Team Infidel
Forum Spin Doctor
Washington Post
December 8, 2006
Pg. 31
Panel Faults Quality of Information on Insurgency, Militias
By Walter Pincus, Washington Post Staff Writer
The U.S. intelligence community has failed to provide policymakers with a clear understanding of the Iraq insurgency, the role of militias or the level of violence in that country, according to the Iraq Study Group.
"Clearly U.S. intelligence agencies can and must do better," the group's report said, though it praises the gathering of day-to-day intelligence about enemy targets and notes that the gathering of information from human sources has improved.
"The quality of the intelligence has to be disappointing with regard to the insurgency," former representative Lee H. Hamilton (D-Ind.), co-chairman of the group, told reporters yesterday. "We are having a huge time, still, identifying the enemy."
The group singled out the lack of analysts experienced in insurgency with needed language skills, such as Arabic, as well as familiarity with Iraqi culture.
As an example, the report says the panel was told that fewer than 10 Defense Intelligence Agency analysts have more than two years' experience analyzing insurgencies, and that the rotation system of the military prevents development of experts. A DIA spokesman said yesterday that about 100 experienced analysts in Iraq and Washington work these issues. He questioned how the study group arrived at its conclusions.
The report also says the intelligence community's knowledge of militias, their leadership, financing and relationship to the government "falls far short of what policymakers need to know." U.S. military sources in Baghdad have identified at least 21 separate militias in that city alone.
The panel's report points out that the Mahdi Army, the militia of Moqtada al-Sadr, may get its support indirectly from the Iraqi government because some members are paid as guards in the Facilities Protection Service, which is on duty at the three Iraq ministries controlled by Sadr's political party.
Another issue raised in the report is why, after $2 billion has been appropriated this year to protect forces in Iraq, more is not being done to try "to understand the people who fabricate, plant and explode" roadside bombs, which are major killers of U.S. troops.
The group recommends that the director of national intelligence and the defense secretary put greater resources and analysts into understanding the sources of sectarian violence.
It also complains that databases underreport violence in Iraq, particularly when no U.S. personnel are involved. "A roadside bomb or a rocket or mortar attack that doesn't hurt U.S. doesn't count," the report says. It cites a day in July 2006 when 93 attacks were reported, yet a careful review showed that 1,100 acts of violence took place. Hamilton told reporters: "We certainly believe it has been grossly underreported. Why that is we don't really know."
The report recommends that the intelligence director and DIA change the collection of data "to provide a more accurate picture of events on the ground."
The CIA should also increase its personnel for training Iraqis and establish a counterterrorism intelligence center in Iraq that would coordinate all information and "facilitate intelligence-led police and military actions" against terrorist networks, the panel says.
Rep. Silvestre Reyes (D-Tex.), incoming chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, said the report's findings are "troubling." He added that his first hearings will be "examining the state of intelligence support to our troops deployed in Iraq."
Staff writer Michael Abramowitz contributed to this report.
December 8, 2006
Pg. 31
Panel Faults Quality of Information on Insurgency, Militias
By Walter Pincus, Washington Post Staff Writer
The U.S. intelligence community has failed to provide policymakers with a clear understanding of the Iraq insurgency, the role of militias or the level of violence in that country, according to the Iraq Study Group.
"Clearly U.S. intelligence agencies can and must do better," the group's report said, though it praises the gathering of day-to-day intelligence about enemy targets and notes that the gathering of information from human sources has improved.
"The quality of the intelligence has to be disappointing with regard to the insurgency," former representative Lee H. Hamilton (D-Ind.), co-chairman of the group, told reporters yesterday. "We are having a huge time, still, identifying the enemy."
The group singled out the lack of analysts experienced in insurgency with needed language skills, such as Arabic, as well as familiarity with Iraqi culture.
As an example, the report says the panel was told that fewer than 10 Defense Intelligence Agency analysts have more than two years' experience analyzing insurgencies, and that the rotation system of the military prevents development of experts. A DIA spokesman said yesterday that about 100 experienced analysts in Iraq and Washington work these issues. He questioned how the study group arrived at its conclusions.
The report also says the intelligence community's knowledge of militias, their leadership, financing and relationship to the government "falls far short of what policymakers need to know." U.S. military sources in Baghdad have identified at least 21 separate militias in that city alone.
The panel's report points out that the Mahdi Army, the militia of Moqtada al-Sadr, may get its support indirectly from the Iraqi government because some members are paid as guards in the Facilities Protection Service, which is on duty at the three Iraq ministries controlled by Sadr's political party.
Another issue raised in the report is why, after $2 billion has been appropriated this year to protect forces in Iraq, more is not being done to try "to understand the people who fabricate, plant and explode" roadside bombs, which are major killers of U.S. troops.
The group recommends that the director of national intelligence and the defense secretary put greater resources and analysts into understanding the sources of sectarian violence.
It also complains that databases underreport violence in Iraq, particularly when no U.S. personnel are involved. "A roadside bomb or a rocket or mortar attack that doesn't hurt U.S. doesn't count," the report says. It cites a day in July 2006 when 93 attacks were reported, yet a careful review showed that 1,100 acts of violence took place. Hamilton told reporters: "We certainly believe it has been grossly underreported. Why that is we don't really know."
The report recommends that the intelligence director and DIA change the collection of data "to provide a more accurate picture of events on the ground."
The CIA should also increase its personnel for training Iraqis and establish a counterterrorism intelligence center in Iraq that would coordinate all information and "facilitate intelligence-led police and military actions" against terrorist networks, the panel says.
Rep. Silvestre Reyes (D-Tex.), incoming chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, said the report's findings are "troubling." He added that his first hearings will be "examining the state of intelligence support to our troops deployed in Iraq."
Staff writer Michael Abramowitz contributed to this report.