Was General Montgomery really overrated in WW2?

Monty's big problem after November 4th, 1942 was that he was too over cautious.

He was terrified that Rommel was going to turn around and "bite him" even though Monty had overwhelming firepower and resources compared to Rommel.

Blaming the weather on November 7th was a cop out. A very poor excuse. The die had already been cast before the 7th.
 
redcoat said:
Strongbow said:
redcoat said:
Strongbow said:
Axis forces in Africa were made up of about 10% German around the time of Al Alamein.
Nonsense.
The Axis forces at El Alamein consisted of 200 German and 300 Italian tanks, and 53,000 German and 55,000 Italian troops.

Well redcoat!! I'm going to take back the "50%" and give you just 34%.

This is from "Hitler" by Norman Stone. p.186 paperback edition.

[By mid-October, Montgomery had assembled enormous weight. He attacked the El Alamein lines on 23 October, with 230,000 men to 80,000 (27,000 Germans), 1440 tanks to 540 (260 German) and, 1500 aircraft to 350.

Sorry, but my figures are from the book.
'Pendulum Of War, The Three Battles of El Alamein' by Niall Barr. (a book about the actual battle, not a study of AH)

For the 23th October 1942
His figures are;
British Commonwealth forces.
220,476 troops

1,029 serviceable tanks (170 Grants, 252 Shermans, 216 Crusader II's, 78 Crusader III's, 119 Stuarts, 194 Valentines)

Artillery 892 guns

A/T guns 1,451.

Axis Forces
108,000 troops (53,736 German)

548 serviceable tanks (249 German- 31 Mk II's, 85 Mk III's, 88 Mk III Special's, 8 Mk IV's, 30 IV Special's)

Artillery 552 guns

A/T guns 1,063.





The British Grant tanks were supplemented by Shermans that the Germans could knock out only at very close range.
I suppose over 2000 meters is very close range for an '88'
The book goes on to describe how Monty used a battle of attrition to wear Rommel down.
This is often claimed for Monty, however its not correct. The battles Monty fought were in Rommels own words 'battles of Material'. Monty used his overwelming firepower, not brute numbers. to wear down the enemy. In fact Monty is famous for his caution when it came to risking the men under his command.

It was hardly an even fight.
A good general always makes sure it isn't.

war isn't a video game


This just to add to the record.

Following figures are from Alamein by Stephen Bungay (June 2002)


50,000 German & 54,000 Italian (104,000 in total).

500 tanks (206 German & 279 Italian)

8th Army (195,000 men)

900 tanks & 2300 guns.

Most of these men were involved in logistics.

The front line soldiers were, 8th Army- 86 battalions (60000 men).

The Axis- 70 battalions (42 Italian & 28 German all up about 45,000 men)

The ratios 8th Army to Axis were 2:1 equipment and 4:3 fighting men.
 
Overrated by who?

The mark of a great general is not invinceability or we would not include any German Generals at all, so it is not just the results of the battles fought that are used to find the measure of the great commanders. I've seen Max Hastings' Overlord mentioned butI want to quote Armageddon by the same author "He possessed a shrewd understanding of what could,and could not be realistically demanded of a British citizen army.But he had done nothing on the battlefield to suggest that his talents,or indeed those of his troops, deserved eulogy. The British had fought workmanlike campaigns in North Africa, Italy and France since their victory at El Alamein in November 1942. But their generals had nowhere shown the genius displayed by Germany's commanders in France in 1940, and in many battles since(p26-7)". Montgomery has been regarded as the masterof the set-piece battle but I don't believe that holds up to scrutiny as much as Monty's defenders like to believe. His initial plan at El Alamein failed and he had to alter it (something which he was loath to admit- his battles ALWAYS went just as he planned) and the Normandy campaign was only made a successs by Bradley's breakout- not his plan. The strange inertia of the British troops who failed to capture Caen on day one- one of the key objectives- continued through the disaster of GOODWOOd and later throgh the failure to capture the Scheldt which led to MARKET-GARDEN. There can be a tendency to under-rate a general who was tended to plod and win through less than brilliant campaigning. Hastings observes that Monty's troops loved him because he did not demand of them the sacrifices that Zhukov did. It is fairly clearthat the British Army of 1944-5 was not the force that history has left us, nor could it be. This country had been bled white during the first world war and had been fighting since 1940 (well, 1939, but let's be serious).Monty's single thrust idea was ludicrous if anyone really believed that he should have led it(Liddell-Hart thought it a good idea but that Patton should have commanded). Monty was the best of the ETO British commanders and should probabaly be rated as highly as Zhukov who afterall won through attrition and overwhelming strength and had his own MARKET-GARDEN , but worse by far, in OPERATION MARS. My personal feeling about El lamein has been that,although saddled with air superiority. supplies, a numerically inferior foe and overwhelming superiority in armor as well as intelligence and fuel, Monty was still able to pull out a victory.(Oh, yeah, his main opponent wasn't there either.JWC
 
