ScarabVenom
Active member
OK, no problem.
Crisis: The Anatomy of Two Major Foreign Policy Crises - Henry Kissinger
p330 - 331
"Simultaneously, there was a message from Hafiz Ismail claiming that Israel had broken the new cease-fire. Sadat followed with a message to Nixon demanding his intercession. In the middle of the afternoon, Sadat, in a message to Nixon, put forward a proposal bound to lead to decisions of grave consequence: the immediate dispatch of American observers or troops for the implementation of the Security Counsel cease-fire resolution on the Egyptian side. What was new was that I had feared throughout the crisies. Sadat told us that he was "formally" issuing the same request to the Soviets. Shortly after Sadat's private message, I learned through a news bulletin that Cairo had announced publicly that it was calling for a Security Counsil meeting to ask that American and Soviet "forces" be sent to the Middle East. The makings of a major crisis were emerging."
p349
"...the omnious implication was that the aircraft were being assembled to carry some of the airborne divisions whose increased alert status had also been noted. East German forces were also at increased readiness. The number of Soviet ships in the Mediterranean had grown to eighty-five - an all time high. (It later reached more than one hundred.) We discovered the next day that a Soviet flotilla of twelve ships, including two amphibious vessels, was heading for Alexandria."
p393 - 394
"Ambassaor Dinitz - Kissinger - Friday , october 26, 1973 10:58 PM
K: Let me give you the President's reaction in seperate parts. First he wanted me to make it absolutely clear that we cannot permit the destruction of the Egyptian army under conditions achieved after a cease-fire was reached in part by negotiations in which we participated...."
In confidence: Moscow's ambassador to America's six Cold War presidents (1962-1986) - Anatoliy Fedorovich Dobrynin
p294
"...When Brezhnev called our chief military representative in Cairo, he replied that there was no immediate threat to Cairo but said that "Sadat completely lost his head" when he learned that several Israeli tanks had crossed the Suez Canal and were heading toward Cairo...
Okay, your first quote....it just proved what I was trying to say...that Egypt asked for a joint Soviet-American force to push Israel back to the 22nd of October lines.
The second one, that's when the Soviets increased readiness and America had to arm their nukes and switched to DefCon III. But, neither the Soviets nor the Americans involved, it's mostly a part of the political war not the military one.
The third one, that's not really about something in the battlefield that was again a part of the political war or Cold War. I don't re-call any Soviets or Americans coming to "save" or "not permit" the destruction of the Egyptian army.
The fourth one, I don't know what are you trying to prove with this. That Sadat lost his head? Of course he did, he's about to get his army surrounded and cut off from Cairo. And that's what happened and I don't deny this. The only interesting part in this one is the last sentence "were heading to Cairo" Israel was going for Suez and Ismailia not Cairo. But again, Cairo wasn't at risk during the war and the Israelis as far as I know didn't attempt to attack Cairo because of their military situation that I've described to you before.