Has any one read: Guderian: Panzer Pioneer or Myth Maker?

[MontyB]

I have always been at odds with some of Guderian's ideas throughout WW2 even to the point that I have found myself agreeing with Rommel (one of the most over romanticised leaders of WW2) on the defence of France and disagreed with his theory of focusing on the PZ IV late in the war, so while looking through a local book store I found this book and I am tempted to pick it up but I am unsure as to whether it is a good investigative account or revisionist history.

Details:

ISBN 9781574888102 / 1574888102
TITLE Guderian: Panzer Pioneer or Myth Maker?
AUTHOR Russell A. Hart

Here is the publishers description:

Biographers and historians have lionized Heinz Guderian as the legendary father of the German armored force and brilliant practitioner of “blitzkrieg” maneuver warfare. As Russell A. Hart argues, Guderian created this legend with his own highly influential yet self-serving and distorted memoir, which remains one of the most widely read accounts of the Second World War. Unfortunately, too many of Guderian 's biographers have accepted his view of his accomplishments at face value, without sufficient critical scrutiny, resulting in an undeserved hagiography. While undoubtedly a great military figure of appreciable ego and ambition and with a volatile, impetuous, and difficult personality, Guderian was determined to achieve his vision of a war-winning armored force irrespective of the consequences. He proved to be a man who was politically naive enough to fall under the sway of Hitler and National Socialism and yet arrogant enough to believe he could save Germany from inevitable defeat late in the war, despite Hitler 's interference. At the same time, Guderian was unwilling either to participate in attempts to remove Hitler or to denounce as traitors the conspirators who did. In the end, he distorted the truth to establish his place in history. In the process, he denigrated the myriad important contributions of his fellow officers as he took personal credit for what were, in reality, collective accomplishments. Thus, he succeeded in creating a legend that has endured long after his death. This brief biography puts the record straight by placing Guderian 's career and accomplishments into sharper and more accurate relief. It exposes the real Heinz Guderian, not the man of legend.

 

[lljadw]

There also is the fact (and this can be consulted on the web)that on the request of Liddell-Hart (IMHO an imposter)Guderian was ,in the English edition of Panzer Leader,commending L-H as his mentor ,a blatant lie,because the role of L-H before the war was insignificant .

 

[fredleander]

.....while looking through a local book store I found this book and I am tempted to pick it up but I am unsure as to whether it is a good investigative account or revisionist history.

You shall only find out by reading it.......if it is revionistic (ugly word) it would be a sort of counter-revisionistic - wouldn't it...? That is good, is it not..?​

 

[MontyB]

I am just trying to determine whether the book is worth buying for example I would not recommend "Panzer Operations: The Eastern Front Memoir Of General Raus, 1941-1945" as I found it somewhat of a self serving self righteous read basically it seems that he alone could have won the war as late as 1944 and never lost a battle everyone else did, I don't mind whether I agree with its findings or its overall aim as long as it is well researched and a worthwhile read.

I tend to think that much of the credit for modern armoured warfare seems to be attributed to Guderian, Liddel-Hart and Fuller when in reality it had many champions around the globe.

You shall only find out by reading it.......if it is revionistic (ugly word) it would be a sort of counter-revisionistic - wouldn't it...? That is good, is it not..?​

I am not sure I agree, it is kind of like the term "reverse racism", there is no reverse racism just racism as it doesnt matter who or what colour/nationality the practitioner is, in this case you can only revise history.

But you are correct I will only know what it is like by reading it.

 

[Doppleganger]

Almost anyone writing their own memoirs will be tempted to embellish the truth somewhat. Guderian was no different. The title of that book is obviously to generate interest and I suspect that the conclusion would determine somewhere in between, gravitating towards Guderian's status being intact.