Re: Overrated by who?

melkor the first said:
The mark of a great general is not invinceability or we would not include any German Generals at all, so it is not just the results of the battles fought that are used to find the measure of the great commanders. I've seen Max Hastings' Overlord mentioned butI want to quote Armageddon by the same author "He possessed a shrewd understanding of what could,and could not be realistically demanded of a British citizen army.But he had done nothing on the battlefield to suggest that his talents,or indeed those of his troops, deserved eulogy. The British had fought workmanlike campaigns in North Africa, Italy and France since their victory at El Alamein in November 1942. But their generals had nowhere shown the genius displayed by Germany's commanders in France in 1940, and in many battles since(p26-7)". Montgomery has been regarded as the masterof the set-piece battle but I don't believe that holds up to scrutiny as much as Monty's defenders like to believe. His initial plan at El Alamein failed and he had to alter it (something which he was loath to admit- his battles ALWAYS went just as he planned) and the Normandy campaign was only made a successs by Bradley's breakout- not his plan. The strange inertia of the British troops who failed to capture Caen on day one- one of the key objectives- continued through the disaster of GOODWOOd and later throgh the failure to capture the Scheldt which led to MARKET-GARDEN. There can be a tendency to under-rate a general who was tended to plod and win through less than brilliant campaigning. Hastings observes that Monty's troops loved him because he did not demand of them the sacrifices that Zhukov did. It is fairly clearthat the British Army of 1944-5 was not the force that history has left us, nor could it be. This country had been bled white during the first world war and had been fighting since 1940 (well, 1939, but let's be serious).Monty's single thrust idea was ludicrous if anyone really believed that he should have led it(Liddell-Hart thought it a good idea but that Patton should have commanded). Monty was the best of the ETO British commanders and should probabaly be rated as highly as Zhukov who afterall won through attrition and overwhelming strength and had his own MARKET-GARDEN , but worse by far, in OPERATION MARS. My personal feeling about El lamein has been that,although saddled with air superiority. supplies, a numerically inferior foe and overwhelming superiority in armor as well as intelligence and fuel, Monty was still able to pull out a victory.(Oh, yeah, his main opponent wasn't there either.JWC

Monty kept his "balance" during the El Alamein battle. The Axis were crumbled away as Monty put it. His performance after November 7th, 1942 was "very ordinary".

A positive point we could say about Caen was that Monty kept the weight of the main German Armour away from the Americans while they were building up towards the breakout, Operation Cobra.
 
My two cents: Yes he was absorbed with his own legend, as was Patton, but Patton was not a politicion, Montgomery was.
 
Sea_Cadet said:
My two cents: Yes he was absorbed with his own legend, as was Patton, but Patton was not a politicion, Montgomery was.
No.
Monty was a professional soldier, at no point did he ever serve or seek a political role.
 
Re: Overrated by who?

melkor the first said:
and the Normandy campaign was only made a successs by Bradley's breakout- not his plan.
Operation Goodwood wasn't Montys plan either, but he gets the blame for it because he was the Allied Ground Commander, just like he should get a least some of the credit for Cobra, as he was still Bradleys boss at the time as well.

