Sir ! you compare the 1870-1871 franco prussian war to ww1 and ww2 ... the comparision is that it was german aggressive foreign policy which brought war in both occassions, otto von bismark ( 1870) was a very cunning politician like hitler and it was both these men intentions to have a war to strengthen germany s position. Another comparision is that france declared war in both instances however the difference was bismarck wanted war with france hitler did not. Bismarck was never aiming to annexe france it was just to remove frances power and influence in southern german states and to remove france as a threat. This as you would know brought the unification of germany in 1871 ( declared in the hall of mirrors, versailles). Hitler wanted war in the east and in my view lost credibility when german forces advanced into polish majority areas, ie the arguement that germany was protecting its own people was lost.
1.
German (imperial and nazi) policy as "aggresive"? Most historians classify French state policy under Napoleon III and that of the pre-1914 Parisian government as highly aggressive and/or revanchist. Even if a subjective classification of German policy might lead down the same path, it surely has to be admitted that the French governments maintained an incredibly egocentric foreign policy of conquest. I suggest that you think about the French policy of "natural borders" and revanchism.
a) "Napoleon III wished to realise French aspirations for "natural borders," a long term goal of French foreign policy since the Middle Ages — to annex all land west of the Rhine river and the Alps including the German state of Palatinate-on-Rhine, Belgium, the southern Netherlands, Luxembourg, Savoy, and parts of Hesse and Rhenish Prussia".
b) "Yet as early as the autumn of 1914, members of the French government were defining war aims as the destruction of German industrial power through the occupation and even annexation of the Rhineland's coal regions. The Saar would be suitable for annexation, while the lower Rhine region of the Ruhr would be put under international protection administered by France, with troops present if need be. France could at one stroke destroy Germany economic and military hegemony, while re-establishing itself as the greatest continental power. One French minister even suggested the removal of "the population of the Palatinate, who hate France, so as to create a vaste area of expansion for the latin race"".
2.
Poland as Immediate Origin of WWII?:
i)
Britain "Defended" Poland as Part of Overall Anti-German Strategy: "On March 30, 1939, the government of the United Kingdom pledged to defend Poland, in the event of a German attack, and Romania in case of other threats. The reason for the British-issued “guarantee” of Romania and Poland was a panic-stricken ad hoc reaction to rumours (later proven to be false) of an imminent German descent on Romania in late March 1939. A German seizure of oil-rich Romania would ensure that in any future Anglo-German war, a British naval blockade would not starve Germany of oil. From London’s point of view, it was imperative to keep the oil wells of Romania out of German hands. The British “guarantee” was primarily intended to block a German move against Romania; Poland was added to the “guarantee” almost as an after-thought. Only in April 1939 did it become evident that the next German target was Poland".
ii)
Britain Planned to Use or Sacrifice Poland as Excuse for Major War: "However, both British and French governments had other plans than fulfilling the treaties with Poland. On May 4, 1939, a meeting was held in Paris, at which it was decided that the fate of Poland depends on the final outcome of the war, which will depend on our ability to defeat Germany rather than to aid Poland at the beginning. Poland's government was not notified of this decision, and the Polish–British talks in London were continued. A full military alliance treaty was ready to be signed on August 22, but His Majesty's government postponed the signing until August 25, 1939".
iii)
Britain Knew of German-Soviet Division of Poland: "At the same time secret German-Soviet talks were held in Moscow which resulted in signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact on August 22. The full text of the treaty, including the secret protocol assuming a partition of Poland and Soviet military help to Germany in case of war, was known to the British government thanks to Hans von Herwarth, an American agent in the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Yet, Poland's government was not informed of this fact either".
iv)
The Soviet Invasion as Irrelevant: "Germany invaded Poland on September 1, 1939, Britain and France declared war on Germany after ultimatums to withdraw expired on September 3. However, all other items of the March 30 guarantee pledge were violated; most notably the failure to respond militarily to the German aggression on Poland (the pledge would not have obliged France and Great Britain to declare war on the Soviet Union due to the actual wording of the pact that specifically named Germany as the potential aggressor. This was kept secret for diplomatic reasons)".
v)
Winston Churchill on Post-WWII Polish Freedom (5 March 1946): "From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an "iron curtain" has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia; all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject, in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and in some cases increasing measure of control from Moscow".
Conclusion 1: Longterm French policy in Europe was based on aggressive expansion at the expense of the German states and/or Germany. Paris' policy of territorial aggrandizement had nothing to do with demographic realities or French-speaking minorities. Historians always point out that Alsace-Lorraine was German-speaking: "The new border [1871-1918] between France and Germany closely followed the geolinguistic divide between Romance and Germanic dialects, except in a few valleys of the Alsatian side of the Vosges mountains, the city of Metz and in the area of Château-Salins (formerly in the Meurthe département), which were annexed by Germany despite the fact that people there spoke French. The fact that also small francophone areas were affected was used in France to denounce the new borders as hypocrisy, as Germany had justified them by the native Germanic dialects and culture of the inhabitants, which was true for a large part of Alsace-Lorraine".
Conclusion 2: The Allied decision to declare war on Germany in
defence of Poland was a farce. Neither London nor Paris cared about Polish sovereignty nor in terms of helping the Poles. The documents and the aftermath of the war make this point clearly. The decision to fight a war against Germany was based on "higher" strategic calculations...incidentally, precisely those types of calculations that led to Germany being accused of starting WWI. (ie. fighting to break out of Franco-Russian strategic encirclement and hoping to counter growing Russian power in the Balkans).
Whether or not these calculations were justified is not the issue. The issues concern German preparations for an invasion of France and England. Since we know that Hitler wanted to keep Poland a localized affair, and that Berlin sought a European peace (albeit one that recognized German domination of western Poland), and that no military plans for an offensive against either France or Britain existed in September 1939, it becomes extremely difficult to argue that Hitler's invasion of Poland started WWII. The limited invasion only started a war in the minds of policymakers in London and Paris...a war that they wanted.
This subjective determination was independent of Poland or of Soviet actions...the only thing that mattered was confronting any perceived increase in the German, and only German, base of power. The declarations of war against Germany were intended to draw Germany into a massive European conflict that London and Paris hoped to win using attrition. Personally, I think that policymakers believed the following to be true:
a) that the German resource base was extremely limited and that a British blockade would deprive German industry of required commodities. Paris and London would therefore win a prolonged conflict. The German-Soviet arrangement circumvented this plan. That London chose to ignore this fact boggles the mind.
b) that the German industrial system was stretched to the limit and that Hitler required territorial expansion for further growth. This argument was dependent on faulty intelligence claims that bloated German armaments production and did not take the Nazi focus on dual-use investments into account. Indigenous German growth potential was in fact massive. This was a case of wild propaganda taking its toll on policy determination.
In any case, it should be remembered that the declaration of war backfired and actually helped the Nazis take control of the European continent. The decision to fight Hitler in 1939 achieved nothing of value for London or Paris or Warsaw. It was a mistake.
[Perseus' point concerning domestic politics is a valid one. However, why is it that the populations of France and Britain did not seem to mind a Soviet invasion of Poland? While I am unsure, I think that the press wrote of a Soviet rescue of Poland. Weird if true].
quotes from Wiki.
