Hitler's speech of 8 november in München

lljadw

Active member
Hitler :

"I wanted to reach the Volga at a certain spot,at a certain city.Coincidentially it carries the name of Stalin himself.But you shouldn't think that I marched there for this reason-it could be named completely different.I went there because it is a very important spot .There one cuts 30 million tons of traffic,including nearly 9 million tons of oil-traffic .There the whole grain from those enormous regions of the Ukraine,the Kuban did rendezvous to be transported north.There the manganese ore was transported.There was a gigantic traffic site......."

Questions :

1°There are at least 4 stupidities in this excerpt: who knows which ?


2° Why was Hitler saying these stupidities?

a° Did he believe them ?:lol:

b° Did he expect that the party ignoramus gathered in the room would believe them?:lol:
 
Hitler :

"I wanted to reach the Volga at a certain spot,at a certain city.Coincidentially it carries the name of Stalin himself.But you shouldn't think that I marched there for this reason-it could be named completely different.I went there because it is a very important spot .There one cuts 30 million tons of traffic,including nearly 9 million tons of oil-traffic .There the whole grain from those enormous regions of the Ukraine,the Kuban did rendezvous to be transported north.There the manganese ore was transported.There was a gigantic traffic site......."

Questions :

1°There are at least 4 stupidities in this excerpt: who knows which ?


2° Why was Hitler saying these stupidities?

a° Did he believe them ?:lol:

b° Did he expect that the party ignoramus gathered in the room would believe them?:lol:

I am not sure I understand your questions here, but given that the bulk of the Ukraine was in German hands I suspect most of the grain was going west not east outside that and without knowing the exact numbers I suspect the answers will come down to how important you believe Stalingrad was as a transport hub.

I suspect he was saying those things for the same reason all politicians speak, if they didn't spout on no one would have any use for them at all and I suspect that he believed there was an element of truth in what he was saying although it would have been spun to make him seem like he was in control.

Yes I suspect he did believe that party idiots would believe them because much like today there is a percentage of the population that will believe anything no matter how ludicrous that comes out of the mouths of political movements they are aligned with.
Hell in a poll released in 2012 15% of Americans still believed Hussein played a part in the 9/11 attacks which proves you can convince idiots of anything and it will persist no matter how much evidence to the contrary.
 
not sure

Hitler was like a high and mighty leader to most of these people and they likely believed him like they were lead to believe lie after lie during the prewar and war periods of Nazi Germany.

The grain as MontyB said was nonsense since the whole of the Ukraine was under German control at this time.

It may have been a hub for Caucus oil?

I would say some traffic into the heart of Russia would be cut off from southern - Caucus USSR?

Kuban near Rostov, I think?
 
:thumb:

As already had been indicated

1)no grain from the Ukraine was going east

2) no products from the Kuban were going east

3)the same for the manganese

4) the claim that BEFORE the war 30 million tons were rendezvous at Stalingrad (of which 9 million of oil) is meaningless :9 million tons of oil = 30 ¨of the Soviet oil production in 1940 :no one can calculate the results for the SU if these 9 million tons were not rendezvous at Stalingrad .
As usual,Adolf was using meaningless raw figures to impress the audience .

From the authorative Germany and WWII (Tome VI):

The Soviet oil requirement was FAR BELOW the production (translation : the Soviets produced more oil than they needed),which means that the results of the loss of the Caucasus oil were incalculable,which means that the Fall Blau was a house of cards built on quick-sands .

The loss of Baku would result in a significant disruption,but it was totally uncertain how significant this disruption would be .

Other point : the Soviet energy mix :before the war : oil 18.7%,wood : 20 %,rest (mainly coal):some 60 %.
:at the end of the war : oil :15 %,woor : 50 %,rest : 35 %

In 1949 the CIA was giving an estimate of the requirements of refined oil by the principal Soviet consumers:

Peace : military : 4.8 million ton ( = 15 %)
: others : 25.1 million ton (= 85 %)

War : military :13.1 million (= 39 %)

: others : 20.7 million ( = 61 %)


My guess is that in WWII the part of the oil consumption by the military was lower than the CIA estimates for 1949.


Conclusion : the economic importance of Stalingrad was probably the usual inflated balloon .
 