.Monty's single thrust idea was ludicrous if anyone really believed that he should have led it(Liddell-Hart thought it a good idea but that Patton should have commanded).
Monty believed in the single thrust so much, that he stated that it should be undertaken even if Bradley or Patton was commanding it.
 
Re: Overrated by who?

redcoat said:
melkor the first said:
and the Normandy campaign was only made a successs by Bradley's breakout- not his plan.
Operation Goodwood wasn't Montys plan either, but he gets the blame for it because he was the Allied Ground Commander, just like he should get a least some of the credit for Cobra, as he was still Bradleys boss at the time as well.

.Monty's single thrust idea was ludicrous if anyone really believed that he should have led it(Liddell-Hart thought it a good idea but that Patton should have commanded).
Monty believed in the single thrust so much, that he stated that it should be undertaken even if Bradley or Patton was commanding it.

Yes, very good points redcoat. I am sure aussiejohn would agree as well.
 
Goodwood

The initial plan was Lt Gen Dempsey's but Monty bought into it, ovesaw it, sold it to Ike and Churchill and changed some of the directives.There is little to mitigate Monty's involvement and actually doing so sounds more like Monty himself.As the commander of the Allied forces in France, Monty conducted a campaign that was ultimately successful, even beating its own deadlines for clearing France of the German Army.
The big however in this is that the forces under the British command(Monty)failed signally in several offences and while they tied down German forces, the plans were to do more than wasaccomplished. There is no question that Monty sold Goodwood as a plan to break out ti Ike and in paricular the Air Chiefs. The resulting furor among the Allied commanders demonstrstes just what the plan was meant to do, not what Monty claimed. Best JWC
 
Re: Goodwood

melkor the first said:
. There is no question that Monty sold Goodwood as a plan to break out ti Ike and in paricular the Air Chiefs. The resulting furor among the Allied commanders demonstrstes just what the plan was meant to do, not what Monty claimed. Best JWC
While Monty may have 'oversold' Operation Goodwood, there is no evidence that he claimed it was the planned break-out.

Here's a post I found on the Axis History Forum by a US poster Richto90 which h covers the facts about Goodwood far better than I could.

The myth that GOODWOOD was intended by Montty to be a "strategic breakthrough" first started a few days later and originated with AEAF commander Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, a bitter enemy of Montgomery. All "sources" that parrot this nonesense usually use Leigh-Mallory (or the other Monty-basher in the RAF and SHAEF, Air Chief Marshal Sir Artheur Tedder) as a starting point for their disinformation.

Here's Monty's instructions to 2nd Army before Operation Goodwood:

"Notes on Second Army Operations
16th July-18th July

1. Object of this operation.
To engage the German armour in battle and 'write it down' to such an extent that it is of no further value to the Germans as a basis of the battle.
To gain a good bridgehead over the River Orne through Caen, and thus improve our positions on the eastern flank.
Generally to destroy German equipment and personnel.
2. Affect of this operation on Allied policy.
We require the whole of the Cherbourg and Brittany peninsulas.
A victory on the eastern flank will help us to gain what we want on the western flank.
But the eastern flank is a bastion on which the whole future of the campaign in North West Europe depends; it must remain a firm bastion; if it became unstable the operations on the western flank would cease.
Therefore, while taking advantage of every opportunity to destroy the enemy, we must be very careful to maintain our own balance and ensure a firm base.
3. The enemy.
There are a lot of enemy divisions in the area south-east of Caen:
21 Panzer Division 16 GAF Field Division
1 SS Panzer Division 272 Infantry Division
12 SS Panzer Division
Another one [116 Panzer Division] is coming and will be here this week-end.
4. Operations of 12 Corps and Canadian Corps - 16th and 17th July.
Advantage must be taken of these to make the Germans think we are going to break out across the Orne between Caen and Amaye.
5. Initial Operations 8 Corps.
The three armoured divisions will be required to dominate the area Bourgebus-Vimont-Bretteville, and to fight and destroy the enemy.
But armoured cars should push far to the south towards Falaise, and spread alarm and dsepondency, and discover 'the form.'
6. 2 Canadian Corps.
While para 5 is going on, the Canadians must capture Vaucelles, get through communications and establish themselves in a very firm bridgehead on the general line Fleury-Cormelles-Mondeville.
7. Later Operations 8 Corps.
When 6 is done, then 8 Corps can 'crack about' as the situation demands.
But not before 6 is done.
8. To sum up for 8 Corps.
Para 5.
Para 7.
Finally.
Para 6 is vital.