Monty, why would you disagree with Guderian's recommendation to focus on production of the Panzer IV. That suggestion had many sound economic and military benefits for a 1944 Germany short on exotic raw materials and spare parts. The long barrelled Panzer IV was still competitive and it made good sense to rationalise German production. Although clearly better tanks the Panzer V and VI were more expensive and slower to make. Germany needed as many tanks as quickly as possible. If I had been Guderian I'd have made exactly the same recommendation.

As far Rommel's defence plans for France it's obvious that he had half an eye on the July bomb plot and his own political plans were it successful. How can a defence plan that has conflicting political intentions be the best one militarily? Also, I know you are alluding to the overwhelming threat of allied air power but the tanks were ineffective where Rommel wanted them anyway - why not take the risk and move them? Tanks are not pill boxes and they need to be used correctly. If there was one thing not in dispute by anyone it was that Guderian knew how to work with armour. More than Rommel, more than Rundstedt (who incidentally supported Guderian) and more than Hitler. Arguing with Guderian over the correct use of tanks is like giving Tiger Woods advice on how to play golf.

 

[lljadw]

As IG of the Pz,it was the task of Guderian to determine what tanks Germany was needing,NOT to meddle in operational things .This was reserved to the local commanders,i.c. Rundstedt,Rommel,Geyr von Schweppenburg ;the point is that Germany only had a few operational PzD:between the Loire and the Seine 3 L,HJ,21,even if these had been able to launch a mass counterattack,IMHO,this would fail .Rommels POV was :better ONE Pzbatallion on the place and moment of the debarquement,than a counterattack a few days later :the days of mobile warfare were over:it all would depend on the first 24 crucial hours .As the Atlantikwall in Normandy was not strong enough to prevent a debarqurment,the Pz units had to be used as immobile artillery .

 

[MontyB]

Almost anyone writing their own memoirs will be tempted to embellish the truth somewhat. Guderian was no different. The title of that book is obviously to generate interest and I suspect that the conclusion would determine somewhere in between, gravitating towards Guderian's status being intact.

Monty, why would you disagree with Guderian's recommendation to focus on production of the Panzer IV. That suggestion had many sound economic and military benefits for a 1944 Germany short on exotic raw materials and spare parts. The long barrelled Panzer IV was still competitive and it made good sense to rationalise German production. Although clearly better tanks the Panzer V and VI were more expensive and slower to make. Germany needed as many tanks as quickly as possible. If I had been Guderian I'd have made exactly the same recommendation.

Because I disagree with the assumption that the Pz IV was still competitive even in 1944 and had as his goal must surely have been to continue the war into 1945-46 it would have been hopelessly inadequate even against the later crop of American tanks.

In my opinion the only future for the Pz IV chassis was as Jagdpanzer IV with Germany's future armoured development being the Panther chassis.

As far Rommel's defence plans for France it's obvious that he had half an eye on the July bomb plot and his own political plans were it successful. How can a defence plan that has conflicting political intentions be the best one militarily? Also, I know you are alluding to the overwhelming threat of allied air power but the tanks were ineffective where Rommel wanted them anyway - why not take the risk and move them? Tanks are not pill boxes and they need to be used correctly. If there was one thing not in dispute by anyone it was that Guderian knew how to work with armour. More than Rommel, more than Rundstedt (who incidentally supported Guderian) and more than Hitler. Arguing with Guderian over the correct use of tanks is like giving Tiger Woods advice on how to play golf.

I disagree, for all his faults Rommel understood that to hold France the stand had to be made at the landing zones and not in plains around Paris therefore the panzers were needed to contain the beachhead and any counter any breakout.
If Rommel understood nothing else he understood the effect that allied air superiority was going to play in the war far better than Guderian did given that Guderian had never tried or been in a position to operate armour without air superiority.

 

[Padre]

With the book in hand, most people could make up their minds to buy or not to buy, with not much effort and time, by examining not too many pages. Should a purchase be made and a mistake realised, one can sell the book to a second-hand book dealer. I doubt the book is several hundred NZ dollars and so any loss minimal and the gamble reasonable. Then again, other's advice and opinions are less important than using the topic to advance your own in search of an audience.

