Hitler and Sung Tsu - Page 7




 
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December 28th, 2011  
Del Boy
 
Good post. I can add that the spirit of the RN in the WW2 ranks was a positive and determined one; protection of Britain and its interests was paramount. Allowing Hitler to cross the channel was never an option as far as they were concerned, and their bottom line was never reached.

Believe me - I remember it well, first hand from HMS Hood and Subs.

I need not mention here the contribution of the RAF, I'm sure you all know this, probably better than I.

I heard recently of a secret force of resistance in position and of high professional capability; very unlike the Home Guard widely known.

We may have been down on occasion but we were never out; and I never heard a word of defeatism ever uttered, that was not an optiion.
December 28th, 2011  
42RM
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by Del Boy
I heard recently of a secret force of resistance in position and of high professional capability; very unlike the Home Guard widely known.
The Auxiliary Units, also known as British Resistance Organisation.

http://www.parhamairfieldmuseum.co.uk/brohome.html
December 28th, 2011  
samneanderthal
 
Unfortunately, Britain did not kick the Italians and Germans out of North Africa until the Americans arrived, inspite of counting with billions of dollars of help and the millions of Indians, ANZACS, free Frenchmen, Poles, etc, British incompetence made a legend out of Rommel, despite the latter putting himself in extremely precarious positions repeatedly (like the cauldron in Gazala, etc,).

Does it make sense that a country that has millions of foreign troops, billions of dollars in equipment, fuel, etc, the largest navy, a mighty industry and is fighting on one front cannot wipe out from Africa 5% of the German army, until the arrival of the Americans who are supplying the USSR, the UK, the Chinese and themselves and are fighting in the Pacific and Atlantic?

Stalin has to deal with over 80% of the German army, the Americans have to deal with the Japanese thousands of miles away, is it too much to ask of Ritchie in 1941, or Auchinleck and Monty in 1942 to give a much weaker Rommel the death blow, instead of making a legend out of him?

Another example of the British fighting ability:
The allies have a half million troops in the Dunkirk pockets that can be easily supplied by the huge allied navy (French+British+Dutch+Norwegian, etc,) across the English Channel and supported by allied planes in the pocket and from Britain. Moreover, the area is not deemed adequate for the German tanks and the naval guns can reach over 30 km inland, wiping out any tanks in the area.
Instead of holding their ground against the few and very primitive German tanks (mostly PZ I and II and even the PZ IV have a short, wimpy cannon, and all are susceptible even to the 25 mm Hotchkiss gun), like the Soviets did in Oranienbaum for almost 3 years or the Germans did in Courland, with a weak navy and facing huge Soviet artillery, tank and air forces, Churchill decides to evacuate so they can fight on the beaches and in the streets, but in Britain, having lost the powerful French army and air force, whose hundreds of good pilots would have been invaluable against the LW.
The British left a huge pile of supplies and many trucks, artillery, etc, that were useful to the Germans.
The simple fact that the powerful allied navy allowed Guderian to close the pocket is remarkable, since their guns should have kept open a 30 km corridor along the coast.
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December 28th, 2011  
VDKMS
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by samneanderthal
Unfortunately, Britain did not kick the Italians and Germans out of North Africa until the Americans arrived, inspite of counting with billions of dollars of help and the millions of Indians, ANZACS, free Frenchmen, Poles, etc, British incompetence made a legend out of Rommel, despite the latter putting himself in extremely precarious positions repeatedly (like the cauldron in Gazala, etc,).
The British could have beaten Rommel alone but Montgomery was an overly cautious leader and slow in his attacks. The Americans were surely helpful but not experienced. They still had to learn a lot.

Quote:
Does it make sense that a country that has millions of foreign troops, billions of dollars in equipment, fuel, etc, the largest navy, a mighty industry and is fighting on one front cannot wipe out from Africa 5% of the German army, until the arrival of the Americans who are supplying the USSR, the UK, the Chinese and themselves and are fighting in the Pacific and Atlantic?
Not all their forces were in Northern Africa.

Quote:
Stalin has to deal with over 80% of the German army, the Americans have to deal with the Japanese thousands of miles away, is it too much to ask of Ritchie in 1941, or Auchinleck and Monty in 1942 to give a much weaker Rommel the death blow, instead of making a legend out of him?
Rommel was very agressive and inventive, Montgomery was defensive and conservative.

Quote:
Another example of the British fighting ability:
The allies have a half million troops in the Dunkirk pockets that can be easily supplied by the huge allied navy (French+British+Dutch+Norwegian, etc,) across the English Channel and supported by allied planes in the pocket and from Britain. Moreover, the area is not deemed adequate for the German tanks and the naval guns can reach over 30 km inland, wiping out any tanks in the area.
Instead of holding their ground against the few and very primitive German tanks (mostly PZ I and II and even the PZ IV have a short, wimpy cannon, and all are susceptible even to the 25 mm Hotchkiss gun), like the Soviets did in Oranienbaum for almost 3 years or the Germans did in Courland, with a weak navy and facing huge Soviet artillery, tank and air forces, Churchill decides to evacuate so they can fight in the beaches and in the streets, but in Britain, having lost the powerful French army and air force, whose hundreds of good pilots would have been invaluable against the LW.
The British left a huge pile of supplies and many trucks, artillery, etc, that were useful to the Germans.
The simple fact that the powerful allied navy allowed Guderian to close the pocket is remarkable, since their guns should have kept open a 30 km corridor along the coast.
That's your theory, wouldn't work in practice.
Did you in your theory included among other things water and food for half a million soldiers, each and every day? Do you now what is needed to supply that to them?
December 28th, 2011  
samneanderthal
 