B.L. Montgomery
15-7-44"

Paragraph 1 is quite clear, nowhere is the idea of a "strategic breakout" bruted about. What is also noticeable is that GOODWOOD itself is actually embodied in paragraph 5, which also does not mention a "strategic breakout" - armoured cars "pushing south" hardly constitutes such a plan. Note also that paragraph 7 - the "cracking about" by 8 Corps - which is the only element that can even be possibly construed as a condoning an attempt at "strategic breakout" is actually only to occur once paragraph 6 is accomplished. That is important in that paragraph 6 actually describes operation ATLANTIC, the follow-on to GOODWOOD. And it was setbacks in that operation - not GOODWOOD that cancelled the "strategic" elements embodied in such vague form in paragraph 7.

Was the possibility that GOODWOOD could result in a "strategic breakthrough" considered? Yes. Was it counted on to do so? No
 
Here's a follow on post by richto90 that maybe of interest:

Montgomery orders to Second Army and in turn the orders from Second Army to 8 Corps and the 8 Corps operational plan make it very clear that GOODWOOD was never intended to be a "strategic breakout."

Second, the 11th Armoured Division did not suffer "huge" losses. Its losses on 18 July were actually recorded as 333 men, a rate of 2.3 percent-per-day, not inconsiderable, but certainly not "huge" (GD Pz-Div suffered greater numerical losses during the battle of Kursk on three of the first five days of the battle and much higher rates have been suffered by division-size forces on many occasions). Tank "losses" were higher, with only 137 operational at last light on 18 July as compared to 296 the preivous evening, but replacement tanks were readily available. By last light on 20 July the division had 178 operational and 269 by 28 July. Neither were losses in the total force committed to GOODWOOD excessive by standards of the day.To summarize, UK forces began with approximately 139,000 men, 1,369 tanks, and at least 732 artillery pieces. Losses were 4,120 men (2.97%) (844 KIA, 2,951 WIA, 325 MIA) and 493 tanks (35%). But only 361 of the tanks were "knocked out" - that is, they were either written off or were so damaged as to require long-term repair, 132 were damaged - that is, they required less than 24 hours for repair. At the end of the battle tank strength was 1,047.

Third, the objective of the 11th AD was not "Falaise" it was - initially - the line Bras-Rocquancourt-Beauvoir Ferme. Neither was the 8 Corps or GOODWOOD objective "Falaise." The actual objectives were given as:

"Notes on Second Army Operations
16th July-18th July

1. Object of this operation.
To engage the German armour in battle and 'write it down' to such an extent that it is of no further value to the Germans as a basis of the battle.
To gain a good bridgehead over the River Orne through Caen, and thus improve our positions on the eastern flank.
Generally to destroy German equipment and personnel."

At 0300 hours 16 July the 8 Corps Operations instruction was issued. The intention laid down in the instruction was:

"On 18th July, 8 Corps will debouch from the existing bridgehead east of the River Orne with a view to:
(a) Dominating the area Bourgebus-Vimont-Bretteville-sur-Laize.
(b) Destroying any enemy armour or other forces encountered en route to this area.
(c) If conditions are favourable, subsequently exploiting to the south."

On 17 July Dempsey issued the following summary to all of his corps commanders:

"Second Army Operations
Commencing on 18th July
....
4. 8 Corps will establish armoured divisions in the areas:
(a) Vimont
(b) Garcelles-Secqueville
(c) Hubert-Folie-Verrieres.
The task of these three divisions will be to get their main bodies so established that there can be no enemy penetration through the ring, to destroy all enemy troop concentrations and installations in the area; to defeat enemy armour which may be brought against them.
Vigorous patrolling and exploitation will be carried out to the east and south-east to the line of the Dives-to the south in the direction of Falaise-to the south-west as far as the River Orne at Thury Harcourt.
Main bodies of the three divisions will not be moved from areas (a), (b) and (c) without reference to me."

