![]() |
![]() |
|
|
Italy had a very good army. Balbo and then Graziani correctly told Mussolini that with German planes and armor they could take Egypt, but Mussolini ignored them and ordered the disastrous invasion just with inferior tanks and artillery and very few modern planes.
The combination of Italian armor, navy and troops and German planes, armor and a few troops was extremely effective in Libya in 1941 and 42 and would have been even more so invading Egypt in 1939, when British defenses were very week. Allowing Britain to capture over a hundred thousand troops and lots of cannon, machine guns, ammunition, etc, in Libya that were used against Italy in Greece was disastrous for the axis. In Contrast, using these forces and some German forces to capture Egypt and Malta in 1939 would have been disastrous for Britain. Invading Egypt successfully would have allowed Italy to control from Erythrea to Libya and kept the Duce from stupidly invading Greece. Guderian was not a tank engineer but a communications officer who performed extremely well, even during the December Soviet counter offesnive, when his men after fighting continuously for 6 months and with extremely few tanks, no winter clothes, little ammunition, and very week air support, etc, had to face Zhukov's much superior T-34s and KV-1s and fresh troops that had survived Barbarossa in Siberia. Guderian was dismissed by the amateur and rather stupid Hitler because he withdrew to fight another day, instead of being completely wiped out. Hitler would dismiss 30 rather bright Generals and Field Marshals because they had failed, mostly thanks to Hitler's stupid, imprecise and confusing orders and counter orders and to Göring's (who on top of directing the Luftwaffe and the economy also directed production) ridiculously low production. |
![]() |
|
![]() |
![]() |
|||
![]() |
Quote:
During WW1 he served as a signals and General Staff Officer. Quote:
|
![]() |
|
|
One of Sun Tsu's principles is that a general should never receive orders from a monarch far away for the front. Hitler did exactly the opposite, changing his generals plans and reactions constantly in the USSR, with disastrous consequences.
Another principle is to defeat the enemy by maneuvering rather than fighting. Hitler did exactly the opposite in Kursk, wasting his forces in a hopeless attack against the most fortified area in history. In Kursk there was no surprise, mobility or air superiority so all the elements of the Blitzkrieg were missing. It was more akin to the Somme & Verdun than to Barbarossa. Hitler had made the same mistake in Stalingrad, where his troops could not maneuver or receive supplies and faced 13,000 cannon (Hitler invaded the huge USSR with only 7,280 cannon). |
![]() |
||
|
Quote:
|
![]() |
||
|
Quote:
|
![]() |
|
|
I think Chalons is one of the best examples of propaganda. First of all, there were Goths, Romans, Franks, etc,
If Attila was defeated, why did he and most of his generals survive, the Goth king die in the battle, Aetius was executed and Rome pay ransom to avoid destruction by Attila a few months after Chalons? A true Roman victory usually resulted in obliteration of the enemy and Chalons certainly does not seem to be the case. Chalons was the only large battle in which Attila relied on a large, slow foot army instead of elite horse archers. The Italian army kicked the Brits out of Somalia and fought quite well with Rommel in Gazala, etc, |
![]() |