Team Infidel
Forum Spin Doctor
Inside The Army
May 7, 2007
Pg. 1
As debate continues in Congress over the direction and duration of the Iraq war, the nearly three-year-old Bush administration plan to train the Iraq Security Forces so that U.S. forces can begin to redeploy is making slow but steady progress, according to the U.S. general overseeing the advisory mission.
When Brig. Gen. Dana Pittard left Iraq after his second tour in early 2005, just two “kind of struggling” Iraqi Army divisions had been cobbled together.
“Now we have 10 very capable divisions,” he told Inside the Army in a May 4 telephone interview from Baghdad.
Pittard said the quality of the U.S. advisers coming to him out of Ft. Riley, KS, has made a difference in the attention the Iraqi soldiers receive.
“The [U.S.] Army has dedicated an entire division headquarters to this training effort,” he said of the Ft. Riley training schools. “And that’s very painful, because we only have ten divisions. So it really shows the priority and dedication of the Army . . . to transition team training.”
He explained that the preparation for the U.S. advisers is now conducted in five phases, culminating at the Phoenix Academy at Camp Taji, Iraq. Intensive Arabic language classes are incorporated into three of those five phases.
“The effort is so much better, and you can see the difference in the teams,” said Pittard.
The service has also centralized the selection of team members at its Human Resources Command, ensuring that the best-qualified individuals are chosen for the job.
“At least at the colonel level, we hand-pick those team members . . . based on the criteria necessary to make a good adviser,” Pittard explained.
He said some of those qualities included tactical experience at different levels and recent deployment in Iraq or Afghanistan.
One obvious reason for that is the familiarity with local culture that a tour of duty provides.
“But also if they were here before, and they now see [how far] Iraqi security forces have come, they’re a lot more enthusiastic” and patient, Pittard added. Such advisers “won’t necessarily measure success in days and weeks. They know it really needs to be measured in months and years.”
Still, challenges to standing up a viable Iraqi military, as well as police and border patrol elements, remain. Many troops in the all-volunteer Iraqi Army believed when they enlisted that they would be stationed close to their own neighborhoods. However, they are often deployed to Baghdad, al-Anbar province and other locations in dire need of security reinforcements.
Coupled with the lack of a modern banking system that would allow for ready transfer of paychecks to their families, that situation has led to a high desertion rate.
Pittard added that another ongoing challenge is the creation of a non-commissioned officer corps and the kind of collective training needed to maintain unit cohesion under battle conditions.
“The Iraqi Army . . . goes back to the 1920s and there are some very good traditions,” he said. He specifically cited excellent training schools for field-grade officers. However, “collective unit training” from the squad level “was not really a tradition in the Iraqi military.”
“That is beginning to take root, but we will see if that’s a permanent planting,” he said. “Time will tell.”
Pittard also emphasized the need for political reconciliation alongside military training. He said leaders dedicated to a unified Iraq and free from sectarian loyalties remain the essential element for keeping the country together: “It’s primarily about getting the right leaders that don’t have a sectarian bias and can be trusted by the government.”
He said one example of success in this area was the reform of the Iraqi National Police, begun in mid-2006 by Maj. Gen. Jassem Al Awadi Hussain when he assumed command of the INP. Hussain came to the position with the intent of purging the top levels of the force of anyone with known ties to sectarian militias.
“A year ago, everybody was writing off the national police as just an arm of the Shi’ia militias,” said Pittard. “A lot has changed since then,” beginning with the senior leadership, he explained.
Hussain “removed four of the nine national police brigade commanders who were suspected of having sectarian leanings,” said Pittard. He has also instituted a four-week intensive re-training course at an academy outside of Baghdad.
“When they graduate they are in their new digitized blue uniforms,” Pittard said. “We haven’t had any known transgressions or extra-judicial killings that have been attributable to those units.”
“If you had suggested that to me ten months ago, I would have told you that that was not possible,” he added.
Pittard acknowledged, however, that local police remain more vulnerable to militia infiltration and that their units would require much more time to mature.
At the same time, the progress of the Baghdad security plan under President Bush’s troop surge is not likely to be known before September, when Gen. David Petraeus, commander of Multi-National Force-Iraq, is expected to conduct a review of that effort.
According to Pittard, Iraqi troops’ readiness to take the lead in securing the country will likely take even longer to assess.
“I do think if we do it right, it will take years,” he said.
