Originally Posted by I3BrigPvSk

I throw in another question and see if we can get a discussion going here. It has little to do with Kursk, but I use this thread.

The Germans developed a new military doctrine prior the outbreak of the war. It worked rather well for them when they conquered most of Europe. Was it Hitler's fault when the doctrine didn't work well when the Germans were defensive?

Are you sure it didn't work well?

I accept that the "Stand fast" approach he pushed probably hastened their demise (with the exception of Stalingrad where it was the only option) but the German Army on defence was very effective.

They were excellent at throwing tother scratch formations to blunt attacks and shore up defences and their ability to move formations from one front to another under the conditions they did it was outstanding.

In the end, it was numbers that defeated them not quality.

Originally Posted by MontyB

Are you sure it didn't work well?

I accept that the "Stand fast" approach he pushed probably hastened their demise (with the exception of Stalingrad where it was the only option) but the German Army on defence was very effective.

They were excellent at throwing tother scratch formations to blunt attacks and shore up defences and their ability to move formations from one front to another under the conditions they did it was outstanding.

In the end, it was numbers that defeated them not quality.

Yes, the Germans decided to make towns and cities into fortresses. It didn't work well during the medieval wars such as the crusades in the Middle East and the Albigensian Crusade in Southern France. It continued with the 100 years war, the 30 years war, the First World War. and those who stayed in the fortress were losing most of the time. The Germans faced some fortresses during the Second World War and they captured them faster than expected.

Originally Posted by MontyB

Are you sure it didn't work well?

I accept that the "Stand fast" approach he pushed probably hastened their demise (with the exception of Stalingrad where it was the only option) but the German Army on defence was very effective.

They were excellent at throwing tother scratch formations to blunt attacks and shore up defences and their ability to move formations from one front to another under the conditions they did it was outstanding.

In the end, it was numbers that defeated them not quality.

I agree with this. I'd like to add that Hitler's order(s) to stand fast after Kurst were absolutely ludicrous. They took away from the Oster the main advantage they had when defending. That is the "mobile defense" and the leaders (such as Manstein, Guderiun, etc.) ability to adapt-react to the situation as needed. Rather than their standing in place and take the brunt of overwhelming odds. Which resulted in enormous losses for Germany.

The results of Manstein's strategy was the Soviets at the border of Romania : after Kursk, Germany had no longer the means for a mobile defense, and it is more than doubtful if they ever had these means as it is for the claim that mobile defense was the indicated strategy for Germany in the east or elsewhere .

Originally Posted by lljadw

The results of Manstein's strategy was the Soviets at the border of Romania : after Kursk, Germany had no longer the means for a mobile defense, and it is more than doubtful if they ever had these means as it is for the claim that mobile defense was the indicated strategy for Germany in the east or elsewhere .

Whatever, to each there own

Originally Posted by lljadw

The results of Manstein's strategy was the Soviets at the border of Romania : after Kursk, Germany had no longer the means for a mobile defense, and it is more than doubtful if they ever had these means as it is for the claim that mobile defense was the indicated strategy for Germany in the east or elsewhere .

While this is partially true it is still the view of many that had Germany instituted a mobile defence or probably more accurately an elastic defence it could have prolonged the war enough to drain the Russian reserve pool and level the playing field.

Whether it could have been done before the Russians reached Berlin it is impossible say but it was the only real option they had to stave off defeat in the East and I doubt whether it would have worked in the West.

In my opinion the only thing that could have prevented Germanys defeat on all fronts was to maintain air superiority and by 1942-3 the Luftwaffe was not capable of doing that.

Originally Posted by MontyB

While this is partially true it is still the view of many that had Germany instituted a mobile defence or probably more accurately an elastic defence it could have prolonged the war enough to drain the Russian reserve pool and level the playing field.

Whether it could have been done before the Russians reached Berlin it is impossible say but it was the only real option they had to stave off defeat in the East and I doubt whether it would have worked in the West.

In my opinion the only thing that could have prevented Germanys defeat on all fronts was to maintain air superiority and by 1942-3 the Luftwaffe was not capable of doing that.

Hitler’s so called spur ofthe moment “fortresses” when Germany was on the defensive “i.e.: Korsun”pocket was a ludicrous strategy. It shortened the war. Note: similar defeats occurredon the western when Hitler refused to allow retreats in the face of complete encircledand near total destruction, i.e.:.: Falaise Pocket. The Wehrmacht suffered enormouslosses that could have been avoided. A strengthof the German field commander from general down to NCO was to use maneuverabilityand mobility strategies in defense against larger forces. Instead they had tousually stay put or die. This handed the advantage over to the Soviets. Whichallowed them to concentrate enormous numbers against German fixed positions.
With the combined forces of the allies it was a matter oftime before German’s defeat. However Hitler’s WW1 thinking – fixed mind set hastenedGermany’s defeat.


The loss of the air war for Germany was a major contributor intheir defeat. It resulted in subjecting the Wehrmacht to unrelenting ground attractaircraft and impacted German war production.