Sending water, food, fuel, ammunition to a half million men and evacuating the wounded and sick accross the Strait of Dover 3 dozen km using Calais and a huge navy and under air cover from both sides of the Channel is much easier than supplying Libya and evacuating the axis wounded using the Italian navy and facing the RN and planes from Malta across several hundred km or supplying the men in Courland with the impotent German navy of 1945 and facing Soviet planes, subs, etc,
The allied navy could have transported troops, tanks, etc, from the rest of France to the bridge head to continue the fight, even after Paris fell. Germany could not afford a prolonged war in 1940 and Hitler knew it and dreaded it.
I doubt that Italy would have declared war on the allies, had there been a strong bridge head in France for troops from the colonies and American supplies to keep arriving and continue the fight.
December 28th, 2011  
lljadw
 
Sam in post 51 :I don't think
Yes,we know,no need to repeat it .
December 28th, 2011  
LeEnfield
 
 
Dunkirk......The Allies, now what would have happened once the French Government told it's troops to stop fighting when they signed the armistice, that would have left the British troops out numbered by ten to one and huge gaps in there lines which meant the bridgehead even smaller and would have come under most of the Germans artillery.

North Africa.....Now Rommel was the master of the counter attack, just ask the Americans what he could do who where at Kaserine Pass.
Now Britain did not have billions of dollars and what ever money they borrowed to fight WW2 has all been paid back in full with interest, mind you it took us 60 years to pay it off but we must be one of the main countries that has cleared its debt's in this conflict. Now at Alemien the same narrow front that stopped Rommel also cost us dearly to break through and nearly two thirds of all British tanks were knocked out there while attacking the German lines. Monty was not in a position to do wide sweeping manoeuvres while chasing Rommel as every thing required had to come along one road and the same soft sand that stopped Rommel also held up Monty
December 28th, 2011  
lljadw
 

Quote:
Originally Posted by VDKMS
The British could have beaten Rommel alone but Montgomery was an overly cautious leader and slow in his attacks. The Americans were surely helpful but not experienced. They still had to learn a lot.



Not all their forces were in Northern Africa.



Rommel was very agressive and inventive, Montgomery was defensive and conservative.



That's your theory, wouldn't work in practice.
Did you in your theory included among other things water and food for half a million soldiers, each and every day? Do you now what is needed to supply that to them?
He does not know,because,in post 51,he said :I don't think
December 28th, 2011  
samneanderthal
 
Hi Lee,
The French did not want to surrender, they just had to do it when the British espeditionary force, especially the air force abandoned France and Italy invaded France. Had the British remained in France the French could have lost most of France and kept fighting and Italy would not have dared to pounce on France. If the German offensive stalled, Italy may have even joined the allies, like it did in WW I, making a big difference.

Kasserine Pass was a basic American mistake rather than a master stroke of counter attack. It resulted because after el Alamein II on Nov 11, 1942 cautious Monty allowed Rommel to crawl over 1,700 km from the plains of Egypt and Libya all the way to the mountains of Tunisia, while Rommel received lots of troops, tanks (including a few Tigers) up to mid February, 1943. Monty paused for 3 weeks, renewing the offensive on Dec 11, allowing the trounced Rommel to rest and escape. Monty captured Tripoli on Jan 23, 1942 over 10 weeks after el Alamein II.
In Kasserine Pass green US tank crews fell for the trap set with plenty of time by the retreating German tanks and were led all the way to the hidden 88 mm guns, where close to 100 of them were blown up. The American leaders and troops panicked when the German armor renewed the attack, but in the end artillery saved the day and the Pass was in allied hands again by Feb 25, 1943, Patton would soon be winning al el Guettar and the axis would surrender in Africa by May 13, 1943.
Overall in all the action around the battle of Kasserine Pass there were nearly 30,000 allies against 22,000 Germans and the allies were advancing in Mountanous terrain with little air support. In contrast at el Alamein II Monty was attacking in flat terrain with 70% more men, 90% more tanks, 60% more cannon and 290% more antitank guns than Rommel had. The RAF provided considerable ground support, while the LW limited itself to shooting down RAF planes and provided almost no ground support. On the other hand axis troops were short of everything (even water) and had been shelled and bombed for a while and their tanks were badly worn after the long trip from Libya in the desert (it is surprising that a few made the round trip).
December 29th, 2011  
MontyB
 
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by Korean Seaboy
Then who created the strategy of the Blitzkrieg in your opinion? I agree that not one person created the theory, but several people in several nations helped formulate the strategy. However, Liddell Hart, Heinz Guderian, De Gaulle, J. F. C. Fuller, Mikhail Tukhachevsky, and several others all had a part in developing the theory.
To claim that they didn't would be ignoring historical quotes, facts, events, in fact, ignore history itself
I am going be a bit more controversial here and say that none of the above created the strategy of Blitzkrieg, I would suggest that the principals of Blitzkrieg were put in place as far back as 1807 by the likes of Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Clauswitz this was further developed by von Schlieffen and von Moltke who emphasised the positioning of superior forces at decisive points through the use of superior mobility and railway allowing for rapid manoeuvre.

Essentially "Blitzkrieg" was under development at least 140 years before the Third Reich put it into practice and the men we are crediting with "inventing" it here are the ones that refined it into the form unleashed in 1939 not its inventors.