The German invasion of Russia:

[Doppleganger]

But they did, just not soon enough and in enough numbers. By 1943 it's unlikely that many would have trusted the Nazis.

http://www.ww2germancavalry.info/cossackunits.htm

I think the Germans were running short of manpower after 2 years of hard fighting so their rules on ethnic selection began to be relaxed. They were really a drop in the ocean compared to the 900,000 odd Ukrainian troops that might have been available had the Germans not been burdened with their racial ideological stance when they first entered the Ukraine. My point is that, until the reality of a long war had set in, there would have been no chance for any so-called 'subhuman' troops in the Wehrmacht or Waffen SS.

 

[A Can of Man]

I don't think you guys understand that the failures that occurred were not the only possible failures. There were just thousands of scenarios for failure just waiting to happen. If you send your limited amount of troops into an area that big, under conditions that bad with logistical options that limited you are going to lose your force.

Even if they had beaten everything they would have been greeted by the Ural mountains. By some act of miracle had the Germans been able to make it all the way there, they would have been beaten up so bad that no way could they ever possibly get past those mountain ranges.
Just how the heck do you expect these guys to bring in fuel, ammunition, food (because 30,000 troops are NOT going to live off the land), medical supplies, casualty evacuation, force replacement.
Face it man. It just wasn't possible.

 

[Supostat]

Even if they had beaten everything they would have been greeted by the Ural mountains. By some act of miracle had the Germans been able to make it all the way there, they would have been beaten up so bad that no way could they ever possibly get past those mountain ranges.
Just how the heck do you expect these guys to bring in fuel, ammunition, food (because 30,000 troops are NOT going to live off the land), medical supplies, casualty evacuation, force replacement.
Face it man. It just wasn't possible.

There is a folksay (proverb? saying?) in Russian regarding such situation or entire `Barbarossa` plan... free translation could sound as It was smooth on the paper, but the mountains were ignored...

 

[A Can of Man]

The Russians are right about that.
That plan didn't have a chance in hell.

 

[Doppleganger]

I don't think you guys understand that the failures that occurred were not the only possible failures. There were just thousands of scenarios for failure just waiting to happen.

So just what where these 'thousands of scenarios for failure'?

If you send your limited amount of troops into an area that big, under conditions that bad with logistical options that limited you are going to lose your force.

Limited numbers of troops? It was the biggest invading army in history.

Even if they had beaten everything they would have been greeted by the Ural mountains. By some act of miracle had the Germans been able to make it all the way there, they would have been beaten up so bad that no way could they ever possibly get past those mountain ranges.

Why do you even think the Germans have to go past the Urals and even if they do, they wouldn't have to do that right away if they had captured the AA Line (do you even know what this means?).

Just how the heck do you expect these guys to bring in fuel, ammunition, food (because 30,000 troops are NOT going to live off the land), medical supplies, casualty evacuation, force replacement.
Face it man. It just wasn't possible.

30,000 troops? I'm sorry, but where do you get this number from?

 

[A Can of Man]

30,000 is an example. An abstract figure in which I explain certain principles in action. But knowing what an invasion of Russia takes, you'll need far more than that. And you still haven't broken the back of the point of the argument.

As for thousands of disasters waiting to happen. That's what waits for you when you are invading a country like Russia. Again, too big, too cold, bad roads and a massive Army waiting on the other end.
In any given operation there are many things that can go wrong. Good planning, good support, good intel and a force that's large enough and proficient enough to deal with the situation reduce the chances of things going wrong and when things do go wrong, give you the flexibility to deal with them.
But Russia... you're stretching things beyond the limit. You've got thousands of disasters waiting to happen.

Limited number of troops... it's limited. 50,000 to take Singapore is decent. Take the same force and try to take Texas and we're talking about something completely different. It doesn't matter if it was the largest operation mounted with the most men. That can still not be enough and I think the invasion of Russia may have been such a scenario.

