How to beat the Taliban in Afghanistan / Pakistan (and win the war on terror) - Page 11




 
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How to beat the Taliban in Afghanistan / Pakistan (and win the war on terror)
 
April 8th, 2013  
BritinBritain
 
 
How to beat the Taliban in Afghanistan / Pakistan (and win the war on terror)
He shouldn't be allowed to breed. His gene pool needs a crap load of chlorine.
April 8th, 2013  
Yossarian
 
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by BritinAfrica
He shouldn't be allowed to breed. His gene pool needs a crap load of chlorine.

That may have been this issue from the start.
April 8th, 2013  
VDKMS
 
Why do some of you guys attack anyone who does not agree with your opinion? On this forum he has the same rights as all of us to give his opinion and if he's wrong you just counter it with facts like brinktk did. If you can't stand him, just ignore him. But revealing an article from a newspaper that has no connection whatsoever with this thread is a blow below the belt.
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How to beat the Taliban in Afghanistan / Pakistan (and win the war on terror)
April 8th, 2013  
senojekips
 
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by VDKMS
Why do some of you guys attack anyone who does not agree with your opinion? On this forum he has the same rights as all of us to give his opinion and if he's wrong you just counter it with facts like brinktk did. If you can't stand him, just ignore him. But revealing an article from a newspaper that has no connection whatsoever with this thread is a blow below the belt.
Your whining attempt at having a "shot" at me, comes as no surprise whatsoever, I suppose it's not surprising that you would recognise a fellow certifiable idiot, who like yourself wastes people's time with drivel and, Yes, we all understand why you would like people to ignore posts like your own, allowing you to defend one of the worlds most despised and distrusted rogue states without the facts being told too.

As you say, he has the same rights as all of us to give us his opinion,... and what you say is perhaps correct, but like nearly everything else you say, you only say the part that suits you. You conveniently neglect to mention that if he wishes to have a controversial opinion or support a known rogue state, he doesn't have the "right" to air his views unopposed, or without peoples knowledge as to the fact that he is a known "whack job". After all, we all realise that you would stand up similarly for a rabid pro nazi Holocaust denier.

I never "revealed" anything that was not already revealed, you twat. The material quoted, was first published by him, on his own website, repeated by the Press and freely available on the Internet.

Like yourself, he appears to be actually proud to show off his own innate stupidity to a world wide audience, and in your case, complete lack of any moral compass whatsoever.
April 9th, 2013  
D.J
 
Peter, you are betting on a dead horse.

Static defenses are highly limited by their very nature: they don't move. Not only are they unable to dodge attacks, but they can only defend a limited location. As such, if it is possible to build a unit that is as powerful as a static defense, for the same price, that static defense is useless. If fact, immobility is such a penalty that even if the defense is half price, it still isn't worth it. Defenses can be out-ranged, swarmed, or just sit useless as the enemy attacks from a different direction. By remaining static you may soon risk the surrender of the initiative to the enemy, unless your static line is strong enough to break his back - which the Germans were not able to do in 1944. They could barely stem the tide but never break the wave.
April 9th, 2013  
Peter Dow
 
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by D.J
Peter you are betting on a dead horse

Static defenses are highly limited by their very nature: they don't move. Not only are they unable to dodge attacks, but they can only defend a limited location. As such, if it is possible to build a unit that is as powerful as a static defense, for the same price, that static defense is useless. If fact, immobility is such a penalty that even if the defense is half price, it still isn't worth it. Defenses can be out-ranged, swarmed, or just sit useless as the enemy attacks from a different direction.
2/3rds of the force are mobile, as I've repeatedly mentioned.

Only 1/3rd is static, 2/3rds are mobile.