It may be fairly asked if those objectives were met. In general, the answer would be - with a few exceptions - yes. Most of the objectives on the ground were reached by the end of the operation and all German counterattacks were either repulsed or contained. And in its primary purpose of "writing down" German armor and strength in general, the objective was most definitely achieved. Overall German forces engaged may be estimated as about 79,750 men, 325 tanks, assault guns, and SP AT, and 291artillery pieces (not including infantry guns), 160 heavy Pak (including at least 51 8.8cm Pak 43/41), 56 8.8cm Flak (note that the generally accepted "144" 88's on Bourgebuis Ridge may include both the Pak 43/41 and an exaggeration), and about 230 Nebelwerfer.

Fragmentary loss reports indicate that total German losses were about 6,500 men (8.15%), 86 tanks, assault guns, and SP AT (26.5%), and at least 72 Nebelwerfer, Pak, and artillery pieces (9.77%). So German personnel losses in both numerical and percentage terms were greater than the British, while the percentage losses in armored vehicles "knocked out" were probably about the same. And, unlike the British losses, it appears that almost none of the German personnel or equipment losses were replaced before the Germans began their withdrawal from Normandy.

Was it a British "victory"? Tactically at least in a very narrow sense - no. Operationally and strategically - yes. Did Rommel have much to do with it - yes, in the sense he directed the forces to be concentrated there, which was pretty much a "no brainer." But the German tactical success was a product of good terrain, a sensible and efficient defensive doctrine and high quality equipment rather than Rommel's influence.

Thanks to richto90 :)
 
Goodwod(AGAIN)

Carlo D'Este 'Decision in Normandy' p.362"..SHAEF'f optimism was intensified by the receipt of Dempsey's operational order on July 13, which assigned the following tasks to 8 Corps -On 18 July will cross R. Orne North of Caen, attack southwards and establish an Armd. Div. in each of the following areas:-BRETTEVILLE SUR LAIZE-VIMONT-ARGENCES-FALAISE." On July 15, Montgomery went to O'Connor's HQ and wrote out a personal directive which changed theobjective to establishing all # armored divisions inthe area of the first 3 mentioned and Falaise not mentioned except for armored cars to push south. This new directive wasconfined to those involved and a copy destined for SHAEF never arrived. Later D'Este write that there were only 2 copies of this order(p391),one given to Dempsey and Monty kept the other. BUT(p399 fn)Monty on July 14 sent Brooke a letter in which he wrote:The time has now arrived to deliver terific blows,designed to "write off" and eliminate the bulk of his holding troops. I doubt if can collectmore troops to write us off again in the west, and it is in the west that I want territory,i.e. I want Brittany...The general aim in this battle will be to destroy all possible enemy troops in the general area Caen-Mezidon-Falaise-Evrecy". He appended a map which showed the Desert Rats as having seized Falaise. D'Este notes "despite his change of heart barely twenty-four hours later, Montgomery left Brooke in no doubt whatsoever that his territorial aim for Goodwood was Falaise. The operational orders sem to be limited so that there was a plausible deniability if the long awaited breakthrough did not come(If it came ,the orders left room for that). Despite his protests that his strategy was too subtle for Ike, it seems that no one misunderstood what he intended and did not deliver. Best JWC(
 
Yes, I agree.

The Americans have been critical of Monty. Some of it was justified.

He had his faults but didn't most military leaders?
 
Is Monty overated?

He was one of the most inspirational military commanders of World War Two,
and his defeat of the Germans at El Alamein, was the first they had experienced.

Winning the battle of El Alamein and driving the Germans 2,000 miles across Africa into Tunisia the allies were eventually able to destroy 320,000 Axis troops and to bag 275,000 of them in Algeria and use North Africa as a springboard to successfully invade Sicily and Italy.
Winston Churchill was convinced that the battle of El Alamein marked the turning point in the war, as he said later [perhaps exaggerating slightly]

"Before Alamein we never had a victory, after Alamein we never had a defeat."


