How to beat the Taliban in Afghanistan / Pakistan (and win the war on terror) - Page 5




 
--
Boots
 
March 11th, 2013  
Capt Frogman
 
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by Peter Dow
Well thank you for your detailed consideration of my plans.


Main Supply Route?

It's a big country. In fact, it's more than 2400 kilometres for a network of road / rail main supply routes something like this.



Don't quibble about the exact routes there. That was knocked up in about 20 minutes.


They are armoured lookout and firing positions, not deep holes to hide away in. So I've preferred to use the words "fortified machine gun nest or pillbox". Bunker maybe sounds too defensive a term.



Most of the time, yes.

I had posted this image in post #7 to give a picture of the concept but I note that imageshack stopped serving the image so I have re-uploaded it again.



The graphic I used is of WW2 era pill-boxes. Hopefully the budget would stretch to fortifications with armoured sights, better camouflage etc.



OK well I have never served but once worked as a maths teacher so hopefully we can complement each other's skills.


Manned 24/7.


On duty at any one time for the 1120 pillboxes,.

Yes but there are 3 shifts so that's 3 times as many needed for 24/7 operation or 10080 troops for one day's operation.

In addition there would be officers and reserves to staff a 24/7 operation.



So for a 560 km route that would be 14,000 guard force including a 25% reserve or 16,800 guard force including a 50% reserve.

Then some more support forces on top.


Right.


You didn't but I just did. The figures I just quoted include the mobile reaction depots which are where the guards spend their off duty time. The mobile reaction troops are just the very same guards who are off-duty back at the depot being called back on emergency reaction duty.


The only routine patrolling is when the guards travel to their pillboxes every day going on and off duty. For additional security, the guards could have a dog as well.

The whole zone either side of the route is watched 24/7.

Setting up a secure perimeter defence either side of a route is a completely different and better plan of security compared to intermittent patrolling of a route which leaves the route unwatched some of the time which allows enemy to plant mines, set up ambushes and doesn't really do a good job of securing a route.


Oh I think the US and allies are paying for hundreds of thousands of Afghan troops on paper but whether we are paying for good troops is another question altogether.

The green troops need to be reorganised to answer to NATO, not Karzai, as I have explained in post #11.

If there's not enough capable Afghans then employ mercenaries from surrounding countries, from the neighbouring Stans and India mostly I would suggest.


It's a different mode of operation when you are operating from an armoured position that can't be suppressed and you've no real interest in suppressing a tiny sneak attack which is hoping to sneak past to plant a few mines on the road.

There you don't want to give a small enemy group of only a few Taliban notice that they have been spotted by making a lot of noise and scaring them off. You want the enemy to come right on in, thinking they are unseen, so you that you can wait until you've got a clear shot to make the kill. Here the mode of operation has something similar to a sniper's job about it.

It's different if you are facing a full-frontal assault on the pillbox by a larger force in which case then the rapid-fire mode of the machine gun can come into its own, though the radio call for support from the mobile reaction force is equally essential.


Well I think my tactics are sound.


Crying or shouting with anger is more appropriate for all the good soldiers we have lost to road side bombs and poorly secured supply routes, bad strategy and tactics and a war run by donkey generals leading our lion troops to their deaths.

This war always was, and still is, an easy win but as well as a competent defence we also need a more aggressive attack as well but you don't seem to be asking any questions about the offensive we need.
What makes you think that you, someone who's never been in Afghanistan, never fought in Afghanistan or even been in the military, has more experience than those of us who've been there and done it?

Please do enlighten me.
March 11th, 2013  
KevinTheCynic
 
 
You don't use a hacksaw when you need a scalpel.
You don't use a machinegun when you need a marksman's rifle.

A machinegun by it's very design spews hundreds of bullets a minute, the idea being to fill a given area with projectiles in a given timeframe. It is not meant to be accurate, it's meant to make that given area so damned dangerous that you will get hit at least once and often, multiple times, in a few seconds.

There's only one machinegun I've ever used (I've been lucky enough to train on six different types) that had the required stability to be used as a sniping platform and that's only because it has a pretty much unique feature that allows such things to occur. But it needs an experienced sniper to make use of it.

But again, don't use hacksaws when you need scalpels - don't use snipers to man a machinegun, let the gunners do that and let the specialized marksmen/snipers provide accurate precision fire.


As of 2012, the standing army of Afghanistan has 200,000 troops. Given that for most armies, fully two thirds will be Service troops to support the Arms, we're talking roughly 67,000 actual combat troops.
Patrolling:
The only way to prevent any enemy from seizing unoccupied ground is by permanently occupying that ground or aggressive patrolling to ensure it stays clear.

But you don't have enough Afghan troops left from the pillbox scheme to supply troops for this, one of the most fundamental tasks of any conventional army. In fact, you're in deficit to the tune of at least 30,000 more combat troops and another 60,000 Service troops to keep them supported.

There is a basic lesson to be learnt from all this: -
Amateurs talk strategy and tactics.
Professionals talk logistics.
March 11th, 2013  
brinktk
 
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by KevinTheCynic
You don't use a hacksaw when you need a scalpel.
You don't use a machinegun when you need a marksman's rifle.

