Team Infidel
Forum Spin Doctor
Wall Street Journal
November 29, 2008
Pg. 12
The Nov. 24 commentary by Brian Kennedy, "What a Single Nuclear Warhead Could Do," makes a strong case for continuing support for ballistic missile defense (BMD) programs. Mr. Kennedy concluded with the statement, "It is of the highest priority to have a president and policy makers not merely acknowledge the problem, but also make comprehensive missile defense a reality as soon as possible."
This sound advice is clearly aimed at the Obama administration, but it misses a basic initial requirement -- to first determine the effectiveness of the ground-based system we have. The components of a missile defense system have been proven to work individually. The local area defense systems Patriot PAC 3, and the Naval Aegis have both been successfully tested as full systems. The same cannot be claimed for the ground based BMD that is deployed in Alaska and Vandenberg AFB, and is planned for deployment in Eastern Europe.
Following the political decision to deploy a capability in Alaska in 2004, there has been a reluctance to subject it to demanding tests. Instead, the system tests have been designed to ensure success rather than stress the system. It is noteworthy that it has not yet been declared operational.
While it might not be considered unusual for such a complex system to still be under the control of a contractor rather than the military, after four years in the field what is unusual is that no intercept test firings have been conducted for almost two years. One test is planned in the near term, but this cannot make up for the lack of serious testing over such a long period. Until the current capabilities have been identified, it is difficult to make balanced improvements.
These comments do not come from opponents of BMD. The plea for more realistic testing comes from strong supporters of missile defense who have been engaged in the ballistic missile/antiballistic missile activity for a long time.
The technical case for space-based interceptors is overwhelming, but it has to be acknowledged that the concept is too hot politically to be pursed at this stage. The best that can be expected in the near term is to ensure we prove to ourselves and to potential adversaries that we have a capability to intercept a limited attack.
We remain strongly supportive of the activity to enhance the BMD capabilities and to deploy such systems overseas. We strongly urge the new administration to ensure we have a technologically proven BMD rather than a politically driven one.
Stanley Orman, Rockville, Md. and Eugene Fox, Plano, Texas
(Maj. Gen. Fox, U.S. Army, ret., was a deputy director of SDIO; Dr. Orman was founding director general of the UK SDI Participation Office.)
November 29, 2008
Pg. 12
The Nov. 24 commentary by Brian Kennedy, "What a Single Nuclear Warhead Could Do," makes a strong case for continuing support for ballistic missile defense (BMD) programs. Mr. Kennedy concluded with the statement, "It is of the highest priority to have a president and policy makers not merely acknowledge the problem, but also make comprehensive missile defense a reality as soon as possible."
This sound advice is clearly aimed at the Obama administration, but it misses a basic initial requirement -- to first determine the effectiveness of the ground-based system we have. The components of a missile defense system have been proven to work individually. The local area defense systems Patriot PAC 3, and the Naval Aegis have both been successfully tested as full systems. The same cannot be claimed for the ground based BMD that is deployed in Alaska and Vandenberg AFB, and is planned for deployment in Eastern Europe.
Following the political decision to deploy a capability in Alaska in 2004, there has been a reluctance to subject it to demanding tests. Instead, the system tests have been designed to ensure success rather than stress the system. It is noteworthy that it has not yet been declared operational.
While it might not be considered unusual for such a complex system to still be under the control of a contractor rather than the military, after four years in the field what is unusual is that no intercept test firings have been conducted for almost two years. One test is planned in the near term, but this cannot make up for the lack of serious testing over such a long period. Until the current capabilities have been identified, it is difficult to make balanced improvements.
These comments do not come from opponents of BMD. The plea for more realistic testing comes from strong supporters of missile defense who have been engaged in the ballistic missile/antiballistic missile activity for a long time.
The technical case for space-based interceptors is overwhelming, but it has to be acknowledged that the concept is too hot politically to be pursed at this stage. The best that can be expected in the near term is to ensure we prove to ourselves and to potential adversaries that we have a capability to intercept a limited attack.
We remain strongly supportive of the activity to enhance the BMD capabilities and to deploy such systems overseas. We strongly urge the new administration to ensure we have a technologically proven BMD rather than a politically driven one.
Stanley Orman, Rockville, Md. and Eugene Fox, Plano, Texas
(Maj. Gen. Fox, U.S. Army, ret., was a deputy director of SDIO; Dr. Orman was founding director general of the UK SDI Participation Office.)