And no matter whether the Soviets slowed down the Germans or not, they still could not stop the Germans advancing almost at will.
Well, they eventually did it...
Doppleganger said:
Well there was a decision and it was in time too.
In time - it was when? In planning of `Barbarossa` winter equipment was foreseen, for about 20% of German army, directed to East (info from the same link), since General Stuff assumed that number will be enough as occupation forces after Red Army will be defeated. If there was another decision already after beginning `Barbarossa` or even in fall 1941 - it was too late. Since traffic jams You mentioned were not foreseen and no logistics was properly planned to make this decision real.
Doppleganger said:
It was successful in December 1941 because the Germans were overstretched and out of supply. The Germans however in my scenario would be dug-in and well supplied with winter gear. As I said, picture the [SIZE=-1]Rzhev battles but on a larger scale. You seem to be a sensible guy with good knowledge so I don't see how you could think that a winter Soviet counteroffensive in 1941 would be as successful against a well prepared German Army on the defensive. It wouldn't and this has nothing to do with any bias. It is plain common sense.[/SIZE]
Well, Germans could not make nor Dnieper, nor Zapadnaya Dvina/Daugava and nor Oder rivers as natural obstacles for dug-in, unbreakable defense lines later, during operation `Bagration`, so why You think defense could be successful in 1941?
One attack at Rhzev was planned and carried out to sidetrack German attention from counter-offensive as Stalingrad, also most of the troops and efforts to break up German defense were concentrated there... Thus Rzhev could not be considered as classic scenario of Red Army offensive on German defense lines.
And as I said earlier - time and any delays helped Red Army, no Germans. In interests of Germans was to finish war asap, the German economics weren't ready for long war on attrition.
the_13th_redneck said:
It didn't matter how much men they lost. Russia could afford that loss.
This one also is overestimated. Russia, even USSR, was and is no China with more then billion population.
At first, USSR before the war outnumbered the Germany in population as 2,4:1. That it is not very much.
At second, in side of Germans also fought Finnish, Romanian, Hungarian, Italian, Austrian people. Even Polish and Czech people have been reported in Soviet archives captured as POWs from regular Wermacht units.
At third, USSR lost significant part of territory which was relatively dense populated as well in the first weeks of war. Population remaining on these territories found itself in the territory occupied by Germans and could not be used by USSR government as mobilization base any more.
Thus, USSR hadn't a large superiority in human resources over Germany. Difference was in the `total mobilization` - USSR exploited ALL its human resources - men were fighting, women worked in factories and farms 16 hours per day. While everyday life continued without significant changes in Germany for a while.