Your knowledge of details don't impress me. These are general rules applied all across the spectrum. Have you ever commanded a rifle squad? Have you ever frozen your ass off in the middle of a valley with no resupply of food or water for a week? If you're telling me that I was to bring my men as a part of a large invasion across distances that are just unimaginably big, then winter sat in and we didn't even have proper winter gear and it would take forever for any kind of resupply to get to us and even then in far smaller quantities than we would need and tell me that we were supposed to win it. I'd say the commander was mad.
At temperatures as low as it gets in Russia, vehicles can stop moving. Then what about all the damn snow? If you get snowed out you have to clear that snow and move which again, makes mobility that much harder. What if you have more men than operable trucks? Then you have to walk it like the Marines had to at the Chosin resivoir. But Russia is a lot bigger than Korea.
And what about the frostbite casualties? What about those wish flu so bad that they cannot move?
And you don't have the logistics to back it up. You cannot solve these problems out of nothing.

 

[Doppleganger]

But knowing what an invasion of Russia takes, you'll need far more than that. And you still haven't broken the back of the point of the argument.

Well, the Germans had over 4 million men for Operation Barbarossa.

As for thousands of disasters waiting to happen. That's what waits for you when you are invading a country like Russia. Again, too big, too cold, bad roads and a massive Army waiting on the other end.

The bad roads, endless landscape, massive army etc ect did not seem to deter the Germans in the first 3 months. By the time the Germans made their fateful decision to attack Moscow (which they need not have done in 1941) they had already captured over 1.5 million Soviet prisoners and had killed hundreds of thousands more.

In any given operation there are many things that can go wrong. Good planning, good support, good intel and a force that's large enough and proficient enough to deal with the situation reduce the chances of things going wrong and when things do go wrong, give you the flexibility to deal with them.
But Russia... you're stretching things beyond the limit. You've got thousands of disasters waiting to happen.

You're correct to say that many things can go wrong even in the most meticulously planned operation but thousands of disasters waiting to happen in Russia is stretching it just a little.

Limited number of troops... it's limited. 50,000 to take Singapore is decent. Take the same force and try to take Texas and we're talking about something completely different. It doesn't matter if it was the largest operation mounted with the most men. That can still not be enough and I think the invasion of Russia may have been such a scenario.

The Germans did not fail in Russia because of lack of men or equipment.

Your knowledge of details don't impress me. These are general rules applied all across the spectrum. Have you ever commanded a rifle squad? Have you ever frozen your ass off in the middle of a valley with no resupply of food or water for a week? If you're telling me that I was to bring my men as a part of a large invasion across distances that are just unimaginably big, then winter sat in and we didn't even have proper winter gear and it would take forever for any kind of resupply to get to us and even then in far smaller quantities than we would need and tell me that we were supposed to win it. I'd say the commander was mad.

Firstly I'm not trying to impress you, as I care little about your opinion of me. Secondly, the Germans initially were not intending to attack in winter so local platoon/squad commanders had no questions of the nature you've stated. Of course it would have been crazy to attack in winter but that was never the plan. The Germans were caught in 2 minds and it ended up being a mini disaster for them.

At temperatures as low as it gets in Russia, vehicles can stop moving. Then what about all the damn snow? If you get snowed out you have to clear that snow and move which again, makes mobility that much harder. What if you have more men than operable trucks? Then you have to walk it like the Marines had to at the Chosin resivoir. But Russia is a lot bigger than Korea.
And what about the frostbite casualties? What about those wish flu so bad that they cannot move?
And you don't have the logistics to back it up. You cannot solve these problems out of nothing.

With respect you do need to read up more on the subject. The Germans for example did not have to attack in winter in Russia. They chose to do so because they believed it was possible to capture Moscow before winter set in. They could have sat on the Dnieper river line and waited until Spring 1942 which is initially what Hitler wanted to do. Get this, it was the generals who persuaded Hitler to gamble and try for Moscow in late 1941, not Hitler. Had the Germans not attacked after Kiev their logistics chain would have been reinforced and their units reequipped and resupplied. Thousands of German soldiers would not have died of frostbite and the winter cold would not have affected the panzers because the panzers would not be doing anything until next spring. In fact, it would have been the Red Army who would have suffered all those problems and they would have suffered horribly. Not least for not being able to muster the 3:1 force ratio necessary for successful offensive operations.