  • Mobile reaction depot - contains single armoured fighting vehicle. This is also where the off-duty mess is so that soldiers are available to react to sustained attacks anywhere along the supply route. One every 2km. Contains additional infantry weapons and ammunition such as additional machine guns, automatic rifles, rocket propelled grenade launchers, mortars and the rest.
  • Armoured personnel carrier Such as an up-armoured humvee. Most mobile reaction depots have one of those. To transport soldiers to the proximity of the enemy attack where soldiers dismount to fight.
  • Infantry fighting vehicle or armoured combat vehicle. With stronger armour and able to fire on the enemy from enhanced weapons mounted to the vehicle, as well as able to perform the soldier transport role of the APC. Ideally the defenders would prefer the more powerful IFVs to the battle taxi APCs but fewer mobile reaction depots house IFVs because IFVs cost more and so fewer are available to the defenders than the lower performing APCs.


4. Shift officer - normally on duty back at the Mobile reaction depot and in command and in radio, mobile (cell) or land-line telephone contact with 4 teams, which is 12 men, on duty for an 8-hour shift. The shift officer acts as a deputy commander for the shift for 4 GUN - Fortified machine gun nests / pillboxes and for the Mobile Reaction Depot.

The Shift Officer is also in radio, mobile (cell) or land-line telephone contact with Shift Officers in neighbouring Mobile reaction depots. The Shift Officer decides whether or not to consult the Depot commander in response to a request for assistance from any of the 4 teams under his command or to a request for assistance from a Shift Officer in a neighbouring Mobile Reaction Depot.

5. Depot commander - in command of one Mobile reaction depot , the vehicle, weapons and everything therein. Commands the 3 Shift officers and 12 teams which totals 39 men under his command. He can declare a depot emergency, and call the off-duty shifts in the mess back on emergency duty.

The Depot Commander can order the depot's vehicle and men to attend and to defend the GUN - Fortified machine gun nests / pillboxes under attack or order mortar teams into action from the Mortar teams' ground.

In an emergency, the Depot Commander notifies his immediate superior officers, the Reaction Captains who are the reaction director and deputy reaction director assigned command responsibility for his Mobile Reaction Depot.

6. Reaction Captain
  • has some command responsibility for the reactions of 8 neighbouring Mobile Reaction Depots
  • is the reaction director for the central 4 depots of these 8 neighbouring depots
  • is the deputy reaction director for the peripheral 4 depots of these 8 neighbouring depots.


Reaction Captains direct Mobile Reaction Depots

The diagram illustrates how the command responsibility of neighbouring Reaction Captains is organised.

Mobile Reaction Depots 1 & 2
- the reaction director is Reaction Captain C
- the deputy reaction director is Reaction Captain A

Mobile Reaction Depots 3 & 4
- the reaction director is Reaction Captain A
- the deputy reaction director is Reaction Captain C

Mobile Reaction Depots 5 & 6
- the reaction director is Reaction Captain A
- the deputy reaction director is Reaction Captain D

Mobile Reaction Depots 7 & 8
- the reaction director is Reaction Captain D
- the deputy reaction director is Reaction Captain A

Mobile Reaction Depots 9 & 10
- the reaction director is Reaction Captain D
- the deputy reaction director is Reaction Captain B

Mobile Reaction Depots 11 & 12
- the reaction director is Reaction Captain B
- the deputy reaction director is Reaction Captain D

Mobile Reaction Depots 13 & 14
- the reaction director is Reaction Captain B
- the deputy reaction director is Reaction Captain E

Mobile Reaction Depots 15 & 16
- the reaction director is Reaction Captain E
- the deputy reaction director is Reaction Captain B

This overlapping organisation ensures that emergencies which are declared at any Mobile Reaction Depot can be supported if needs be by Reaction Captains with responsibility for the depot under attack ordering neighbouring depots on either side to react to the emergency.

A vehicle is assigned to each Reaction Captain who routinely drives to visit the 8 Mobile Reaction Depots for which he has command responsibility for daily meetings with the Depot Commanders and with the other 2 Reaction Captains he shares depot command responsibility with.

The Reaction Captains can arrange to receive a salute at attention from each off-duty shift twice a week with an opportunity for the Reaction Captains to boost morale by reminding the Gunners that every Reaction Captain has 8 Mobile Reaction Depots and 320 soldiers under his command and that the 2 Reaction Captains with command responsibility for a particular depot have between them 480 soldiers under their command.