He helped formulate the invasion plan for France, and in the Normandy campaign and he was supreme field commander of all ground forces until Aug., 1944, And his taking on the main bulk of the German Panzer forces at Caen, enabled the American Twelfth Army Group to breakout from Normandy and move deeply into France.

Then pushing through the low countries, Montgomery’s 21st Army Group crossed the River Rhine on March 24th 1945. He accepted the formal surrender of the German military at Luneburg Heath on May 4th 1945.

I cant think of any other British or American commander, [with the possible exception of Patton] with as good a Resume as his. Among the Allied forces it would be just the Russian commanders like Zhukov and Vasilevsky winning the huge battles like Stalingrad, Kursk, Bagration and Berlin that could be placed ahead of him.

He is said to have made this quote after the American involvement in Vietnam........

"The U.S. has broken the second rule of war. That is, don't go fighting with your land army on the mainland of Asia. Rule One is don't march on Moscow. I developed these two rules myself."


Wise man.
 
He also wrote a book of memoirs in which he claimed to have single-handedly have won the war in Europe himself. After that none of his former colleagues among the Americans and more than a few of the British, would ever talk to him again. Not that wise a man.
 
I don't know if I could ever call Monty 'inspirational'. He was a solid, competent commander who tended to err on the side of caution. He did not give the impression of ever totally understanding the role and breakthrough ability of armoured spearheads for example.

As for the comments he made about his two rules of war, they hardly transform Monty into some kind of latter-day Sun Tze. The first one being bloody obvious (in hindsight) and the second one meaningless unless it was taken out of context.

For the record, the first defeat the Germans experienced was at the gates of Moscow, not El Alamein. Monty never faced the core strength of the Wehrmacht, namely its Panzerarmees with Luftwaffe CAS, on anything like equal terms. The Western German Army he faced in 1944 was gutted, desperately short on trained manpower, had almost no mobility and virtually no air cover or CAS. I wonder how well he would have done had Monty been in charge of a Red Army Front on the Ostfront, facing the best legions of the Wehrmacht. Not so well I'm thinking.

I've not read the book that Charge mentioned but if he truly claimed that he won the war in Europe single-handedly then not only a man who has an inflated view of himself in world history, but also a misguided and arrogant one too.
 
Charge wrote________________________________________________________________________________

He also wrote a book of memoirs in which he claimed to have single-handedly have won the war in Europe himself. After that none of his former colleagues among the Americans and more than a few of the British, would ever talk to him again. Not that wise a man.
____________________________________________________________________________________________


Gee Charge, I dont think Monty would have given two hoots about getting a few American and fellow Brits noses out of joint.
Unlike you I haven't read his memoirs, but in the few [ memoirs ] that I have read, they always seem to put themselves in the best possible light, and blame others for any failures, [ both Axis and Allies ] which is just human nature I guess.

But I think Monty's record speaks for itself.




*********************************************************************




Doppleganger wrote _________________________________________________________________________

I don't know if I could ever call Monty 'inspirational'. He was a solid, competent commander who tended to err on the side of caution. He did not give the impression of ever totally understanding the role and breakthrough ability of armoured spearheads for example.
____________________________________________________________________________________________

You tell that to the men of the 8th army.
He took a beaten and dispirited army, and gave it self belief, turning it in to a winning unit. Unlike many senior officers of the day, he went out of his way to meet the soldiers under his command. He lived a lifestyle that was not typical of a general, putting his mens well being first.

He just calmly went about the job of defeating the Germans and winning the war.


Doppleganger wrote _________________________________________________________________________

As for the comments he made about his two rules of war, they hardly transform Monty into some kind of latter-day Sun Tze. The first one being bloody obvious (in hindsight) and the second one meaningless unless it was taken out of context.
____________________________________________________________________________________________


Don't know if anyone was saying it made him a genius, but they were both good rules.


Doppleganger wrote _________________________________________________________________________

For the record, the first defeat the Germans experienced was at the gates of Moscow, not El Alamein.
____________________________________________________________________________________________



I think Churchill meant the British army.
And I believe the the Battle of Britain was Germanys first defeat.