 

[A Can of Man]

4 million men isn't enough to take Russia.
And the victories in the actual start of the invasion don't matter. That's how the fight always starts against the Russians anyway. And all those prisoners... don't know if it's intentional or not, but those also slow you down.
I know the Germans thought they could win before winter set in. Why on earth otherwise would they have not issued winter gear?
Saying thousands of disasters were waiting to happen in Russia isn't a stretch. It's what happened to Napoleon as well.
And it doesn't matter what happened. The logistics chain would have been stretched beyond its limits because of the nature of the battlefield. It is simply too far and ther roads suck. If it rains, your supply convoy will be stuck in the mud. If it snows out your convoy will be stuck in the snow. And you'll have too large of a force to reinforce purely by air as well. That operation alone would be simply colossal.

 

[Supostat]

The bad roads, endless landscape, massive army etc ect did not seem to deter the Germans in the first 3 months.

In fact only first two weeks went in more or less accordance with `Barbarossa` plans and timeline. After engaging the Second strategic echelon of Red Army in July 9 significantly slowed Germans down.

With respect you do need to read up more on the subject. The Germans for example did not have to attack in winter in Russia. They chose to do so because they believed it was possible to capture Moscow before winter set in. They could have sat on the Dnieper river line and waited until Spring 1942 which is initially what Hitler wanted to do. Get this, it was the generals who persuaded Hitler to gamble and try for Moscow in late 1941, not Hitler. Had the Germans not attacked after Kiev their logistics chain would have been reinforced and their units reequipped and resupplied. Thousands of German soldiers would not have died of frostbite and the winter cold would not have affected the panzers because the panzers would not be doing anything until next spring. In fact, it would have been the Red Army who would have suffered all those problems and they would have suffered horribly. Not least for not being able to muster the 3:1 force ratio necessary for successful offensive operations.

1. Actually winter did not affect panzers in winters 1942/1943, 1943/1944 and 1944/1945, as well as muddy roads. Only fall 1941 and winter 1941/1942. has been always mentioned as reason for failing German plans. And only because of bad planing, since during following winters both panzers and soldaten were prepared of low temperatures. And responsibility to prepare vehicles and men for winter combat is responsibility of generals, not of Hitler.

2. Miller-Gillebrandt writes, in winter 1941/1942 from frostbitten soldiers 85% returned to duty, 10% returned to duty in non-combat units (continued their service in the rear), 3,5% were commissioned as unable to continue any duty, 1,5% died. In numbers it is less than 3000 dead and ~75 000 non-letal, unable to continue duty in combat units. It is not much, if compared to combat-caused casualties of German army.

3. If Germans stopped Dnieper river line and gave Russians a rest, they will have even less success and could be defeated earlier. Only hope for Germans was to defeat Soviets asap. Any delay will decrease their chances, since USSR had more resources than Germany. And if Germany loses initiative, it loses war too.

 

[Doppleganger]

4 million men isn't enough to take Russia.

Says who? What is your basis for stating this?

I know the Germans thought they could win before winter set in. Why on earth otherwise would they have not issued winter gear?

Winter gear was issued. I suggest you go and read up a little more.

And it doesn't matter what happened. The logistics chain would have been stretched beyond its limits because of the nature of the battlefield. It is simply too far and ther roads suck. If it rains, your supply convoy will be stuck in the mud. If it snows out your convoy will be stuck in the snow. And you'll have too large of a force to reinforce purely by air as well. That operation alone would be simply colossal.

You haven't bothered to properly read what I wrote, have you? And if you can't be bothered to even give me that courtesy I'm done debating with you mate.

 

[Doppleganger]

In fact only first two weeks went in more or less accordance with `Barbarossa` plans and timeline. After engaging the Second strategic echelon of Red Army in July 9 significantly slowed Germans down.

The point is, that between June and December the Red Army could not stop the Wehrmacht from advancing and lost more casualties than any other army in history during that timeframe.

1. Actually winter did not affect panzers in winters 1942/1943, 1943/1944 and 1944/1945, as well as muddy roads. Only fall 1941 and winter 1941/1942. has been always mentioned as reason for failing German plans. And only because of bad planing, since during following winters both panzers and soldaten were prepared of low temperatures. And responsibility to prepare vehicles and men for winter combat is responsibility of generals, not of Hitler.

Well not just responsibility of the generals but of the entire German infrastructure. After 1941 the original plan of Barbarossa was over anyway and newer plans were in place.

2. Miller-Gillebrandt writes, in winter 1941/1942 from frostbitten soldiers 85% returned to duty, 10% returned to duty in non-combat units (continued their service in the rear), 3,5% were commissioned as unable to continue any duty, 1,5% died. In numbers it is less than 3000 dead and ~75 000 non-letal, unable to continue duty in combat units. It is not much, if compared to combat-caused casualties of German army.