A machinegun by it's very design spews hundreds of bullets a minute, the idea being to fill a given area with projectiles in a given timeframe. It is not meant to be accurate, it's meant to make that given area so damned dangerous that you will get hit at least once and often, multiple times, in a few seconds.

There's only one machinegun I've ever used (I've been lucky enough to train on six different types) that had the required stability to be used as a sniping platform and that's only because it has a pretty much unique feature that allows such things to occur. But it needs an experienced sniper to make use of it.

But again, don't use hacksaws when you need scalpels - don't use snipers to man a machinegun, let the gunners do that and let the specialized marksmen/snipers provide accurate precision fire.


As of 2012, the standing army of Afghanistan has 200,000 troops. Given that for most armies, fully two thirds will be Service troops to support the Arms, we're talking roughly 67,000 actual combat troops.
Patrolling:
The only way to prevent any enemy from seizing unoccupied ground is by permanently occupying that ground or aggressive patrolling to ensure it stays clear.

But you don't have enough Afghan troops left from the pillbox scheme to supply troops for this, one of the most fundamental tasks of any conventional army. In fact, you're in deficit to the tune of at least 30,000 more combat troops and another 60,000 Service troops to keep them supported.

There is a basic lesson to be learnt from all this: -
Amateurs talk strategy and tactics.
Professionals talk logistics.

BINGO! Especially the last part. I wouldn't bother arguing with this guy. He's clueless how ludicrous he sounds and stupidly naive and self righteous he is about his own military expertise. The bean counters tried something similar in Vietnam known as the "trace" to the grunts and as the McNamara line to the politicians...It was entirely too expensive and a total failure. Or the Maginot line in France...static defense takes away all options. He doesn't get this. You don't defeat an enemy by sitting on your hands, you do it by kicking in their doors and taking over their homes. Can't do that from a "reinforced machine gun nest". But hey, we're only the experts...what the hell do we know?
--
Boots
March 11th, 2013  
BritinAfrica
 
 
There's one in every litter.
April 1st, 2013  
Peter Dow
 
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by Capt Frogman
What makes you think that you, someone who's never been in Afghanistan, never fought in Afghanistan or even been in the military, has more experience than those of us who've been there and done it?

Please do enlighten me.
It's a different skill set to be a commander in chief. It's like the difference between a brickie and an architect.

Or in computer games terms, it is like the difference between a first person shooter and a real time strategy game.

Or in politics it's like the difference between the guy who delivers leaflets and the leader of the party.

You guys are great at the actual firing at the advancing enemy but you'd never think to stop off at the London home of one of the enemy commanders Pakistani General Musharraf and pack him off to Guantanamo. (Too late now because he has gone back to Pakistan to stand in the elections)

You put all your faith in idiot politicians to tell you who the enemy is, who is controlling and financing and supplying the Taliban. You'd simply never think of stopping pro-jihadi TV satellite broadcasts on satellites controlled by Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt. That's not what soldiers do, but it is what we need to do to win.

This war is not just a fire-fight. It's a political war as much as it is a military war and so long as we are in bed with the enemy commanders we can't win. But you guys can't see that. You trust too much in your superior officers to lead you and they trust too much in the political leadership we have, which is lame.
April 1st, 2013  
Peter Dow
 
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by KevinTheCynic
You don't use a hacksaw when you need a scalpel.
You don't use a machinegun when you need a marksman's rifle.

A machinegun by it's very design spews hundreds of bullets a minute, the idea being to fill a given area with projectiles in a given timeframe. It is not meant to be accurate, it's meant to make that given area so damned dangerous that you will get hit at least once and often, multiple times, in a few seconds.

There's only one machinegun I've ever used (I've been lucky enough to train on six different types) that had the required stability to be used as a sniping platform and that's only because it has a pretty much unique feature that allows such things to occur. But it needs an experienced sniper to make use of it.

But again, don't use hacksaws when you need scalpels - don't use snipers to man a machinegun, let the gunners do that and let the specialized marksmen/snipers provide accurate precision fire.
The M2 Machine Gun or Browning .50 Caliber Machine Gun, is a heavy machine gun ... It is the primary heavy machine gun of NATO countries, and has been used by many other countries.
...

M2 as a sniper rifle

The M2 machine gun has also been used as a long-range sniper rifle, when equipped with a telescopic sight. Soldiers during the Korean War used scoped M2s in the role of a sniper rifle, but the practice was most notably used by US Marine Corps sniper Carlos Hathcock during the Vietnam War. Using an Unertl telescopic sight and a mounting bracket of his own design, Hathcock could quickly convert the M2 into a sniper rifle, using the traversing-and-elevating (T&E) mechanism attached to the tripod and a bolt on pistol grip kit that converts the M2 to fire semi-automatically by activating the trigger on the side plate to assist in aiming at stationary targets.[citation needed] When firing semi-automatically, Hathcock hit man-size targets beyond 2000 yards—twice the range of a standard-caliber sniper rifle of the time (a .30-06 Winchester Model 70). In fact, Hathcock set the record for the longest confirmed kill at 2,460 yards or 1.3 miles (2,250 m), a record which stood until 2002.