So in emergencies the Secure Supply Route Protection Force is well organised to defeat any attack the enemy dares to try against any part of the supply route. They shall not pass! (No passeran!)

The Reaction Captain has a captain's office and quarters adjacent to one of the 4 Mobile Reaction Depots for which he is the reaction director and the Depot Commander of that particular Mobile Reaction Depot also serves as the Reaction Captain's secretary to take telephone calls to the Reaction Captain's Office if he is out of his office and quarters at the time.

Being so mobile in his daily routine, the Reaction Captain must be contactable via radio or mobile (cell) telephone when he is out of his office.

In the event of a major attack, the Reaction Captain will set up a tactical command headquarters at his office to direct the battle and call for further reinforcements from neighbouring Reaction Captain's offices if required.





Quote:
Originally Posted by D.J
By remaining static you may soon risk the surrender of the initiative to the enemy, unless your static line is strong enough to break his back - which the Germans were not able to do in 1944. They could barely stem the tide but never break the wave.
My plan assumes that initiative-taking offensive forces are indeed taking the fight to the enemy in the rest of Afghanistan and in Pakistan, against the Taliaban and their ISI masters, in Pakistan.

My plan is not responsible for specifying the organisation of these offensive forces. We already have very well organised special and air-borne forces, air and missile forces. NATO's most offensive forces are fantastically capable already and don't need reorganising by me - they just need to be tasked to hit Taliban and ISI targets in Pakistan as well as in the rest of Afghanistan.

The issue I am raising with our offensive campaign is our leaders reluctance to target the likes of the University of Jihad and the ISI HQ in Pakistani. We don't need new forces to hit those targets - we just need the orders to go out to our existing forces to hit those kinds of targets in Pakistan.
April 9th, 2013  
KevinTheCynic
 
 
Like the myth of the lemming throwing itself over cliffs to commit suicide, the myth here is the enemy walking straight into your killzone and allowing themselves to be picked off.

They won't and that means you're defence line isn't worth a damned thing because the Taliban troops will use mortars and rockets from range to attack the pillboxes rather than just walk straight into the killing ground.
They'll fire a few rounds and leave most quick, all you'll find is the firing signature.

They won't try to infiltrate the pillbox line, they'll instead start killing NGO aid workers in the rural towns and they'll snipe at troops from the hilltops and they'll make improvised explosives from fertilizer and make truck-bombs to detonate next to schools and hospitals, they'll victimize anyone who sides with the foreign invaders and so on and so on etc. etc. ad nauseum.

In short, they won't throw themselves against your Maginot Line of Afghanistan, they'll revert back to being the Dushmans and they'll attack soft targets and make the lives of innocent civilians a misery. So much so that in the end, the civilians will turn against the West simply to stop the Dushmans from attacking them.
April 9th, 2013  
Peter Dow
 
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by KevinTheCynic
Like the myth of the lemming throwing itself over cliffs to commit suicide, the myth here is the enemy walking straight into your killzone and allowing themselves to be picked off.

They won't
That's the idea - to stop the enemy walking straight up to the supply route to plant mines or mount ambushes. They'd have to try to cross the defensive line first or perhaps try to bluff their way through a NATO auxiliary force military / police controlled stop point and those are not good options for the Taliban.

Quote:
Originally Posted by KevinTheCynic
and that means you're defence line isn't worth a damned thing
It's worth it to keep the supply routes secure.

Quote:
Originally Posted by KevinTheCynic
because the Taliban troops will use mortars and rockets from range to attack the pillboxes rather than just walk straight into the killing ground.
They'll fire a few rounds and leave most quick, all you'll find is the firing signature.
Well the enemy have only got a small fortified pillbox target to hit and whilst they can fire a few mortars and rockets off before the mobile reaction force can get into position to return mortar fire, the enemy won't have time to zero in to the target and hit it enough times to get through the fortifications.

Quote:
Originally Posted by KevinTheCynic
They won't try to infiltrate the pillbox line,
Preventing infiltration is one of main aims of my plan. If they don't try, the plan is succeeding.

