Hitler's speech of 8 november in München

But couldn't you draw the conclusion that an acknowledged inability to provide fuel (oil) encouraged a lower level of vehicle production.

In other words Germany was not a fully mobile force because it did not have the capacity to fuel a fully mobile force and therefore it concentrated on alternatives such as horse drawn units in order to have enough fuel for the motorised units it had as a result even capturing more oil would not necessarily have helped because it did not have the vehicle production capacity to utilise it anyway.

Basically they got themselves into a catch 22 situation.

I think it is an interesting topic but I am not sure it is a quantifiable one.

Certainly for at least the 1st 1/2 of the war that would be a very difficult question to answer. I do think that as they fought into 44 they were pinched for oil.
 
My impression is that it was mostly a structural problem : before the war there were dozens of small factories which resulted in a low production of automobiles ,while in France there were 3 big ones: Renault,Citroen,Peugeot.

Later more .
 
About the relationship between oil production and fuel production,IMHO,the figures are not indicating the existence of such a relationship;

1939: oil production (imports included) :8.2 million

:truck production 101000

1940 : oil :6.7;trucks:63000


1941: oil:8.3;trucks : 62000


1942: oil:8.6 ;trucks:81000


1943:eek:il :10.3 ;trucks:108000


The variations in the oil and truck production do not correspond to each other :see : 1940/1941


The source of the truck production is the USSBS (US strategic board survey) which gives also the distribution between WM and civilians/exports


1940: WM :60 %
1941: 60 %
1942: 73 %
1943: 85 %
 
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