 

[Doppleganger]

Because I disagree with the assumption that the Pz IV was still competitive even in 1944 and had as his goal must surely have been to continue the war into 1945-46 it would have been hopelessly inadequate even against the later crop of American tanks.

Why do you disagree with that assumption? I suspect that Guderian's goal was purely to prevent the destruction of Germany. The war was long lost by 1944 and no-one bar Hitler and a few of his fanatics thought otherwise. The other thing that must be taken into account is how Germany achieved their initial victories. It wasn't because they had superior tanks - in many cases they had inferior machines.

I disagree, for all his faults Rommel understood that to hold France the stand had to be made at the landing zones and not in plains around Paris therefore the panzers were needed to contain the beachhead and any counter any breakout.
If Rommel understood nothing else he understood the effect that allied air superiority was going to play in the war far better than Guderian did given that Guderian had never tried or been in a position to operate armour without air superiority.

Sound point regarding air superiority which is the only reason why you have any argument here. Having tanks as static pillboxes is a criminal waste of their ability. Tanks are not designed for defensive operations. The best way to stop a determined assualt is to deploy layers of defensive rings, encompassing artillery, minefields, tank traps and dug in infantry. Like the Red Army did at Kursk. Not tanks. Tanks are there for the counter-attack when you need mobile firepower. Guderian understood this as did Rundstedt and Schweppenburg. The whole point of having the panzers inland was to suck the Allies inland and encourage the Allied advance to overreach itself it, then counterattack with a pincer movement. Similar to what Manstein did at the 3rd Battle of Kharkov.

Rommel can claim with hindsight (had he lived) that Allied air superiority proved decisive. Other than that, he was wrong. Basing the panzers inland was the only chance the Germans had, although I don't believe it would have worked given Allied air power.

 

[MontyB]

Why do you disagree with that assumption? I suspect that Guderian's goal was purely to prevent the destruction of Germany. The war was long lost by 1944 and no-one bar Hitler and a few of his fanatics thought otherwise. The other thing that must be taken into account is how Germany achieved their initial victories. It wasn't because they had superior tanks - in many cases they had inferior machines.

All true but in the early campaigns the battles were not so armour intensive therefore inferior tanks could still secure victories when handled properly with adequate air and ground support, by 1944 battles had become far more armour intensive with the allies deployment of AFV's being more conventional and less piecemeal.

With the new generation of Russian tanks as well as the development of British and American armour the Pz-IV was simply past its prime and the chassis had reached its developmental end in all but a tank killer role, even as early as late 1945 it would have been a death trap for tank crews.

Sound point regarding air superiority which is the only reason why you have any argument here. Having tanks as static pillboxes is a criminal waste of their ability. Tanks are not designed for defensive operations. The best way to stop a determined assualt is to deploy layers of defensive rings, encompassing artillery, minefields, tank traps and dug in infantry. Like the Red Army did at Kursk. Not tanks. Tanks are there for the counter-attack when you need mobile firepower. Guderian understood this as did Rundstedt and Schweppenburg. The whole point of having the panzers inland was to suck the Allies inland and encourage the Allied advance to overreach itself it, then counterattack with a pincer movement. Similar to what Manstein did at the 3rd Battle of Kharkov.

Rommel can claim with hindsight (had he lived) that Allied air superiority proved decisive. Other than that, he was wrong. Basing the panzers inland was the only chance the Germans had, although I don't believe it would have worked given Allied air power.

I am not suggesting that the Germans were going to save France by parking armoured divisions on the shoreline and firing at battleships off the coast I am however suggesting that the Atlantic wall would have been far harder to breech had there been armour available near the beach to help close down allied breakthroughs, lets face it had the landing force not been able to get off the beaches within a very short time Overlord would have collapsed within a week.

