India begins construction of aircraft carrier - Page 2




 
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April 14th, 2005  
Xion
 
behemoth did you read what rajkhalsa wrote?



Quote:
Originally Posted by rajkhalsa

How about the Indian ocean?

90% of India's energy imports and nearly all its foreign trade goes through the Indian ocean, not to mention the almost 10,000 islands that make up India's territory.

Rather than repeat, I'll just cross-post from another post I previously made on the subject: regarding the role of the IN


Cheers,
Raj

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Pecently, the IN had unveiled its new doctrine. It reflects and reacts to the new world situation and the growing importance of Asia in oil politics.

With exception of the USN, India is the dominant force in the Indian ocean region. Along with its navy, the magnitude of the shore-based IAF and missile forces can virtually deny the region to any surface force from the Malaccas to the Persian gulf. Even a hypothetical USN carrier force would not lightly tangle with this in conventional terms.

From what reseach I have done, I see the IN's role as basically three-fold -- wherein the IN must be capable of fulfilling each of these roles at the same time without compromizing on any of the other of them, viz.:
(1). A guaranteer of Indian strategic interests
(2). An independantly operateable (from the mainland, that is) instrument of localized force projection anywhere in the IOR
(3). And a policeman of free-lanes shipping in the busiest sea lanes in the world.

With regards to the first, India is heavily dependant on foreign oil for its needs. As the Indian economy continues to boom, oil requirements grow exponentially. India's relationship with Iran, UAE, Oman and even speculations in the N. African desert require adaquate security of tankers transiting from the Gulf to India's west coast. It is necessary that IN must be overwhelmingly capable of providing this security, as the Indian economy is dependant on this influx.

Even with pipeline politics and talks of pipelines from through Pakistan from Iran and the CAR, India's strategic supply of petrolium reserves is two weeks --about the time it would take to conduct any war against Pakistan or China. Those two weeks, would see whatever land-based oil lines in Pakistan obviously destroyed. India would then be forced to import its entire petrolium resources through sea-lanes, and the Indian Navy must be in a position, post-war, to protect India's shipping from any threat.

India's strategic requirements don't have to deal with India alone. China, Japan, Korea and even ASEAN members get their oil from the same place, and are even more heavily dependant on the Mid East. The vast majority (we're talking 95+%) of their oil is shipped through the IO and up the S. China sea. The very jugular vein of these countries flows right under India, and unlike India, they are in no position to do anything about it. This is a tremendous --and completely overlooked-- strategic advantage India holds over these nations.

Obviously, the only potential enemy India has with these nations is China, whose energy need requirements are in an even more critical position than India. Its pipeline projects basically all are based out of Pakistan. Even with these, the vast majority of its oil will continue to be shipped from the ME. And even the Pakistan-pipelines require shipping oil/lng from there to Pakistan in any case. The pipelines can easily be neutralized by IAF/IA. IN's role is to deny the Chinese navy access to the region, and interdict its shipping by IN's overwhelming regionalized superiority.

Any PLAN (or other navy's for that matter) increase in procurment/deployment to the IOR will be matched by IN force increase/deployments, so this superiority remains. The likely aquisition of Tu-22M3s from Russia in the next year or so will act as a strategic, long-range standoff platform with which, for example, massive E. Asian fleet entering the IOR will be hard-pressed to counter (especially given the geography of the Indonesian, etc. archipelagoes)

With regard to the second point, force-projection, what the Tsunami disaster basically displayed to the surprised world the speed, size and effectiveness of IN's deployability to troublespots in the region. India, being that its a regional superpower strategically unconstrained in its natural sphere of influence --(unlike, for example, China which is contained by strong and hostile littoral nations like Japan, Korea, Taiwan, which as well have US backing)-- has a vested interest in the surrounding states and has the ability to intervene, humanitarianly or otherwise, as was displayed with the Indian Peacekeeping Force in SL and the put-down of the invasion of the Maldives in the 80s, and by the Tsunami deployments now.