Quote:
Originally Posted by KevinTheCynic
they'll instead start killing NGO aid workers in the rural towns and they'll snipe at troops from the hilltops and they'll make improvised explosives from fertilizer and make truck-bombs to detonate next to schools and hospitals, they'll victimize anyone who sides with the foreign invaders and so on and so on etc. etc. ad nauseum.

In short, they won't throw themselves against your Maginot Line of Afghanistan, they'll revert back to being the Dushmans and they'll attack soft targets and make the lives of innocent civilians a misery. So much so that in the end, the civilians will turn against the West simply to stop the Dushmans from attacking them.
Well the schools and hospitals which we provide money, NGO assistance and security for must be restricted to being located only in the relatively safe building ground near to the secure supply routes.

NGOs, the UN and the rest ought not to attempt to provide services in the first instance in a war zone in bandit country. To do so would be a strategic mistake for anyone remotely associated with an occupying power.

It is the sole responsibility of the Afghan national and local authorities funding themselves to decide for themselves where, be that in Afghan cities, rural towns or villages, is safe to stay and to defend themselves there using their own resources. We only help out with security in bandit country with air attacks and air-borne raids or special force infiltration as and when intelligence points to a target of opportunity.

If Afghan civilians want to work with us, live with us in the secure zones next to our secure supply routes, benefit from our protection, get away from the Taliban, get regular food supplies, offers of work, schools for their kids, medical services etc, then that can be offered but they must agree to accept the security restrictions which come with living on secure land which will be effectively governed as a military base governed ultimately by our generals and their political masters.

NGOs ought to be firmly warned not to venture out into bandit country but to wait for civilians to come to the secure supply route for help and help them there, where it is safe to do so.

Truck bombs won't be able to get onto our secure supply route to bomb anyone living there and neither will enemy snipers get in range. If civilians or NGOs get bombed or sniped in bandit country we say "We told you so".
April 9th, 2013  
brinktk
 
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by KevinTheCynic
Like the myth of the lemming throwing itself over cliffs to commit suicide, the myth here is the enemy walking straight into your killzone and allowing themselves to be picked off.

They won't and that means you're defence line isn't worth a damned thing because the Taliban troops will use mortars and rockets from range to attack the pillboxes rather than just walk straight into the killing ground.
They'll fire a few rounds and leave most quick, all you'll find is the firing signature.

They won't try to infiltrate the pillbox line, they'll instead start killing NGO aid workers in the rural towns and they'll snipe at troops from the hilltops and they'll make improvised explosives from fertilizer and make truck-bombs to detonate next to schools and hospitals, they'll victimize anyone who sides with the foreign invaders and so on and so on etc. etc. ad nauseum.

In short, they won't throw themselves against your Maginot Line of Afghanistan, they'll revert back to being the Dushmans and they'll attack soft targets and make the lives of innocent civilians a misery. So much so that in the end, the civilians will turn against the West simply to stop the Dushmans from attacking them.

Exactly.

I've mentioned words to this effect on several occasions and apparently it's lost on him. With the number of forces left to man this line, who will be left to go on the offensive? It's in the Talibans best interest to keep the line in place to justify it so we will be forced to keep throwing money at it and bogging down the tens of thousands of soldiers that would otherwise be hunting them down. So harassing attacks will be conducted. All the while the whole system drains money and the dushman reign terror throughout the countryside because there are no forces left to stop them.

He doesn't understand what we mean when we say "mobile". Having a reserve does not mean it's mobile, it means you have a reserve. It would be much more feasible to take the dominant terrain features in an AO where the surrounding countryside can be observed for miles and miles. At the same time sending out LP/OPs to extend the area of observation. This would free up countless soldiers to conduct the nasty work of counter insurgency by isolating the enemy away from the villages, gaining the support of the populace, and keeping the enemy in a defensive posture. The dead space can be covered by UAV's since most units have multiple Ravens available to them on top of several other more advanced UAV's with greater range at the Brigade level.