Also Rommel did not need hindsight as he saw what the RAF did to the DAK during the withdrawal from Al Alamein.

 

[Doppleganger]

All true but in the early campaigns the battles were not so armour intensive therefore inferior tanks could still secure victories when handled properly with adequate air and ground support, by 1944 battles had become far more armour intensive with the allies deployment of AFV's being more conventional and less piecemeal.

With the new generation of Russian tanks as well as the development of British and American armour the Pz-IV was simply past its prime and the chassis had reached its developmental end in all but a tank killer role, even as early as late 1945 it would have been a death trap for tank crews.

I respect you as a poster Monty but I think on this occasion you are just basically wrong. I'm not even sure what 'armour intensive' means. The whole point about tanks is their mobile ability and it's where you apply the firepower that matters. Although I concede that by 1944 the Allies (especially the Red Army) had caught up it was still the case that superior tactics, when carried with sufficient numbers, would carry the day. The Germans were still very much tactically superior with armour. No-one is arguing that the Panzer IV wasn't a cutting edge design. The point is that in the dire situation that Germany found herself in 1944, quite a bit more of a slightly obsolescent tank than very few of a bleeding edge tank was vastly preferable. This is the crux of the argument. I'm sure Guderian would have loved to be in the position where he could recommend that the factories retool for Panzer Vs and VIs but given the harsh economic reality of the situation this was never going to be realistic. As Stalin is quoted as saying, quantity has a quality all of its own.

I am not suggesting that the Germans were going to save France by parking armoured divisions on the shoreline and firing at battleships off the coast I am however suggesting that the Atlantic wall would have been far harder to breech had there been armour available near the beach to help close down allied breakthroughs, lets face it had the landing force not been able to get off the beaches within a very short time Overlord would have collapsed within a week.

Also Rommel did not need hindsight as he saw what the RAF did to the DAK during the withdrawal from Al Alamein.

I don't subscribe to the point of view that the invasion had to be defeated near the beaches. That is a very blunt way of looking at things. One of the basic tenets of warfare is misdirection and bluff. Sucking in the Allied forces inland and then cutting off the attack with armour was the right way to go about things. Keeping German armour away from Allied naval guns was another consideration that has to be noted. The one blocker was obviously Allied airpower. And correctly you identified that on a very limited scale Rommel had direct experience of how debilitating this could be. However, once again I draw your attention to the fact that Rommel was very heavily involved in the July bomb plot and political considerations were very much in his mind.

 

[fredleander]

The long barrelled Panzer IV was still competitive and it made good sense to rationalise German production. Although clearly better tanks the Panzer V and VI were more expensive and slower to make. Germany needed as many tanks as quickly as possible. If I had been Guderian I'd have made exactly the same recommendation.

Sorry for butting in here. When I went through the detailed transcripts of Hitler's daily staff meetings I was quite astonished to see how everybody, particularly Hitler, cursed the Panzer V for all its technical problems. It was obviously new, but nevertheless. The general opinion was clearly that it could as well be scrapped. It was hinted to the Panzer IV as a much better alternative during the prevailing conditions. Things might have changed in 1944, though.

That said, it was strange to read how these generals dug themselves down in details on companies and platoons, various officers and whether an army should have a delivery of five or six Tigers. Everybody was very keen on letting themselves be heard all the time, Keitel constantly parroting Hitler in the background. Totally insane.​

 

[MontyB]

I respect you as a poster Monty but I think on this occasion you are just basically wrong. I'm not even sure what 'armour intensive' means. The whole point about tanks is their mobile ability and it's where you apply the firepower that matters. Although I concede that by 1944 the Allies (especially the Red Army) had caught up it was still the case that superior tactics, when carried with sufficient numbers, would carry the day. The Germans were still very much tactically superior with armour. No-one is arguing that the Panzer IV wasn't a cutting edge design. The point is that in the dire situation that Germany found herself in 1944, quite a bit more of a slightly obsolescent tank than very few of a bleeding edge tank was vastly preferable. This is the crux of the argument. I'm sure Guderian would have loved to be in the position where he could recommend that the factories retool for Panzer Vs and VIs but given the harsh economic reality of the situation this was never going to be realistic. As Stalin is quoted as saying, quantity has a quality all of its own.

