Team Infidel
Forum Spin Doctor
New York Times
January 22, 2007
Pg. 6
Military Memo
By David S. Cloud
WASHINGTON, Jan. 21 — Less than a month after Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates took office, his imprint on American military strategy is beginning to show.
Mr. Gates, it turns out, is a hawk.
In just the last two weeks, he has supported deepening the American military commitment in Iraq, spoken approvingly of sending more troops to Afghanistan and, after dispatching a second American aircraft carrier to the Persian Gulf, declared that negotiations with Iran right now would be futile.
But a hawk may not be all he is. His favorite quotation from history, he told reporters traveling with him this week for meetings with allies and commanders in Europe and the Middle East, is from Frederick the Great, the 18th century Prussian monarch and gifted musician: “Negotiations without arms are like music books without instruments.”
Or, put another way, it takes military power to create the leverage necessary to make negotiations fruitful.
Mr. Gates seems to be hoping that a short-term application of military might can shift the balance of power in the region sufficiently to make eventual political settlements — between Shiites and Sunnis in Iraq, with Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan and even with the ayatollahs in Iran — more plausible for the United States than they appear right now.
It is too early to say whether this new approach will work, or even whether Mr. Gates’s views will ultimately drive decisions in an administration where President Bush himself has rarely shown interest in that sort of strategic thinking.
But there is no mistaking the course change at the Pentagon.
Already there are signs, some large and some small, that Mr. Gates would like to discard assumptions that have dictated how the Bush administration has fought in Iraq.
The most far-reaching of those has been the idea, promoted by his predecessor, Donald H. Rumsfeld, that the American military should be deployed with the fewest number of forces necessary to do the job.
In practice, many critics inside and outside the military say, that has meant that the Army and Marine Corps have never had adequate force levels to do the job in Iraq.
Mr. Bush’s plan to send more than 20,000 additional troops to Iraq was not Mr. Gates’s idea, but he quickly supported it after joining the administration last month, even overruling military commanders who asked initially for only about 7,000 more troops.
Mr. Gates does seem to share Mr. Rumsfeld’s concern that sending more American troops will only delay the day when Iraq’s government will assume greater responsibility for security.
But rather than withhold additional troops altogether, Mr. Gates has insisted that the additional forces are a source of leverage over the Iraqi prime minister, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki.
He has emphasized repeatedly that the American troop buildup, which is happening over a period of months, could be halted if Iraq’s Shiite-dominated government does not deliver on promises to send its own troops to Baghdad and not to interfere with operations against Shiite death squads in Baghdad.
Perhaps the biggest test of Mr. Gates’s influence will be whether the United States follows through on this threat if Mr. Maliki does not comply with those promises.
Mr. Gates’s formative experience in government came over a three-decade career as a Soviet specialist in the Central Intelligence Agency.
He argued in a 1999 speech, almost a decade after he stepped down as C.I.A. director, that billions of dollars in covert aid, including Stinger missiles, to the Afghan rebels fighting the Soviet occupation in the 1980s enabled them to “fight the vaunted Soviet Army to a standoff and eventually force a political decision to withdraw.”
At its height, the Soviet deployment to Afghanistan was over 100,000 troops, more than double the current American and NATO force level in Afghanistan, and yet the Soviets still retreated in defeat.
In some ways, the United States, as an occupying army in both Afghanistan and Iraq, is dealing with the same difficulties the Soviets faced then.
How can it avoid the same fate? Mr. Gates seems to think it can be done by, in addition to pressuring Mr. Maliki, bringing pressure to bear on other countries to help stabilize the region.
Hopscotching around the Persian Gulf last week, Mr. Gates met with leaders from Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Bahrain, appealing to those Sunni governments to urge their fellow Sunnis in Iraq to reach a political accommodation with the Mr. Maliki’s Shiite-dominated government.
His warning to the Persian Gulf kingdoms was blunt: If Iraq falls apart, the Iranian Shiites will gain power in the region, to the Sunnis’ disadvantage.
Mr. Gates also seems to think there might be a way to restrain Iran’s nuclear ambitions and its meddling in Iraq, short of going to war against Iran. He mused publicly last week that negotiations between the United States and Iran might one day make sense, if the United States could regain “leverage” over the Iranians.
How to do that? As Frederick the Great might have said, send in more troops and another aircraft carrier first.