He seems to the think the ANA will be diligent soldiers actively watching their sector while also maintaining there weapons, cameras, TV screens, and level of training and fitness...This simply is not the case. It will be hard enough keeping a great deal of them from falling asleep at their post or smoking hash inside the bunkers. He doesn't understand the cultural conflicts that will arise from tribal or regional loyalties. Not to mention the fact that there will no doubt be a "shake down" of these convoys to secure passage through whichever sector they happen to be passing through. I would imagine a great deal of the Afghan soldiers will likely sell a great deal of the equipment on the black market, and between 5-15% will likely help the Taliban in inflicting acts of espionage on the entire operation.

The bottom line, it reduces the number of options we have and increases the number of options the Taliban has. It puts on the defensive REACTING. It gives the initiative to the Taliban. This is the opposite of what any military commander or force wants.

This is counter insurgency. I've said this over and over...the people are the battleground. Their support for your side is the decisive operation. Isolating the Taliban away from the people is the ultimate goal. In order to do that they have to see that your side is going to win. They have to not have fear that the Talibs are going to come into their village at night and kill anyone and their family for any number of reasons. We can't do that sitting on our thumbs from inside of a bunker.

Also, how is there to be a 6 miles zone on both sides through the mountains, or through the fields where farmers earn their livelyhoods and support the local economy, or in terrain that is heavily forrested?
April 9th, 2013  
Peter Dow
 
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by brinktk
Exactly.
and replied to even more exactly.

Quote:
Originally Posted by brinktk
I've mentioned words to this effect on several occasions and apparently it's lost on him. With the number of forces left to man this line, who will be left to go on the offensive?
Well so long as our forces are there for combat operations, the main component of offensive operations would be our forces.

As the President seems determined to pull out our NATO combat forces by some time in 2014, which is his plan, not mine, then I would suggest that Afghans would need an offensive force as well, but that's likely to comprise of special forces, air-borne, special police units and so on.


Quote:
Originally Posted by brinktk
It's in the Talibans best interest to keep the line in place to justify it so we will be forced to keep throwing money at it
The point is the money is already being thrown at the Afghan national army. The difference with my plan is we control how the money is spent, how the troops it is paying for are organised and deployed, to good effect rather than faffing around at Karzai's pleasure but at our expense.


Quote:
Originally Posted by brinktk
and bogging down the tens of thousands of soldiers that would otherwise be hunting them down.
Yes but a $10 a day Taliban fighter who has put down his Kalashnikov for a while and who looks like an Afghan farmer isn't any easier to find with one police officer looking at him or 10,000 soldiers surrounding him.

Thousands of soldiers moving around hunting along every mountain track and field of Afghanistan is a very inefficient strategy.

Much easier and efficient to distinguish the enemy when they arm themselves and come to fight you in our fortified defensive positions and supply routes.

Quote:
Originally Posted by brinktk
So harassing attacks will be conducted.
Our guards can harass attackers back more effectively.

Quote:
Originally Posted by brinktk
All the while the whole system drains money
The money is being drained now and always has been drained for all the years we have been there. Karzai and his cronies have got very rich but Afghanistan is not that much more secure, not for all the money spent.

My plan puts the money to proper efficient use for a change instead of letting it drain away.

Quote:
Originally Posted by brinktk
and the dushman reign terror throughout the countryside because there are no forces left to stop them.
While we are there, there are our forces to stop the enemy if we get the intelligence to strike at them. In the future, Afghan special forces can aim to take on that role though for now, only we can really do that, especially into Pakistan.

As for a reign of terror - Afghans have the option to move to somewhere safer according to advice from their politicians - or we can offer them refugee camps situated along our secure supply routes.

Quote:
Originally Posted by brinktk
He doesn't understand what we mean when we say "mobile". Having a reserve does not mean it's mobile, it means you have a reserve.
The 2/3rds mobile element of the supply route protection force are not "reserve" troops.

The reserve troops in my plan whether that be a 25% reserve or 50% reserve are soldiers who are off active duty altogether, perhaps off on holiday, on special training courses, off ill etc.