Quote:
Originally Posted by KevinTheCynic
As of 2012, the standing army of Afghanistan has 200,000 troops. Given that for most armies, fully two thirds will be Service troops to support the Arms, we're talking roughly 67,000 actual combat troops.
Well the typical figures I have in mind as I mentioned above are

25 infantry per kilometre, 40 infantry per mile (that's for a 25% reserve)

So if I had 60,000 ...

(say we leave 7,000 actual combat troops for Karzai's national army which Afghanis pay for themselves, we don't give them a penny or cent for that force. The 60,000 would be the NATO auxiliary force comprised of mostly Afghans but could also include Indians, Pakistanis, Tajiks, Uzbeks other "stans" mercenaries who want a good salary - I have been talking about)

... 60,000 actual combat troops to deploy to secure our bases and supply routes between our bases I could defend 2400 km or 1500 miles of bases and supply routes between bases which could be arranged maybe something like this



Quote:
Originally Posted by KevinTheCynic
Patrolling:
The only way to prevent any enemy from seizing unoccupied ground is by permanently occupying that ground or aggressive patrolling to ensure it stays clear.
The rest of Afghanistan, outside our bases and secure supply routes, we use as no more than a free fire zone which we hit with air power, maybe heavy bombers, maybe drones, maybe attack helicopters, maybe on rare occasions we send in a helicopter air assault raid - we can hit any target of opportunity we see in it this outer zone but we don't bother actually trying to "occupy it" per se. It's really up to the local Afghans who want to live in that outer zone to provide us with good intelligence about the enemy if they want us to know where to hit the enemy in that zone. But otherwise, what we don't know about this outer zone won't kill us.

That outer zone of Afghanistan gets treated exactly the same as Pakistan. If we know where the enemy is concentrated in that outer zone we bomb them.

Quote:
Originally Posted by KevinTheCynic
But you don't have enough Afghan troops left from the pillbox scheme to supply troops for this,
For what? All we do with ground troops is control our bases and supply routes. Plus some air-borne troops for raids now and then. We don't need to do anything else.

Quote:
Originally Posted by KevinTheCynic
one of the most fundamental tasks of any conventional army. In fact, you're in deficit to the tune of at least 30,000 more combat troops and another 60,000 Service troops to keep them supported.
No, one of the most fundamental tasks of any conventional army is not to get sucked into a quagmire which trying to secure the mountains of Afghanistan and Pakistan most certainly is. It's bandit country and always will be. So what?

Quote:
Originally Posted by KevinTheCynic
There is a basic lesson to be learnt from all this: -
Amateurs talk strategy and tactics.
Professionals talk logistics.
Well the professionals ought to be talking about ratcheting up the military pressure on the Pakistani ISI and military hardliners (the ones supporting the Taliban and other terrorist groups) to make them look weak and ripe for arrest by the Pakistanis who are loyal to us - the politicians, police, judges, conventional military who hate the ISI for backing the Taliban and other terrorists, and who will hate the ISI 100 times more after we take control over all TV satellites beaming into Pakistan and start telling the Pakistanis the truth about the ISI enemy within.

Professional military need to take a long hard look at the military intelligence and start going on the offensive in Pakistan and stop fighting only a defensive war in Afghanistan.
April 1st, 2013  
Peter Dow
 
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by brinktk
BINGO! Especially the last part. I wouldn't bother arguing with this guy. He's clueless how ludicrous he sounds and stupidly naive and self righteous he is about his own military expertise. The bean counters tried something similar in Vietnam known as the "trace" to the grunts and as the McNamara line to the politicians...It was entirely too expensive and a total failure. Or the Maginot line in France...static defense takes away all options. He doesn't get this. You don't defeat an enemy by sitting on your hands, you do it by kicking in their doors and taking over their homes. Can't do that from a "reinforced machine gun nest". But hey, we're only the experts...what the hell do we know?
We go on the offensive in Pakistan using air power. There's no point invading with our troops near the Pakistani capital to kick in the doors of the University of Jihad, the Taliban HQ or the ISI building - that's a job for our loyalists in the Pakistani state which they might well do if the clear alternative we pose is that if they don't kick in those doors we will level those buildings using bombs, missiles etc with a PS. to stand down the Pakistani air defences while we are at it or else they will become targets too, we're not bluffing, our nukes are bigger than your nukes etc. Common sense will prevail and the ISI enemy and their proxy terrorist forces will fall. Game over, we win.
April 1st, 2013  
senojekips
 
 
Fcuk! the armchair General has returned
April 1st, 2013  
Yossarian
 
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by senojekips
Fcuk! the armchair General has returned
Quickly! Forum! Atttaaaacccckkk!
April 1st, 2013  
MontyB
 
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by Yossarian
Quickly! Forum! Atttaaaacccckkk!
Screw that I am digging a mote, buying a deck chair and warming up the popcorn maker, this could get interesting.

Just as long as the crazies stay on the other side of the mote this could be entertaining.
 


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