January 22, 2007
Pg. 6
Military Memo
By David S. Cloud
WASHINGTON, Jan. 21 — Less than a month after Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates took office, his imprint on American military strategy is beginning to show.
Mr. Gates, it turns out, is a hawk.
In just the last two weeks, he has supported deepening the American military commitment in Iraq, spoken approvingly of sending more troops to Afghanistan and, after dispatching a second American aircraft carrier to the Persian Gulf, declared that negotiations with Iran right now would be futile.
But a hawk may not be all he is. His favorite quotation from history, he told reporters traveling with him this week for meetings with allies and commanders in Europe and the Middle East, is from Frederick the Great, the 18th century Prussian monarch and gifted musician: “Negotiations without arms are like music books without instruments.”
Or, put another way, it takes military power to create the leverage necessary to make negotiations fruitful.
Mr. Gates seems to be hoping that a short-term application of military might can shift the balance of power in the region sufficiently to make eventual political settlements — between Shiites and Sunnis in Iraq, with Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan and even with the ayatollahs in Iran — more plausible for the United States than they appear right now.
It is too early to say whether this new approach will work, or even whether Mr. Gates’s views will ultimately drive decisions in an administration where President Bush himself has rarely shown interest in that sort of strategic thinking.
But there is no mistaking the course change at the Pentagon.
Already there are signs, some large and some small, that Mr. Gates would like to discard assumptions that have dictated how the Bush administration has fought in Iraq.
The most far-reaching of those has been the idea, promoted by his predecessor, Donald H. Rumsfeld, that the American military should be deployed with the fewest number of forces necessary to do the job.
In practice, many critics inside and outside the military say, that has meant that the Army and Marine Corps have never had adequate force levels to do the job in Iraq.
Mr. Bush’s plan to send more than 20,000 additional troops to Iraq was not Mr. Gates’s idea, but he quickly supported it after joining the administration last month, even overruling military commanders who asked initially for only about 7,000 more troops.
Mr. Gates does seem to share Mr. Rumsfeld’s concern that sending more American troops will only delay the day when Iraq’s government will assume greater responsibility for security.
But rather than withhold additional troops altogether, Mr. Gates has insisted that the additional forces are a source of leverage over the Iraqi prime minister, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki.
He has emphasized repeatedly that the American troop buildup, which is happening over a period of months, could be halted if Iraq’s Shiite-dominated government does not deliver on promises to send its own troops to Baghdad and not to interfere with operations against Shiite death squads in Baghdad.
Perhaps the biggest test of Mr. Gates’s influence will be whether the United States follows through on this threat if Mr. Maliki does not comply with those promises.
Mr. Gates’s formative experience in government came over a three-decade career as a Soviet specialist in the Central Intelligence Agency.
He argued in a 1999 speech, almost a decade after he stepped down as C.I.A. director, that billions of dollars in covert aid, including Stinger missiles, to the Afghan rebels fighting the Soviet occupation in the 1980s enabled them to “fight the vaunted Soviet Army to a standoff and eventually force a political decision to withdraw.”
At its height, the Soviet deployment to Afghanistan was over 100,000 troops, more than double the current American and NATO force level in Afghanistan, and yet the Soviets still retreated in defeat.
In some ways, the United States, as an occupying army in both Afghanistan and Iraq, is dealing with the same difficulties the Soviets faced then.
How can it avoid the same fate? Mr. Gates seems to think it can be done by, in addition to pressuring Mr. Maliki, bringing pressure to bear on other countries to help stabilize the region.
Hopscotching around the Persian Gulf last week, Mr. Gates met with leaders from Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Bahrain, appealing to those Sunni governments to urge their fellow Sunnis in Iraq to reach a political accommodation with the Mr. Maliki’s Shiite-dominated government.
His warning to the Persian Gulf kingdoms was blunt: If Iraq falls apart, the Iranian Shiites will gain power in the region, to the Sunnis’ disadvantage.
Mr. Gates also seems to think there might be a way to restrain Iran’s nuclear ambitions and its meddling in Iraq, short of going to war against Iran. He mused publicly last week that negotiations between the United States and Iran might one day make sense, if the United States could regain “leverage” over the Iranians.
How to do that? As Frederick the Great might have said, send in more troops and another aircraft carrier first.