-- Marina Malenic
May 7, 2007
Pg. 1
As debate continues in Congress over the direction and duration of the Iraq war, the nearly three-year-old Bush administration plan to train the Iraq Security Forces so that U.S. forces can begin to redeploy is making slow but steady progress, according to the U.S. general overseeing the advisory mission.
When Brig. Gen. Dana Pittard left Iraq after his second tour in early 2005, just two “kind of struggling” Iraqi Army divisions had been cobbled together.
“Now we have 10 very capable divisions,” he told Inside the Army in a May 4 telephone interview from Baghdad.
Pittard said the quality of the U.S. advisers coming to him out of Ft. Riley, KS, has made a difference in the attention the Iraqi soldiers receive.
“The [U.S.] Army has dedicated an entire division headquarters to this training effort,” he said of the Ft. Riley training schools. “And that’s very painful, because we only have ten divisions. So it really shows the priority and dedication of the Army . . . to transition team training.”
He explained that the preparation for the U.S. advisers is now conducted in five phases, culminating at the Phoenix Academy at Camp Taji, Iraq. Intensive Arabic language classes are incorporated into three of those five phases.
“The effort is so much better, and you can see the difference in the teams,” said Pittard.
The service has also centralized the selection of team members at its Human Resources Command, ensuring that the best-qualified individuals are chosen for the job.
“At least at the colonel level, we hand-pick those team members . . . based on the criteria necessary to make a good adviser,” Pittard explained.
He said some of those qualities included tactical experience at different levels and recent deployment in Iraq or Afghanistan.
One obvious reason for that is the familiarity with local culture that a tour of duty provides.
“But also if they were here before, and they now see [how far] Iraqi security forces have come, they’re a lot more enthusiastic” and patient, Pittard added. Such advisers “won’t necessarily measure success in days and weeks. They know it really needs to be measured in months and years.”
Still, challenges to standing up a viable Iraqi military, as well as police and border patrol elements, remain. Many troops in the all-volunteer Iraqi Army believed when they enlisted that they would be stationed close to their own neighborhoods. However, they are often deployed to Baghdad, al-Anbar province and other locations in dire need of security reinforcements.
Coupled with the lack of a modern banking system that would allow for ready transfer of paychecks to their families, that situation has led to a high desertion rate.
Pittard added that another ongoing challenge is the creation of a non-commissioned officer corps and the kind of collective training needed to maintain unit cohesion under battle conditions.
“The Iraqi Army . . . goes back to the 1920s and there are some very good traditions,” he said. He specifically cited excellent training schools for field-grade officers. However, “collective unit training” from the squad level “was not really a tradition in the Iraqi military.”
“That is beginning to take root, but we will see if that’s a permanent planting,” he said. “Time will tell.”
Pittard also emphasized the need for political reconciliation alongside military training. He said leaders dedicated to a unified Iraq and free from sectarian loyalties remain the essential element for keeping the country together: “It’s primarily about getting the right leaders that don’t have a sectarian bias and can be trusted by the government.”
He said one example of success in this area was the reform of the Iraqi National Police, begun in mid-2006 by Maj. Gen. Jassem Al Awadi Hussain when he assumed command of the INP. Hussain came to the position with the intent of purging the top levels of the force of anyone with known ties to sectarian militias.
“A year ago, everybody was writing off the national police as just an arm of the Shi’ia militias,” said Pittard. “A lot has changed since then,” beginning with the senior leadership, he explained.
Hussain “removed four of the nine national police brigade commanders who were suspected of having sectarian leanings,” said Pittard. He has also instituted a four-week intensive re-training course at an academy outside of Baghdad.
“When they graduate they are in their new digitized blue uniforms,” Pittard said. “We haven’t had any known transgressions or extra-judicial killings that have been attributable to those units.”
“If you had suggested that to me ten months ago, I would have told you that that was not possible,” he added.
Pittard acknowledged, however, that local police remain more vulnerable to militia infiltration and that their units would require much more time to mature.
At the same time, the progress of the Baghdad security plan under President Bush’s troop surge is not likely to be known before September, when Gen. David Petraeus, commander of Multi-National Force-Iraq, is expected to conduct a review of that effort.
According to Pittard, Iraqi troops’ readiness to take the lead in securing the country will likely take even longer to assess.
“I do think if we do it right, it will take years,” he said.
-- Marina Malenic