Firstly, please provide a link if you are quoting from a source. Secondly, you are not stating how long it took for frostbitten soldiers to return to their units which is a significant piece of information. Thirdly, had the Germans a) went for Moscow after Smolensk or b) dug-in after Kiev until spring 1942 the effects of the weather on the Germans would have been minimal, successful or not.

3. If Germans stopped Dnieper river line and gave Russians a rest, they will have even less success and could be defeated earlier. Only hope for Germans was to defeat Soviets asap. Any delay will decrease their chances, since USSR had more resources than Germany. And if Germany loses initiative, it loses war too.

This is really just an opinion that has no basis in fact. There is nothing to suggest that the Soviets would have recovered from their 1941 losses by Spring 1942. In fact, they would likely have been in a worse position than historically as Stalin would have demanded attack after attack on dug-in German forces that would resulted in horrible losses for the Red Army. Like the 'Rzhey meat grinder' but on an even bigger scale.

 

[Supostat]

The point is, that between June and December the Red Army could not stop the Wehrmacht from advancing and lost more casualties than any other army in history during that timeframe.

But it slowed down and forced Germans to change their plans. It is still better for Red Army than if the `Barbarossa` would be fulfilled in accordance to timeline.

Well not just responsibility of the generals but of the entire German infrastructure. After 1941 the original plan of Barbarossa was over anyway and newer plans were in place.

Again, in winters 1942/1943., 1943/1944 and 1944/1945. German infrastructure had no such problems as in winter of 1941/1942. It means there was no decision or - decision came too late.

Firstly, please provide a link if you are quoting from a source. Secondly, you are not stating how long it took for frostbitten soldiers to return to their units which is a significant piece of information. Thirdly, had the Germans a) went for Moscow after Smolensk or b) dug-in after Kiev until spring 1942 the effects of the weather on the Germans would have been minimal, successful or not.

I'm afraid You do not read Russian...
http://army.armor.kiev.ua/hist/bezdarnoct-1.shtml

This is really just an opinion that has no basis in fact. There is nothing to suggest that the Soviets would have recovered from their 1941 losses by Spring 1942.

They did it in reality... despite to fact that Germans did not stop but continue their offensive.

In fact, they would likely have been in a worse position than historically as Stalin would have demanded attack after attack on dug-in German forces that would resulted in horrible losses for the Red Army. Like the 'Rzhey meat grinder' but on an even bigger scale.

Stalin demanded it also after Moscow, in beginning of December 1941 and it was quite successful, even with lack of tanks and other vehicles, carried out generally by infantry and cavalry, with some tank brigades, armed mainly with cheap, simple and light T-60 tanks...

 

[A Can of Man]

Yep. The Red Army needed to slow the Germans down. That's what they wanted and that's what they got. It didn't matter how much men they lost. Russia could afford that loss.
Russia knows how to use its winter to the fullest effect. That is why it is such an effective deathtrap.
And don't tell people that "that's an opinion" because your "facts" are the most blatant examples of opinions based on "what if" scenarios to which anything could have happened.

 

[Doppleganger]

But it slowed down and forced Germans to change their plans. It is still better for Red Army than if the `Barbarossa` would be fulfilled in accordance to timeline.

True but we both agree that the original timetable for Barbarossa was hopelessly unrealistic. And no matter whether the Soviets slowed down the Germans or not, they still could not stop the Germans advancing almost at will.

Again, in winters 1942/1943., 1943/1944 and 1944/1945. German infrastructure had no such problems as in winter of 1941/1942. It means there was no decision or - decision came too late.

Well there was a decision and it was in time too. The problem was that the German logistical chain could not adequately supply basics such as ammunition, food and fuel, never mind items like winter uniforms and snow tracks for the panzers. The winter uniforms for example had been ordered by Hitler, but they were sitting in a train yard in Poland in a massive traffic jam.

I'm afraid You do not read Russian...
http://army.armor.kiev.ua/hist/bezdarnoct-1.shtml

I don't but I appreciate the link anyway.

Stalin demanded it also after Moscow, in beginning of December 1941 and it was quite successful, even with lack of tanks and other vehicles, carried out generally by infantry and cavalry, with some tank brigades, armed mainly with cheap, simple and light T-60 tanks...

