The German invasion of Russia:

[MontyB]

I am wondering whether Germany shouldn't have concentrated its efforts in the south right from the very beginning and driven straight for the Ukraine and oil fields in the south before swinging north ie a rather large hook as opposed to the three pronged attack plan they went for (similar to the invasion of France), while fighting holding actions in the north..

Had they achieved these goals quickly not only would they have cut the bulk of Russian fuel supplies they would have also have severely reduced Russian food supplies prior to the first winter.

Yes I know this is a bit simplistic but it is a theory that interests me.

 

[perseus]

MontyB

Perhaps a better idea still may have been to give Russia all of Poland in return for Lithuania, Bessarabia and Moldavia, or do you think it would have been a bit obvious what they were up to!

Regarding the Ukraine I recall at least one historian suggested that Germany didn't make full use of the Black Sea and river system flowing into it for transporting supplies. This would have been an additional advantage at least until the rivers froze up.

 

[Kunikov]

Umm...no. The Germans were stretched thin as it was while attacking along an entire front and keeping their flanks in check. If they had an extended flank they would have been even more stretched, especially in the logistics area. They had enough problems concentrating their supply routes throughout three army groups, putting the majority of forces into one would have been even worse.

 

[Doppleganger]

IMO Barbarossa would have worked best as a 2 season campaign, with the schwerpunkt though through Army Group South. I don't have enough time to expand on this atm but the idea would be to reach and hold the Dneiper River and hold that general defensive line until spring 1942. What would happen then would depend obviously on the actual results of the first season. The Red Army would have to be caught off guard as they were historically, which is why 'Case Blau', the German codename for the 1942 summer offensive, went initially so well.

The whole point of a 2 season campaign is twofold:

1) To allow the proper refit, recycle and resupply of German front line formations, allowing amongst other things winter clothing to reach the front line troops in good time for winter.

2) To attack in the summer which maximizes German mobility and tactical strength and defend in the winter where Soviet strength is at its greatest.

 

[MontyB]

I am just wondering whether depriving the Russians of southern Russian oil fields and the Ukrainian supplies in the first year while German strength was at its best and the Russians were technically and tactically at their weakest may not have more beneficial than bogging an entire Army Group down outside Leningrad.

I think the simplest explanation is to leave Army Group North holding the Polish frontier with AG Center and South combined and attacked along AG Souths historical lines with AG Center breaking off North toward Moscow around Kharkov.

 

[Kunikov]

IMO Barbarossa would have worked best as a 2 season campaign, with the schwerpunkt though through Army Group South. I don't have enough time to expand on this atm but the idea would be to reach and hold the Dneiper River and hold that general defensive line until spring 1942. What would happen then would depend obviously on the actual results of the first season. The Red Army would have to be caught off guard as they were historically, which is why 'Case Blau', the German codename for the 1942 summer offensive, went initially so well.

The whole point of a 2 season campaign is twofold:

1) To allow the proper refit, recycle and resupply of German front line formations, allowing amongst other things winter clothing to reach the front line troops in good time for winter.

2) To attack in the summer which maximizes German mobility and tactical strength and defend in the winter where Soviet strength is at its greatest.

That isn't a Blitzkrieg campaign anymore. This means an actual build up for war surpassing what the Germans had already done in 1941, which in turn means that the USSR would probably have done more to get ready.

 

[Kunikov]

I am just wondering whether depriving the Russians of southern Russian oil fields and the Ukrainian supplies in the first year while German strength was at its best and the Russians were technically and tactically at their weakest may not have more beneficial than bogging an entire Army Group down outside Leningrad.

I think the simplest explanation is to leave Army Group North holding the Polish frontier with AG Center and South combined and attacked along AG Souths historical lines with AG Center breaking off North toward Moscow around Kharkov.

You are, again, ignoring logistics, pushing more forces than Army Group South had as it began its advance will only complicate and slow things down, not speed them up. It will also create an extended flank.

 

[Doppleganger]

That isn't a Blitzkrieg campaign anymore. This means an actual build up for war surpassing what the Germans had already done in 1941, which in turn means that the USSR would probably have done more to get ready.

Well it would be a 2 season Blitzkrieg campaign. The major difficulty I see though is gaining the impetus/surprise for season 2. The problem would be that the schwerpunkt of any new advance would have to be carefully considered, with the element of surprise being crucial for success.

Stalin ignored all the signals for German build-up for the historical campaign. Why then would he react to a slightly bigger logistical build-up and more focused military build-up? He would most likely ignore it again.

 

[Del Boy]

Just another historical irrelevance from me. It seems to me that the Russians, because of their confidence in Generals Janvier and Fevrier, never get serious until Moscow can see the whites of their invaders' eyes. Then they get under their duvets and hibernate. OK,OK -I'm going.

 

[Kunikov]

Well it would be a 2 season Blitzkrieg campaign. The major difficulty I see though is gaining the impetus/surprise for season 2. The problem would be that the schwerpunkt of any new advance would have to be carefully considered, with the element of surprise being crucial for success.

Stalin ignored all the signals for German build-up for the historical campaign. Why then would he react to a slightly bigger logistical build-up and more focused military build-up? He would most likely ignore it again.