The reserves mentioned in my plan are not in the mobile depots or in the guard posts or travelling between them. The reserve troops are at home with their wives and children and they are not part of any mobile response to an attack.

The 2/3rd mobile element are not "in reserve". They are very much on call to respond as a mobile reaction force there and then. They may have to get out of their beds at the mobile depots to respond but they are very much on call, waiting for an emergency call to come in.

The mobile force could move in and man the empty guard posts and machine guns as they normally do "on duty" if that was appropriate - but as appropriate to meet the particular attack, they have the full range of infantry weapons to bring from the depots to meet any kind of attack.

On reacting to an attack, the mobile forces could be getting into their APC travelling say 10km down the main supply road to the nearest supply depot to the attack then proceeding from there.

So I am quite clear in my plan of the difference between mobile forces and a reserve. It is should be quite clear to the reader what I mean. There should be no reason for confusion.

Quote:
Originally Posted by brinktk
It would be much more feasible to take the dominant terrain features in an AO where the surrounding countryside can be observed for miles and miles. At the same time sending out LP/OPs to extend the area of observation.
I have been very clear about what I mean so that you all can critique my plan. If you wish me to critique your plan then I suggest that you be equally clear, such as by spelling out what you mean by "AO" and "LP/OPs".

In my plan, the fortified machine gun nests are sited taking account of the local lie of the land to obtain a good view of the approaches.

In other words, if a suitable ridge exists to site guard posts on, and that ridge runs from 7 miles to 5 miles in distance from the road, then it is better to site the posts on the ridge where you get a good view of the approaches, and can direct mortar fire as necessary, than to site the guard posts at 6 miles just because the plan says "6 miles". The plan is just a guide. Of course you take advantage of high points allowing good visibility of approaching enemy.

I have tried to indicate that idea in this image -

- where the pill boxes are shown on top of a suitable ridge which will see into the ground further from the road but which won't be at exactly 6 miles from the road.

If by "P" you mean patrols, I have to caution that patrolling over contested ground, not behind a defensive line, where the enemy can wait until the patrol has passed to set up an ambush, or lay some mines, for the next patrol, as has been done for years, formerly in Iraq and now only in Afghanistan, is military folly of the worst stupidity and has got many of our soldiers killed.

The generals who have refused to secure ground behind defensive lines and then had the cheek to order our troops to patrol over minefields and into ambushes are really dangerously incompetent generals and should be dismissed from the high command.

Quote:
Originally Posted by brinktk
This would free up countless soldiers to conduct the nasty work of counter insurgency by isolating the enemy away from the villages, gaining the support of the populace, and keeping the enemy in a defensive posture.
If the villagers want to be isolated from the dangers in bandit country then they can come into our secure supply routes and live in refugee camps there.

If villagers want to take their chances with the insurgents in bandit county then that's their choice. We ought not to sweat about villagers' choices either way. We ought not to order our troops to go rushing out into bandit country with all kinds of promises we can't keep just on the off chance the Taliban have got some villagers to push around for a while.

If and when the villagers get really sick of the Taliban they will come with intelligence on the enemy and that's when we strike with our offensive forces.

Quote:
Originally Posted by brinktk
The dead space can be covered by UAV's since most units have multiple Ravens available to them on top of several other more advanced UAV's with greater range at the Brigade level.
Well I'd like to think about how UAVs might be incorporated into my plan - by launching and controlling the UAVs from the depots perhaps?

Would UAVs be something the Shift Officers could operate without getting distracted from staying in touch with the guards on duty in the guard posts?

Or would UAVs be something the Depot Commander himself would want to play with now and then rather than always having a UAV in the sky all the time?

Or would a UAV only be deployed in emergencies when the whole depot alerts and more troops are available, one of which could operate the UAV?

Perhaps a UAV would be best controlled by the Reaction Captain to help him distinguish probing nuisance provocations by skirmishers from a large scale enemy attack?

I can see that UAVs do offer a particularly useful facility that may be worth a specific organisational modification to my plan, such as defining a UAV specialist soldier who would report directly to the Reaction Captain?
 


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