It was successful in December 1941 because the Germans were overstretched and out of supply. The Germans however in my scenario would be dug-in and well supplied with winter gear. As I said, picture the [SIZE=-1]Rzhev battles but on a larger scale. You seem to be a sensible guy with good knowledge so I don't see how you could think that a winter Soviet counteroffensive in 1941 would be as successful against a well prepared German Army on the defensive. It wouldn't and this has nothing to do with any bias. It is plain common sense.
[/SIZE]

 

[Supostat]

And no matter whether the Soviets slowed down the Germans or not, they still could not stop the Germans advancing almost at will.

Well, they eventually did it...

Well there was a decision and it was in time too.

In time - it was when? In planning of `Barbarossa` winter equipment was foreseen, for about 20% of German army, directed to East (info from the same link), since General Stuff assumed that number will be enough as occupation forces after Red Army will be defeated. If there was another decision already after beginning `Barbarossa` or even in fall 1941 - it was too late. Since traffic jams You mentioned were not foreseen and no logistics was properly planned to make this decision real.

It was successful in December 1941 because the Germans were overstretched and out of supply. The Germans however in my scenario would be dug-in and well supplied with winter gear. As I said, picture the [SIZE=-1]Rzhev battles but on a larger scale. You seem to be a sensible guy with good knowledge so I don't see how you could think that a winter Soviet counteroffensive in 1941 would be as successful against a well prepared German Army on the defensive. It wouldn't and this has nothing to do with any bias. It is plain common sense.[/SIZE]

Well, Germans could not make nor Dnieper, nor Zapadnaya Dvina/Daugava and nor Oder rivers as natural obstacles for dug-in, unbreakable defense lines later, during operation `Bagration`, so why You think defense could be successful in 1941?

One attack at Rhzev was planned and carried out to sidetrack German attention from counter-offensive as Stalingrad, also most of the troops and efforts to break up German defense were concentrated there... Thus Rzhev could not be considered as classic scenario of Red Army offensive on German defense lines.

And as I said earlier - time and any delays helped Red Army, no Germans. In interests of Germans was to finish war asap, the German economics weren't ready for long war on attrition.

It didn't matter how much men they lost. Russia could afford that loss.

This one also is overestimated. Russia, even USSR, was and is no China with more then billion population.

At first, USSR before the war outnumbered the Germany in population as 2,4:1. That it is not very much.

At second, in side of Germans also fought Finnish, Romanian, Hungarian, Italian, Austrian people. Even Polish and Czech people have been reported in Soviet archives captured as POWs from regular Wermacht units.

At third, USSR lost significant part of territory which was relatively dense populated as well in the first weeks of war. Population remaining on these territories found itself in the territory occupied by Germans and could not be used by USSR government as mobilization base any more.

Thus, USSR hadn't a large superiority in human resources over Germany. Difference was in the `total mobilization` - USSR exploited ALL its human resources - men were fighting, women worked in factories and farms 16 hours per day. While everyday life continued without significant changes in Germany for a while.

 

[Doppleganger]

Well, they eventually did it...

They did but this was in no small part due to failures in German strategic and operational planning.

In time - it was when? In planning of `Barbarossa` winter equipment was foreseen, for about 20% of German army, directed to East (info from the same link), since General Stuff assumed that number will be enough as occupation forces after Red Army will be defeated. If there was another decision already after beginning `Barbarossa` or even in fall 1941 - it was too late. Since traffic jams You mentioned were not foreseen and no logistics was properly planned to make this decision real.

I think Hitler started ordering winter uniforms after the Kiev operation. Remember, it's the belief of some historians that Hitler intended to do no more major fighting until 1942, with the exception of a winter siege on Leningrad. Of course, once he decided to gamble on Moscow there was no hope of those uniforms reaching the front line.

Well, Germans could not make nor Dnieper, nor Zapadnaya Dvina/Daugava and nor Oder rivers as natural obstacles for dug-in, unbreakable defense lines later, during operation `Bagration`, so why You think defense could be successful in 1941?