Yes but Stalin had a very good reason for believing his quote and that was that the Soviet Union had quantity the Germans didn't, by 1944 the Germans were struggling with supply and manpower problems, they were struggling to field equipment in any number let alone the vast numbers that would have been needed.

Even if they could have produced the tank numbers they would never have been able to field, fuel and man them in sufficient numbers to match the allies, basically I feel it is a view endorsed by someone who is only looking at one aspect of the German position at the time.

So yes if you take the lack of supplies, manpower, air power and production out of the equation the Pz IV would have been the ideal tank in 1942.

I don't subscribe to the point of view that the invasion had to be defeated near the beaches. That is a very blunt way of looking at things. One of the basic tenets of warfare is misdirection and bluff. Sucking in the Allied forces inland and then cutting off the attack with armour was the right way to go about things. Keeping German armour away from Allied naval guns was another consideration that has to be noted. The one blocker was obviously Allied airpower. And correctly you identified that on a very limited scale Rommel had direct experience of how debilitating this could be. However, once again I draw your attention to the fact that Rommel was very heavily involved in the July bomb plot and political considerations were very much in his mind.

What exactly were the Germans going to cut off the allied forces with?
Their industries, transport facilities/lines, staging areas and front lines were being hammered constantly by superior numbers of allied tanks, artillery and aircraft, their codes had been broken and the allies were probably receiving German orders before Germans were.

It was only through the incredible sacrifice and to a large degree bravery/quality of the German soldier that the allies were contained in Normandy for as long as they were yet somehow even with the benefits of 70 years of hindsight you think the German fortunes would have been different had they allowed even more Allied men, material and machines ashore then provided them with forward air bases to operate the 12000 aircraft assigned to Overlord?

Seriously the position of the German army west of the Rhine was all but untenable once the Allies had broken out of Normandy and the only time there was a relative parity in two armies was while the Allies were stuck on the beaches which in my opinion was the best and only time the Germans had a chance of holding on in the west.

I will give you two examples of what awaited German armour when it tried to operate without air cover.

1) Operation Lüttich:
Here is what happens when AFV's meet RAF Typhoons...

(Source: http://www.archivesnormandie39-45.org/PhotosHD/p011915.jpg)

2) The Falaise Pocket:
All done with Allied artillery and aircraft

I believe that Guderian and the others that supported the idea of some grand panzer battle in central France were either plotting the destruction of the German armoured forces or just completely deluded about the effects allied material superiority was going to play against any major build up of German forces.

In this case unfortunately we are not going reach an agreement so I will finish up by saying that not only do I think you are wrong on this one but so was Guderian and stranger still Rommel was 100% correct.

Sorry for butting in here. When I went through the detailed transcripts of Hitler's daily staff meetings I was quite astonished to see how everybody, particularly Hitler, cursed the Panzer V for all its technical problems. It was obviously new, but nevertheless. The general opinion was clearly that it could as well be scrapped. It was hinted to the Panzer IV as a much better alternative during the prevailing conditions. Things might have changed in 1944, though.

That said, it was strange to read how these generals dug themselves down in details on companies and platoons, various officers and whether an army should have a delivery of five or six Tigers. Everybody was very keen on letting themselves be heard all the time, Keitel constantly parroting Hitler in the background. Totally insane.​

Hehe I wish more people would butt in.