:thumb:

As already had been indicated

1)no grain from the Ukraine was going east

2) no products from the Kuban were going east

3)the same for the manganese

4) the claim that BEFORE the war 30 million tons were rendezvous at Stalingrad (of which 9 million of oil) is meaningless :9 million tons of oil = 30 ¨of the Soviet oil production in 1940 :no one can calculate the results for the SU if these 9 million tons were not rendezvous at Stalingrad .
As usual,Adolf was using meaningless raw figures to impress the audience .

From the authorative Germany and WWII (Tome VI):

The Soviet oil requirement was FAR BELOW the production (translation : the Soviets produced more oil than they needed),which means that the results of the loss of the Caucasus oil were incalculable,which means that the Fall Blau was a house of cards built on quick-sands .

The loss of Baku would result in a significant disruption,but it was totally uncertain how significant this disruption would be .

Other point : the Soviet energy mix :before the war : oil 18.7%,wood : 20 %,rest (mainly coal):some 60 %.
:at the end of the war : oil :15 %,woor : 50 %,rest : 35 %

In 1949 the CIA was giving an estimate of the requirements of refined oil by the principal Soviet consumers:

Peace : military : 4.8 million ton ( = 15 %)
: others : 25.1 million ton (= 85 %)

War : military :13.1 million (= 39 %)

: others : 20.7 million ( = 61 %)


My guess is that in WWII the part of the oil consumption by the military was lower than the CIA estimates for 1949.


Conclusion : the economic importance of Stalingrad was probably the usual inflated balloon .

I am somewhat intrigued by a couple of comments there:
1) Why weren't Kuban resources heading East as the region was not in German hands until late November 1942 so at the time of Hitlers comments it was still Russian controlled.

2) Even if Baku oil had little impact on Russian operations what effect would the excess oil have had on German operations especially in the south given much shortened supply lines to AGS.
 
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From what I have read, the Kuban was already captured by the Germans,with in october 1942,a pro German autonomous government .
 
2) Even if Baku oil had little impact on Russian operations what effect would the excess oil have had on German operations especially in the south given much shortened supply lines to AGS.

That's something difficult to answer,but my assumption is that the effect would be marginal,because

a)the distance Baku-Stalingrad still was 1200 km(which means 10 days for a train to do going and coming)

b) the problems were not that much the distance,but the railway infrastructure,and how much would the railway Baku-Stalingrad be operational

c) I don't think that one could say that if Baku was captured in august,Stalingrad would fall in october,or that Uranus would be a failure, or that 6th Army could escape from Stalingrad .

d) If Baku was captured in august, what would be its production capacity? AND what would be its refining capacity ?Would Baku not be destroyed and would the Germans have the means AND the manpower to restart production and refining ?Or would the results be the same as in Maikop ? = meaningless .
 
repy

The Germans came close to capturing the oilfields at Grozny - Baku but fell shy, before the winter set in. Instead they were bombed to prevent anyone from using them. Germany was very dependent on foreign oil having none of its own and somewhat limited supplies in Hungry and Romania. The Soviets as mentioned had other oil sources although still would find the lack of this oil a bit of a disruption. Hitler lost the ability to make Germany completely oil independent with the losses in the Caucuses, partially due to his obsession with Stalingrad which originally was not the major goal of the offensive Blau. They would never be oil independent with the expensive synthetic oil. Weather the Germans could have held the Caucuses without taking Stalingrad remains to be seen? However for whatever reason they ignored warning about being over extended and having weak flanks and lost at Stalingrad which forced the withdraw of AGS. Remember when we speak of distances most T-34 had to come form the Urals. American lend lease had to cross the U-Boat infested Atlantic ocean.
 
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Kuban

From what I have read, the Kuban was already captured by the Germans,with in october 1942,a pro German autonomous government .

You are right the Kuban was the location of very viscous fighting in 42 43 and is actually a small province, adjacent to the north eastern shores of the black sea. In 42 it was completely under German control.
 
From what I have read, the Kuban was already captured by the Germans,with in october 1942,a pro German autonomous government .

I agree seems my initial information was wrong as on the 18 Aug 1942 German troops assaulted Novorossiysk and Tuapse on the Black Sea coast in southern Russia and South of the Kuban which means it must have been in German hands.