One of the main differences though was in force relations between the 2 sides in 1942, compared to 1944. In 1944 the Red Army had a 2:1 superiority in troops, nearly 3:1 in artillery pieces and nearly 8:1 in tanks and aircraft. In 1942 the odds would be much more in the German's favour. That would be the big difference, along with the fact that in 1942, the Red Army had not yet recovered in spirit, training and confidence from the mauling it had received in 1941. In short, it had not yet learned from the Wehrmacht and was nothing like the enormously powerful army it was 2 years later.

One attack at Rhzev was planned and carried out to sidetrack German attention from counter-offensive as Stalingrad, also most of the troops and efforts to break up German defense were concentrated there... Thus Rzhev could not be considered as classic scenario of Red Army offensive on German defense lines.

David Glantz believes that the 'Mars' offensive was designed to be even bigger than the 'Uranus' offensive further south at Stalingrad. It is his belief that Operation Mars was no sideshow and indeed was designed to push back AGC from the Rzhev salient. Stalin was still uneasy about such a large concentration of German forces fairly near Moscow. This operation is detailed in David Glantz's book, "Zhukov's Greatest Defeat: The Red Army's Epic Disaster in Operation Mars, 1942 (Modern War Studies)" and in the link below. David Glantz is no pro German historian as you might be aware. In fact, he's been accused by some of being too pro Soviet.

http://www.theeasternfront.co.uk/Battles/operationmars.htm

And as I said earlier - time and any delays helped Red Army, no Germans. In interests of Germans was to finish war asap, the German economics weren't ready for long war on attrition.

True but I think a delay of a few months to avoid fighting in the Russian winter was not only utterly sensible, it was necessary. The Germans knew that Stalin was ordering wave after wave of futile, uncoordinated attacks. The sensible option would be to let these attacks come when it suited the Germans, not when it suited the Soviets. It is one of the basic tenets of war after all that you make your enemy fight on your times.

 

[A Can of Man]

Barbarossa was on an unrealistic timetable because that's the only thing that would "work."

 

[Supostat]

David Glantz believes that the 'Mars' offensive was designed to be even bigger than the 'Uranus' offensive further south at Stalingrad. It is his belief that Operation Mars was no sideshow and indeed was designed to push back AGC from the Rzhev salient. Stalin was still uneasy about such a large concentration of German forces fairly near Moscow. This operation is detailed in David Glantz's book, "Zhukov's Greatest Defeat: The Red Army's Epic Disaster in Operation Mars, 1942 (Modern War Studies)" and in the link below. David Glantz is no pro German historian as you might be aware. In fact, he's been accused by some of being too pro Soviet.

http://www.theeasternfront.co.uk/Battles/operationmars.htm

http://rkkaww2.armchairgeneral.com/battles/mars42.htm

 

[Doppleganger]

http://rkkaww2.armchairgeneral.com/battles/mars42.htm

Ok, so you've posted a link that is basically a rebuttal to David Glantz's book. Fair enough, although without the ability to read the sources (which I presume are in Russian), it's hard for me to check their validity. Glantz at least, is widely known and respected. I'm not saying that there is no worth in the article but I have no real cause to disbelieve Glantz over an unknown author who only references two alternative secondary sources and appears to have no primary sources of his own.

I would like for you to answer my other points though, if you don't mind.

 

[Supostat]

Ok, so you've posted a link that is basically a rebuttal to David Glantz's book. Fair enough, although without the ability to read the sources (which I presume are in Russian), it's hard for me to check their validity. Glantz at least, is widely known and respected. I'm not saying that there is no worth in the article but I have no real cause to disbelieve Glantz over an unknown author who only references two alternative secondary sources and appears to have no primary sources of his own.

There's another one (seems to be quite similar with previous), with author known:
http://rkkaww2.armchairgeneral.com/battles/mars42_Orlov.htm

And here is original in Russian:
http://www.tellur.ru/~historia/archive/04-00/orlov.htm

I do not consider myself as expert in operation `Mars`, however I do not agree with thesis `Red Army's generals were fools and unable to conduct battles of first half of WW2 properly` ©.

I would like for you to answer my other points though, if you don't mind.

I already mentioned my arguments and I do not want to repeat them... basically they are:
1. Giving up initiative (even for while) increases a risk to loose entire war.
2. Time and any delays worked in the benefit of Red Army, not of Wermacht.
3. Thesis about unbreakable German defense lines in winter 1941/1942, located near the Dnieper river, does not hold critics because of points 1 and 2.