Pakistan presents no naval threat to the IN, and land-based resources are itself able to neutralize them. IN will have a supporting role (as 1971 war showed) but these will be limited to speedy missile boats and patroling vessels. The meat of IN deployment -- and where IN's capital deployments will be against Pakistan -- is that of blockade of its shoreline. India's mobilization following the Pakistani-backed terrorist attack on India's Parliament showed that this can easily be done.

Another goal of this is the ability to land troops in nearby trouble spots. The intital landings of IPKF in SL was done mostly by air, and then only after ports were secured. While IAF is going hellstrong on strategic transport capability (that itself another topic), IN is concentrating on having the ability to conduct forced landings in hostile territory. Potenial targets: Pakistan (unlike in the previous wars, Indian conventional superiority now allows India to not only fight on the border, but literally to establish a beach head in Balochistan directly to create another front bypassing traditional defended borders, and supply this front quite at want); Sri Lanka (intervening in the civil war); or Burma (any full-scale India-China war will have the PLA streaming through the Burmese jungles around the Himalay.

The fact that India has started the increase of the Marine Commando Force to regimental-plus size is telling.

The third, policing the seas is the most benign, and where there is considerable convergence with US and allies (UK, Japan, ASEAN) interest. It is in India's greatest interest that freedom of the seas is maintained around her. Piracy remains a very bad problem in SE Asia, where the hundreds of thousands of islands make for policing difficult. There is also a growing problem around Bengal and Lanka of piracy.

There is also a military reason. The rapidly growing India-US friendship has been most materially evidently shown --despite it being perhaps the most low-key-- by IN ships routinely escorting USN ships in the IOR. This was especially during the afghanistan invasion, where USN capital ships were otherwise committed.

Also India's benign foreign policy all these years have caused the ASEAN nations to rapidly turning to India as a counterbalance against China, which is seen as hostile, and even to balance America/Australia. IN escorts Singaporean, Thai, Indonesian, Cambodian and Vietnamese commercial and naval ships, as well as Japan, Australian and Korean ships transiting the sealanes there. There is joint patrolling with USN in the area already, and I've heard that Japan is invited, but I think recent developments wrt China would make them shy to stray far from home. Also, because India is a neutral country, Thailand and Indonesia requested India patrol the seaways around their country so America won't have to.

Another (main?) reason behind India's willingness to have a continuous presence in the area is to deter the PLAN from even entering the IOR through sustained forward IN deployments in and monitoring of the region.

I don't think many people really grasp how far the IN has come in recent years. From being a gorified brown-water navy through the 80s, to the 15-year plan from 2002 that will see in little over a decade -- that is, 2017 -- India having 3 carrier battle-group fleets and a fourth around a cruiser comprising upwards of 150 ships and 40 submarines, 30 MR aircraft and helicopters, 60 ASW helicopters and planes, an coast guard tripled in size, induction if indigenous nuclear submarines, and an double increase in IAF size and potency, with many more modern planes capable of long-distance ASh roles (including by that time at least sqn strength Backfires, and 4 sqn MKIs which also have standoff long-range nuclear/missile capabilites.)

What's also significant is that as IN's strength increases, it will see greater cooperation and inter-operability with USN and allied navies, especially in the Gulf and SE Asia.

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Regards,
Raj
April 16th, 2005  
EagleZtrike
 
 
You guys should make a halfpipe on it too and maybe a rail so the planes can grind.

Quote:
behemoth did you read what rajkhalsa wrote?
That's way too long
April 16th, 2005  
behemoth79
 
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by Xion
behemoth did you read what rajkhalsa wrote?



Quote:
Originally Posted by rajkhalsa



Pakistan presents no naval threat to the IN, and land-based resources are itself able to neutralize them. IN will have a supporting role (as 1971 war showed) but these will be limited to speedy missile boats and patroling vessels. The meat of IN deployment -- and where IN's capital deployments will be against Pakistan -- is that of blockade of its shoreline. India's mobilization following the Pakistani-backed terrorist attack on India's Parliament showed that this can easily be done.
With the religious tensions between India and Pakistan, i have always believed, along with many historians, that the most likely place for the next nuclear attack would be between India and Pakistan. That is why i said a missle defense system would be better. besides an aircraft carrier is used to attack targets which cannot be reached from current airbases. What target would India attack that it cannot reach from its current airbases?
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