That's something difficult to answer,but my assumption is that the effect would be marginal,because

a)the distance Baku-Stalingrad still was 1200 km(which means 10 days for a train to do going and coming)

b) the problems were not that much the distance,but the railway infrastructure,and how much would the railway Baku-Stalingrad be operational

All true but they would have had the Volga itself to move supplies which would have taken the stress off rail transport.
 
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Germany was very dependent on foreign oil having none of its own

This is a common assumption,but a wrong one :

Between 1933/1939,Germany produced/imported 36 million tons of oil=

Home crude production : 3 million =8 %

Synthetic oil production: 5 million= 14 %

Imports (mainly from oversea) :28 million ton (=78 %)


Between 1940/1944,Germany produced/imported (all from Europe) :41 million tons of oil =

Home crude production : 8 million (= 19 %)

Synthetic oil production : 22 million (=54 %)

Imports : 11 million (= 27 %)

This is indicating that Germany was not very depending on imports during the war .

Other point :if after the war, Germany would have still no overseas imports,and also have no imports from Europe,would it be that bad for Germany ? It still would have 6 million tons of oil per year (30 million :5) while before the war,it became strong with 5 million per year (36:7).

Independent/dependent are very relative notions.
 
I doubt also the claim that it was important for Germany to be not dependent on oil,as before WWII ,the importance of oil was in most countries marginal (even in the US)and as most countries were importing all of their oil .

After the war : in 1948,Britain imported 99 % of her oil,but as oil was only 10 % of her energy mix, it was not that important .

:in 1956,the importance of oil in the energy mix of Western Europe was 22 %,and,although all the oil was imported, the economy was not collapsing because of the Suez crisis: the effects were marginal . It was the same in 1967.

:in 1973/74 two things happened in Britain : the oil crisis,which hurted the economy,and the strike of the coal miners which forced Heath to surrender,because the economy was collapsing .


Even in 1973,coal was more important than oil .
 
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This is a common assumption,but a wrong one :

Between 1933/1939,Germany produced/imported 36 million tons of oil=

Home crude production : 3 million =8 %

Synthetic oil production: 5 million= 14 %

Imports (mainly from oversea) :28 million ton (=78 %)


Between 1940/1944,Germany produced/imported (all from Europe) :41 million tons of oil =

Home crude production : 8 million (= 19 %)

Synthetic oil production : 22 million (=54 %)

Imports : 11 million (= 27 %)

This is indicating that Germany was not very depending on imports during the war .

Other point :if after the war, Germany would have still no overseas imports,and also have no imports from Europe,would it be that bad for Germany ? It still would have 6 million tons of oil per year (30 million :5) while before the war,it became strong with 5 million per year (36:7).

Independent/dependent are very relative notions.

What I find hard to believe in those figures is that WW2 only used 5 million tons of oil (1933-39 = 36 million tons, 1940-44 = 41 million tons).

It also does not really explain whether the 36 and 41 million tons met 100% of Germany's oil needs.
 
Oil

The Nazi war machine was never that well oiled "excuse the pun". Major sources of prewar oil from Mexico and the Soviet Union were obviously no longer available. At the end the Germans even had to move their artillery and tanks up to the battlefield using teams of horses. As the war dragged on Germany became the least mechanized major power in the war.

An issue was both the synthetic oil plants and the oil fields at Ploesti were subject to allied bombing raids. The Germans were quick to rebuild but this put a strain on this precious comedy.

A question before the head butting over Stalingrad between Hitler and Stalin, what was the major objective for operation Blau, if not to seize the Caucasus oil fields?
 
What I find hard to believe in those figures is that WW2 only used 5 million tons of oil (1933-39 = 36 million tons, 1940-44 = 41 million tons).

It also does not really explain whether the 36 and 41 million tons met 100% of Germany's oil needs.


Domestic crude oil production


1940:1.5 million ton
1941:1.6 million
1942:1.7 million
1943:1.9 million
1944: 1.6 million

Total:8.3 million


Synthetic oil production

1940: 3.1 million ton

1941: 3.9 million

1942: 4.6 million

1943: 5.6 million

1944 : 3.8 million

Total : 21 million ton


Imports :

1940: 2.1 million ton

1941: 2.8 million

1942 : 2.3 million

1943:2.8 million

1944 : 1 million

Total : 11 million

Domestic Crude + synthetic = 30 million = 6 million per year

Imports = some 2 million per year .(11:5)

Bear in mind that these are production figures,not consumption figures,and are not indicating the needs .From what I have read (but with the needed reservation) the WM consumed 5 million tons in 1941 (there were also civilian needs) and 4.4 million ton in 1944.

