The Hidden Security Risk

Team Infidel

Forum Spin Doctor
Washington Times
June 17, 2008
Pg. 25
Defense contracts to foreign firms should be limited
By John Bolton
Defense procurement issues are typically matters of eye-glazing complexity and obscurity. Military and corporate jargon, proliferating acronyms and impenetrable regulatory structures dissuade even knowledgeable foreign affairs devotees from paying much attention.
Every so often, however, a military procurement controversy spotlights a more salient national security issue in ways potentially critical to long-term American defense. Just such a moment now confronts us in the controversial Air Force decision awarding a massive aerial-refueling tanker contract to a foreign-dominated consortium.
Spurning a competitive bid by Boeing, the Air Force awarded the contract to the European Aeronautic Defense and Space Co. (EADS) and Northrop Grumman, a U.S. firm. Boeing is now protesting the bid decision before the Government Accountability Office - and a decision is likely just days away.
There is no doubt that many, perhaps even most, arguments about preserving the "defense industrial base" are simply poorly disguised arguments for protectionism. But not all of them. That is why, for example, we have restrictions on arms exports: to ensure that critical technologies are not sold to potential adversaries. One could argue persuasively that there are too many restrictions, but there is no serious analyst who has ever argued for no restrictions.
Obviously, the critical analytical task is where to draw the line. Manufacturing military uniforms abroad is one thing. Manufacturing nuclear weapons is something else.
Sweeping too broadly justifiably raises concerns about an under-the-table industrial policy that acts as a hidden tariff barrier against the disfavored. Sweeping too narrowly, however, risks the unintended transfer abroad of key technologies or placing at risk our supplies of critical national security assets at decisive moments. Unless one is prepared to argue that everything our military and intelligence services require can be outsourced abroad, there is no way to avoid drawing this line.
Through ad hoc decision making over many years, however, the line, if ever clear, has been completely obscured. One compelling example is our imminent dependence on Russian rocket boosters for access to the space station, which is made particularly acute as the space shuttle fleet rapidly approaches the end of its life span. How we reached this breathtaking dependency follows no coherent story line, but its conclusion is clear. Why we would want to do this to ourselves yet again is beyond explanation.
The most sensible line to draw is around those technologies essential to America's massive force-projection capabilities, the sub-nuclear military attribute that justifiably distinguishes the United States as the world's sole superpower. No other NATO member, except Britain and France in limited ways, has such a capability, and outside NATO, only Russia currently has it to a significant extent. Central to sustained force projection is the ability of U.S. air and naval assets to range around the globe - attacking far-away targets; inserting, supplying and protecting friendly ground forces; and acting as a critical deterrent to possible threats.
And central to these global capacities is the seemingly prosaic task of keeping our air and naval fleets safely refueled. The U.S. Navy over the years shifted from sail to coal to oil, and now to nuclear power for many of its blue-water ships, reducing the need for refueling stations around the world. Our air assets, however, do not have that flexibility. Aerial refueling is the blue-sky equivalent of nuclear propulsion for our blue-water navy.
There is no justification for putting this unimaginably important capability at risk by manufacturing critical elements of it abroad. It is not enough to say that EADS is largely owned by allies of the United States, because we may well differ with allies on key issues of national security. Consider, for example the widely differing views between America and "Europe" on Arab-Israeli affairs, on NATO expansion, on Iran's nuclear program, or on a host of other issues. Moreover, Russia is a five-percent owner of EADS. For those who may have forgotten, Russia is not a NATO ally. Finally, of course, ownership structures in EADS may change, and not necessarily for the better.
The United States simply cannot risk being denied full access to the aerial-refueling planes and spare parts at times of risk. And yet that is precisely the outcome we will face if awarding the tanker contract to Northrop/EADS is sustained.
To be sure, all American defense firms, including Northrop-Grumman and Boeing, have had to compete recently in the increasingly incoherent procurement system. It is no disparagement of any private firm to say they had little choice in the matter, since they are not policy-makers in the domestic-vs.-foreign manufacturing debate, but instead they are policy receivers. How they or others responded to or fared in past procurements is not an answer to the current dilemma.
It is, in fact, only a decision like that on the aerial-refueling tanker that highlights how completely out of sync procurement has drifted from what should be fundamental politico-military priorities. With so much at stake, the decision America faces is not limited simply to the outcome of the current tanker competition.
We need instead a complete and coherent reappraisal of our military procurement policies on the domestic-versus-foreign issue. This reappraisal should proceed whether or not Boeing's current bid protest succeeds, but it will be especially important if the protest fails. At that point, a decisive shift in the security of our force-projection capabilities will take place, which cannot be corrected for years or possibly decades to come. Whether originating in the Administration or in Congress, this reappraisal needs to begin immediately.
Former U.N. Ambassador John Bolton, who also served as Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, is of counsel to Kirkland & Ellis, which represents the Boeing Co.
 
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