There's no such thing as a 'two season' blitzkrieg campaign. A Blitzkrieg campaign is a quick battle, at most a month or two, and that's what the Germans planned for. Stalin didn't ignore 'all the signals' rather he was suspicious of them. If he saw forces for a real campaign against the Soviet Union, that'd be a different story. Even so this is a moot point since a 'two season' campaign would never have been tried.

 

[Kunikov]

Just another historical irrelevance from me. It seems to me that the Russians, because of their confidence in Generals Janvier and Fevrier, never get serious until Moscow can see the whites of their invaders' eyes. Then they get under their duvets and hibernate. OK,OK -I'm going.

Have you ever thought about reading literature and learning about the topics you'd like to offer an ill formed opinion on?

 

[MontyB]

Well it would be a 2 season Blitzkrieg campaign. The major difficulty I see though is gaining the impetus/surprise for season 2. The problem would be that the schwerpunkt of any new advance would have to be carefully considered, with the element of surprise being crucial for success.

Stalin ignored all the signals for German build-up for the historical campaign. Why then would he react to a slightly bigger logistical build-up and more focused military build-up? He would most likely ignore it again.

I find it hard to believe there would have been a hope in hell they could have put together a "surprise" second season.
Personally I am still convinced the extra 6 weeks and manpower lost bailing the Italians out in the Balkans may have been more crucial than has been discussed.

 

[Doppleganger]

There's no such thing as a 'two season' blitzkrieg campaign.

Says who?

A Blitzkrieg campaign is a quick battle, at most a month or two, and that's what the Germans planned for.

In a 2 season campaign the Germans would ideally only be actually fighting for around a maximum of 5 months in each season. Barbarossa lasted around 6 months and that was a Blitzkrieg campaign interspersed with more traditional 'keil und kassel' operations to reduce encircled pockets.

Stalin didn't ignore 'all the signals' rather he was suspicious of them. If he saw forces for a real campaign against the Soviet Union, that'd be a different story.

Well he did virtually nothing about the signals, despite being warned by 3 separate, reliable sources. There is nothing to suggest he'd react any differently to an altered Operation Barbarossa.

 

[Doppleganger]

I find it hard to believe there would have been a hope in hell they could have put together a "surprise" second season.
Personally I am still convinced the extra 6 weeks and manpower lost bailing the Italians out in the Balkans may have been more crucial than has been discussed.

Well that's exactly what they did historically in Case Blau in 1942. The Soviets expected them to have another go at capturing Moscow but the Germans struck south instead.

 

[Kunikov]

I find it hard to believe there would have been a hope in hell they could have put together a "surprise" second season.
Personally I am still convinced the extra 6 weeks and manpower lost bailing the Italians out in the Balkans may have been more crucial than has been discussed.

The 6 weeks would have been lost nonetheless since the Rasputitsa was extra long that year.

 

[Kunikov]

Says who?

The creators of the concept of Blitzkrieg.

In a 2 season campaign the Germans would ideally only be actually fighting for around a maximum of 5 months in each season. Barbarossa lasted around 6 months and that was a Blitzkrieg campaign interspersed with more traditional 'keil und kassel' operations to reduce encircled pockets.

How long was Barbarossa supposed to last for? Around 8-12 weeks, what actually happened and what the Germans planned for are two different things. Tying into the other and trying to make a basis for a 'two season campaign' won't work. Read "Blitzkreig Legend" by Karl-heinz Frieser.

Well he did virtually nothing about the signals, despite being warned by 3 separate, reliable sources. There is nothing to suggest he'd react any differently to an altered Operation Barbarossa.

You apparently don't know much about what was going on. It would obviously be useless to try convince you otherwise. Simply put, for every action there is an opposite and equal reaction. There is a reason for the Red Army numbering over 5 million men by 1941 when in the late 1930's they had only around 1 million. In large part that is due to German warmongering.

 

[Del Boy]

Have you ever thought about reading literature and learning about the topics you'd like to offer an ill formed opinion on?

Ooooooooooh! No need to throw your rattle out of your pram old chap. Why not pull your finger out and try a smile. Glad to know you can read, not all of us are that bright.

 

[Doppleganger]

The creators of the concept of Blitzkrieg.

When did they say this?

How long was Barbarossa supposed to last for? Around 8-12 weeks, what actually happened and what the Germans planned for are two different things. Tying into the other and trying to make a basis for a 'two season campaign' won't work. Read "Blitzkreig Legend" by Karl-heinz Frieser.

Why can't you tell me yourself why you think it won't work.

You apparently don't know much about what was going on. It would obviously be useless to try convince you otherwise. Simply put, for every action there is an opposite and equal reaction. There is a reason for the Red Army numbering over 5 million men by 1941 when in the late 1930's they had only around 1 million. In large part that is due to German warmongering.

Is that so? What you posted here is basically waffle and has nothing to do with my point that Stalin did very little when he knew of the impending German invasion. Unless you have respected sources that state otherwise?

 

[LeEnfield]

There were to few Germans and to many Russians. The Germans did not have the man power to hold what they had taken and fight in Russia and North Africa

 

[Del Boy]

It seems to me that the Russians, because of their confidence in Generals Janvier and Fevrier, never get serious until Moscow can see the whites of their invaders' eyes. Then they get under their duvets and hibernate.

In retrospect i have come to the conclusion that my above abbreviated history of the campaigns against Russia best sums up their strategies. And they work. And i learnt it at school. And that's the true story of Russian victorious defence, in a few words..