly deep into enemy territory and carry on fighting without long-range artillery support.
After years of study and design competitions, the Marine Corps Systems Command authorized a plan in 2003 to acquire test models of the EFSS. The Pentagon sought contactors who could provide a single vehicle capable of towing the mortar or its ammunition carrier and fitting inside the CH53E or the Osprey.
In 2004, the Marines approved initial cost and schedule estimates -- roughly $670 million for the system and a 2006 operational capability -- and a $12 million initial contract for test models was signed with the competition winner, General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems.
Delays and cost increases began shortly thereafter, according to the GAO. Delays occurred because "the Marine Corps was optimistic in its belief that using commercial off-the-shelf systems with some modifications could provide a solution to meet the need for an internally transportable system."
Marine Corps officials had asked for a quick production schedule because they wanted the EFSS ready for deployment with the first Marine Expeditionary Unit that got the Osprey. But the Osprey itself ran behind schedule.
Design changes required to fit the vehicle inside the Osprey at the correct weight took place at the same time the first models were being delivered to the Marines. The additional developmental work required the Marines to take more risk and change from a fixed-price contract to one that promised reimbursement of the contractor's costs, the GAO said.
In addition, what the GAO called "noncritical" changes in requirements were made. They included reducing the trailers' basic ammunition load from the original 50 to 100 rounds to 34 rounds. The Marines told the GAO that the initial load was "a concept," not a "requirement." Another costly change was raising the vehicle's on-road speed to 35 miles per hour.
In 2007, the EFSS received flight certification for both aircraft, and by July operational testing was completed. Although the system met its key performance parameters and 13 of 14 critical requirements, it also "experienced several safety, performance and reliability problems during testing," the GAO reported.
The GAO noted that after the contract was awarded, the Marines reduced the required sustained rate of fire "from four rounds per minute to two rounds per minute." The Marine program office said that change was due "to a typographical error found in the requirements documentation," according to the GAO. But during testing, "it did not meet the critical requirement related to maximum rate of fire," the GAO added.
The GAO also noted that EFSS vehicles carried all required equipment, "but not securely." Three incidents occurred during testing that involved potential risk of injury to a crew member riding in the rear seat of the ammunition trailer, the GAO said. The vehicle's cooling system did not work well and no extreme cold weather testing was conducted.
As a result of the deficiencies, the director of the Marine Corps Operational Test and Examination Activity termed the EFSS "a 'niche' capability." He recommended that the deficiencies be addressed and more testing be done before deploying the system.
The initial cost of the EFSS has so far increased just $15.5 million, to $691.2 million in 2007. But as the GAO noted, the final costs are not in. Under the current contract, the government is at risk because there is little incentive for the "contractor to control costs until the terms of the work are finalized," according to the GAO.
The cost of 20 years of ammunition is projected at more than $501.7 million, making the EFSS a program costing more than $1 billion.
The need for further testing will delay initial operational deployment to spring, according to the GAO. If all goes well, the EFSS will still be deployed with the first Marine Expeditionary Unit to have the Osprey, because initial deployment of the aircraft "is currently projected to take place in the fall of 2008," according to the GAO.
National security and intelligence reporter Walter Pincus pores over the speeches, reports, transcripts and other documents that flood Washington and every week uncovers the fine print that rarely makes headlines -- but should.
January 7, 2008
Pg. 15
Fine Print
By Walter Pincus
In 1996, the Marine Corps Combat Development Command determined that its expeditionary forces needed an agile and mobile weapon to fire over the enemy's front lines, a concept quickly dubbed Dragon Fire.
More than 11 years later, full production of the system that officials chose still has not been approved and the decision has been delayed yet again, until spring. In the intervening years, its cost has risen modestly but could increase much more.
The tale of the project, officially named the Expeditionary Fire Support System (EFSS), provides a short course on how new and costly weapons systems evolve. Its journey through the bureaucracy is described in a Dec. 21, 2007, Government Accountability Office report prepared for Sen. Carl M. Levin (D-Mich.), chairman of the Armed Services Committee.
In 1999, the Marines conceived of the EFSS as one vehicle towing a 120mm mortar and another towing an ammunition trailer. Both would be transportable aboard the CH53E helicopter, as well as the V-22 Osprey vertical lift aircraft, which itself was being developed.
The idea was that with its four- to 12-mile range, the 120mm mortar would give a mobile Marine expeditionary force the ability to fly deep into enemy territory and carry on fighting without long-range artillery support.
After years of study and design competitions, the Marine Corps Systems Command authorized a plan in 2003 to acquire test models of the EFSS. The Pentagon sought contactors who could provide a single vehicle capable of towing the mortar or its ammunition carrier and fitting inside the CH53E or the Osprey.
In 2004, the Marines approved initial cost and schedule estimates -- roughly $670 million for the system and a 2006 operational capability -- and a $12 million initial contract for test models was signed with the competition winner, General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems.
Delays and cost increases began shortly thereafter, according to the GAO. Delays occurred because "the Marine Corps was optimistic in its belief that using commercial off-the-shelf systems with some modifications could provide a solution to meet the need for an internally transportable system."
Marine Corps officials had asked for a quick production schedule because they wanted the EFSS ready for deployment with the first Marine Expeditionary Unit that got the Osprey. But the Osprey itself ran behind schedule.
Design changes required to fit the vehicle inside the Osprey at the correct weight took place at the same time the first models were being delivered to the Marines. The additional developmental work required the Marines to take more risk and change from a fixed-price contract to one that promised reimbursement of the contractor's costs, the GAO said.
In addition, what the GAO called "noncritical" changes in requirements were made. They included reducing the trailers' basic ammunition load from the original 50 to 100 rounds to 34 rounds. The Marines told the GAO that the initial load was "a concept," not a "requirement." Another costly change was raising the vehicle's on-road speed to 35 miles per hour.
In 2007, the EFSS received flight certification for both aircraft, and by July operational testing was completed. Although the system met its key performance parameters and 13 of 14 critical requirements, it also "experienced several safety, performance and reliability problems during testing," the GAO reported.
The GAO noted that after the contract was awarded, the Marines reduced the required sustained rate of fire "from four rounds per minute to two rounds per minute." The Marine program office said that change was due "to a typographical error found in the requirements documentation," according to the GAO. But during testing, "it did not meet the critical requirement related to maximum rate of fire," the GAO added.
The GAO also noted that EFSS vehicles carried all required equipment, "but not securely." Three incidents occurred during testing that involved potential risk of injury to a crew member riding in the rear seat of the ammunition trailer, the GAO said. The vehicle's cooling system did not work well and no extreme cold weather testing was conducted.
As a result of the deficiencies, the director of the Marine Corps Operational Test and Examination Activity termed the EFSS "a 'niche' capability." He recommended that the deficiencies be addressed and more testing be done before deploying the system.
The initial cost of the EFSS has so far increased just $15.5 million, to $691.2 million in 2007. But as the GAO noted, the final costs are not in. Under the current contract, the government is at risk because there is little incentive for the "contractor to control costs until the terms of the work are finalized," according to the GAO.
The cost of 20 years of ammunition is projected at more than $501.7 million, making the EFSS a program costing more than $1 billion.
The need for further testing will delay initial operational deployment to spring, according to the GAO. If all goes well, the EFSS will still be deployed with the first Marine Expeditionary Unit to have the Osprey, because initial deployment of the aircraft "is currently projected to take place in the fall of 2008," according to the GAO.
National security and intelligence reporter Walter Pincus pores over the speeches, reports, transcripts and other documents that flood Washington and every week uncovers the fine print that rarely makes headlines -- but should.