Doppleganger wrote _________________________________________________________________________

I wonder how well he would have done had Monty been in charge of a Red Army Front on the Ostfront, facing the best legions of the Wehrmacht. Not so well I'm thinking.
____________________________________________________________________________________________

Well we're getting into the realms of hypotheticals here again, but if Zhukov, Vasilevsky, Chuikov, Vatutin ect.ect. could beat the best legions of the Wehmacht, I think Monty may have been able to as well.
But of course, we'll never know for sure will we?


Doppleganger wrote _________________________________________________________________________

I've not read the book that Charge mentioned but if he truly claimed that he won the war in Europe single-handedly then not only a man who has an inflated view of himself in world history, but also a misguided and arrogant one too.
____________________________________________________________________________________________


As I mentioned in answering Charge, i've never read it either, so I guess we'd have to see some quotes from it to see where he says that he "single-handedly" won the war in Europe.

I know Monty didn't beat around the bush with some of his claims, but that seems somewhat of an exaggeration.
And of course many of the commanders exaggerated their own exploits, and overestimated the numbers against them, as well as shifting blame to others for their mistakes, both Axis and allied commanders.

Summing up, Monty simply did what he had to do, which was to continually beat the Germans and help win the war.
 
Ashes said:
Doppleganger wrote _________________________________________________________________________

I don't know if I could ever call Monty 'inspirational'. He was a solid, competent commander who tended to err on the side of caution. He did not give the impression of ever totally understanding the role and breakthrough ability of armoured spearheads for example.
____________________________________________________________________________________________

You tell that to the men of the 8th army.
He took a beaten and dispirited army, and gave it self belief, turning it in to a winning unit. Unlike many senior officers of the day, he went out of his way to meet the soldiers under his command. He lived a lifestyle that was not typical of a general, putting his mens well being first.

He just calmly went about the job of defeating the Germans and winning the war.

One thing that Monty did do very well was to be concerned for the welfare of his men. Perhaps this explains some of his cautiousness for which he is to be applauded. However, the fact remains that as a commander he was solid rather than inspirational and he did not appear to fully understand how to exploit the use of armour.

Ashes said:
Doppleganger wrote _________________________________________________________________________

For the record, the first defeat the Germans experienced was at the gates of Moscow, not El Alamein.
____________________________________________________________________________________________


I think Churchill meant the British army.
And I believe the the Battle of Britain was Germanys first defeat.

I was referring to Germany's first defeat of her armies, which were more significant than the Battle of Britain for the future outcome of the war. Technically, Germany's first defeat was suffered at the Battle of the River Plate (I believe) but I think it really doesn't matter for the debate at hand.

Ashes said:
Doppleganger wrote _________________________________________________________________________

I wonder how well he would have done had Monty been in charge of a Red Army Front on the Ostfront, facing the best legions of the Wehrmacht. Not so well I'm thinking.
____________________________________________________________________________________________

Well we're getting into the realms of hypotheticals here again, but if Zhukov, Vasilevsky, Chuikov, Vatutin ect.ect. could beat the best legions of the Wehmacht, I think Monty may have been able to as well.
But of course, we'll never know for sure will we?

Yes, they did, but only when the odds were stacked heavily in their favour and because mistakes by both the German General Staff and Hitler meant that the Germans misused the forces they had at hand. I don't think Monty was as daring as most of the commanders you mentioned and undoubtedly most were far more attuned to fast-paced mobile warfare than Monty was.

Monty in many ways harked back to the WW1 school of Generals. Had he faced the Wehrmacht on even terms he would have been out-maneuvered, out-generaled and out-fought. Monty was fortunate that as a commander he enjoyed material, logistical and air superiority over his protagonist. Generally, he used those well but in the light of the nature of his advantages and the nature of the gutted opponent he faced in 1944 I must agree he was overrated. But, then again, so are many of the other senior commanders of the Western Allies. We as victors of WW2 were able to somewhat write the history of what happened. We've given ourselves too much credit and given the Soviet Union not enough for winning WW2 in Europe.
 
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