About the needs : these are subjectif and incalculable(consumption also is not indicating needs),they als depend on the missions .There were problems at Stalingrad,not because the production was to low,but because transport difficulties .Only in the summer of 1944 was there a crisis: after/because the LW lost the battle over Germany,the allied air forces had all possibility to attack and destroy the plants and refineries for synthetic oil;the result was that Germany survived on her stocks .
 
About 1933/39

Domestic crude :

1933: 0.25 million

1934:0.31

1935 : 0.43

1936:0.44

1937 : 0.45

1938: O.53

1939: 0.9

Total:3.3 million


Synthetic (same years)

0.17 million
0.15
0.24
0.50
0.65
1.2
2.2

Total:5.1

Imports (same years)

2.65 million
3.1
3.85
4.25
4.3
5.2
5.1

Total:28.4

Total for the period 33/39 : 36.8 = 5.2 per year

And (maybe relevant) for the same period :

imports from Romania :4.5 million

imports from the SU : 2.2 million

imports from the US : 4.6 million (1939 is missing)
 
Bear in mind that these are production figures,not consumption figures,and are not indicating the needs .From what I have read (but with the needed reservation) the WM consumed 5 million tons in 1941 (there were also civilian needs) and 4.4 million ton in 1944.

About the needs : these are subjectif and incalculable(consumption also is not indicating needs),they als depend on the missions .There were problems at Stalingrad,not because the production was to low,but because transport difficulties .Only in the summer of 1944 was there a crisis: after/because the LW lost the battle over Germany,the allied air forces had all possibility to attack and destroy the plants and refineries for synthetic oil;the result was that Germany survived on her stocks .

This is part of my point though, if Germany really only (for arguments sake) could supply 70% of its needs with the rest being made up of alternate forms of energy for example horse drawn transport then you could argue that Germany never had all the oil it needed.

I agree that it is somewhat incalcuable but there must be a way of estimating Germanys real needs verses it supplied quantity.
 
oil

if Germany really only (for arguments sake) could supply 70% of its needs with the rest being made up of alternate forms of energy for example horse drawn transport then you could argue that Germany never had all the oil it needed.

As the war needs expanded the need for oil would only increase. With time the German industry built an ever increasing number of armored vehicles, planes, etc. that would need more fuel than that allocated in the original short war plan Germany had at 1st hoped for.
As a result Germany depended more heavily on horse drawn transport than any other main European power in WW2. This situation got worse as the USSR received lend lease 6-wheel drive trucks, the Soviets became more mobile than the Germans. The US never used horses drawn transport. lljadw you may be right about the oil %, but I believe the heavy reliance on horse drawn transport indicts a lack of fuels.
 
We have the same discussion on the Armchair General Forum,where a Russian poster has given figures for the Soviet military consumption (navy not included),which was some 13 million ton(= 13 % of the total production),while on German side,an extrapolation for the military consumption (only partial figures are available) would give a figure of 22 million ton on a war production of 44 million (= 50 % of the total production) .

I thinke that the use of horse drawn transport is (also) indicating a shortage of trucks and automobiles .The German automobile production was very low before the war.

In 1938, there were on 1000 inhabitants the following automobiles

Belgium:28

Holland:22

Denmark:26

Sweden : 30

UK : 51

France : 55

Germany : 21

US :220
 
But couldn't you draw the conclusion that an acknowledged inability to provide fuel (oil) encouraged a lower level of vehicle production.

In other words Germany was not a fully mobile force because it did not have the capacity to fuel a fully mobile force and therefore it concentrated on alternatives such as horse drawn units in order to have enough fuel for the motorised units it had as a result even capturing more oil would not necessarily have helped because it did not have the vehicle production capacity to utilise it anyway.

Basically they got themselves into a catch 22 situation.

I think it is an interesting topic but I am not sure it is a quantifiable one.
 
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