It is questionable that the evacuation of Soviet heavy industry would have been heavily affected whether the Germans halted at the Dnieper or not.
For example, Kharkov was the motherland of factory which constructed and produced T-34 tanks... Kharkov is on the East from the Dnieper river. If no need to evacuate it, imagine counterattack of winter 1941/1942 not with some T-60 tanks, but with full tank divisions of T-34. That makes a difference.
Stopping of Germans at Dnieper, without any doubts, is decision which benefits Red Army too, not only Wehrmacht.
Doppleganger said:
I don't think it would have made much difference but I do know there's no way that the Red Army of 1941/42 would have resembled the Red Army of 1943/44. Basically because a) the Red Army of 1941/42 had not only been severely mauled but its replacements were in the main under trained and poorly equipped and b) it's too early for the Red Army to apply the lessons it learned in combat in 1941.
a) Well, nobody is saying that Red Army would counterattack just after Germans stopped. There still we delays because of need to train conscripts, to find out and understand plans of enemy and so on. So, if Germans stopped in September, the main counterattack would follow only in November or even in January.
b) But it is still worth chance to take initiative from the Germans. In better conditions than real counterattack of 1941/1942, in terms of better equipment due to less evacuated and thus more productive industry.
Doppleganger said:
Sorry what didn't you get? The meaning of force relations?
The meaning of entire sentence
The force relations between the 2 sides is of no importance when determining the outcome of a battle. Force relations of proportion of forces makes a count, nobody has canceled the minimum needed superiority for successful attack.
Doppleganger said:
Therefore, the next best option was to dig-in around October and wait until Spring 1942. This wasn't only Hitler's initial intent, some influential generals like Gerd von Rundstedt also favoured this plan. It doesn't matter whether the Red Army can reequip and resupply faster because the Germans really have no choice by this time. It is military suicide to:
- attack in winter when you also know that you're under supplied
- attack in winter when you also know that your formations need to rest and refit
- attack in winter when you know that you're not equipped for winter warfare
Mate, it really is a no brainer and I don't know why you're having such a hard time grasping this.
You're also forgetting that it's almost certain that the Red Army will mount a major winter offensive in 1941 which will break against the dug-in Wehrmacht.
Of course they will mount a major winter offensive. Without any doubts. Only I think they certainly will brake up German defense lines. I am not sure could Red Army fulfill its objectives of this offensive for 100% (it depends also from what would be those objectives) because it will still lack a truck transport and at the certain moment their supplies woudn't be able to catch the first line units, in such way stopping entire offensive. But this counterattack will surely give a hard time to Germans. There won't be just sitting in fox-holes and shooting at approaching Russkies just as at shooting range.
Doppleganger said:
Come Spring 1942, the Red Army will be in no shape to mount a major summer offensive. It took another year before the Red Army was able to win in a summer engagement and that was at Kursk where the Germans allowed themselves to be sucked into a massive pitched battle reminiscent of WW1. It's not going to happen in Spring 1942, especially when historically the Red Army was beaten all the way back to Stalingrad and in this 'what if' scenario the Wehrmacht would be in measurably better shape in 1942.
Well, it depends from result of our hypothetic campaign of winter 1941/1942. at Dnieper. If Germans more or less succeed their defense than yes, You could be right and Germans would rule in the following campaign of summer 1942. If no and Red Army success to push Germans back significantly, forcing them to suffer casualties both in living force and technic, then Germans would another hard time at first to launch ad offensive and a second, to force Dnieper line (which now will de defended from other side) themselves.