I don't think there is any doubt that the Pz V had its problems but given that it had been put into production with little or no testing this was always on the cards but I am confident that given another year of development it would have overcome many of those issues (as indicated by the claim that the Panther G was considered one of the best medium tanks produced), the Pz IV chassis on the other hand still had a role to play in its tank killer role where it could still be up-gunned and armoured while still using less resources than the Pz-IV.

 

[Doppleganger]

Yes but Stalin had a very good reason for believing his quote and that was that the Soviet Union had quantity the Germans didn't, by 1944 the Germans were struggling with supply and manpower problems, they were struggling to field equipment in any number let alone the vast numbers that would have been needed.

Even if they could have produced the tank numbers they would never have been able to field, fuel and man them in sufficient numbers to match the allies, basically I feel it is a view endorsed by someone who is only looking at one aspect of the German position at the time.

Which is an argument for producing a cheaper tank more quickly surely? Anyway, the war was lost in 1944 so all this speculation is fruitless. I will end by saying that Guderian was there, had all the relevant data to hand, was an acknowledged pioneer in both the development and operation of armour and surely had his country's best interest at heart. If I am forced to choose between his opinion and yours Monty I'm afraid you will lose.

For the record the Germans were struggling with supply and material problems as far back as July 1941.

Again, regarding the other debate topic the point regarding the war being lost stands. I have never said that the Germans would ultimately be successful if they followed Rundstedt and Schweppenburg's wishes (Guderian was consulted but had no authority on the Western Front). What I have said is that a) it was entirely keeping with logical and proven operational use of armour and b) Rommel's orders were also influenced by political motive. You must bear that in mind when coming to any ultimate conclusion.

Anyway, back to the thread topic as this has derailed somewhat. While Guderian's claim to the father of Blitzkrieg is not exactly undisputed, there is no doubt that he was a highly successful theorist and battlefield commander at the large field army level. Sure Guderian, made himself out to be more noble, more deserving of praise, less guilty of mistakes, less problematic and less of a Nazi than probably was actually true. However, none of this diminishes his considerable military achievements.

 

[samneanderthal]

Rommel's idea of keeping the Panzers close to the beaches is hard to support in the face of dozens of 12" to 16" naval cannon capable of reaching over 30 km inland. See what the 14" cannon of the old Texas did to a Panzer division that supposed to be beyond its range (the captain flooded the torpedo blister on one side, so the listing elevated the cannon and extended their range.
Moreover, the large number of P-37s, and the small numbers of Typhoons, Tempests, P-38s, etc, doomed the small number of Panzers in France with meager air cover, regardless of where they were deployed.
The only reasonable option was Rundstedt's advice "make peace you idiots".
If the Texas could neutralize a sniper in Omaha beach and the P-38s could skip a 500lb bomb through the door of Kluge's headwarter's, there was little hope for a few hundred Panzers to survive, whether they were PZ IVs, Panthers or Tigers (as Wittman would find out).

 

[MontyB]

Rommel's idea of keeping the Panzers close to the beaches is hard to support in the face of dozens of 12" to 16" naval cannon capable of reaching over 30 km inland. See what the 14" cannon of the old Texas did to a Panzer division that supposed to be beyond its range (the captain flooded the torpedo blister on one side, so the listing elevated the cannon and extended their range.
Moreover, the large number of P-37s, and the small numbers of Typhoons, Tempests, P-38s, etc, doomed the small number of Panzers in France with meager air cover, regardless of where they were deployed.
The only reasonable option was Rundstedt's advice "make peace you idiots".
If the Texas could neutralize a sniper in Omaha beach and the P-38s could skip a 500lb bomb through the door of Kluge's headwarter's, there was little hope for a few hundred Panzers to survive, whether they were PZ IVs, Panthers or Tigers (as Wittman would find out).

They only had to survive long enough to reach the beach as there was no chance for a second landing had the initial assaults failed and I believe this was Rommel's point, once the allies were ashore it was all over but the shooting but if held long enough for the landings to fail then the Atlantic wall was safe for at least another year.