Gallipoli Campaign

what do you believe was the cause of the failure of the Gallipoli campaign?

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Missileer said:
I don't know, so many factors were against the ANZAC forces. .
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The ANZAC's only made up a minority of the Allied forces at Gallipoli ( At their maximum strength they had less than 2 divisions)

The casualities suffered by the Allied forces were as follows ,

Britain, 119,696 killed, wounded, or missing.

ANZAC 33,665

French 27,004
 
godofthunder9010 said:
The primary perpetrators and combatants for that successful fight agaist the Ottomans were Arabs. .
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Nonsense .:2guns:
That's a bit like saying that it was the Free French who were responsible for the defeat of the German forces in Normandy in 1944
 
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Not really. If memory serves me correct it was Arab forces with British advisers that had the most success against the Ottomans.
 
The Arabs did play a part in disrupting the Turkish forces, but did not defeat them. The British Empire did.
 
I dont think you can make Churchill the scapegoat.

Fail was down to a number of reasons:
1, Strategy
2, Not properly resourced
3, Failure to exploit an advantage (common in WW1)
4, Leadership
 
If you dont get angry I wanna add somethin to this thread.

Turkish leader Kemal Atatürk's say about the Anzacs who dead in Gallipoli:
"After having lost their lives on this land they have become our sons as well"​
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No Aussie soldier is angry at hearing that. That particular quote from Ataturk is very moving, and it's probably because of this that the Aussies and Turks are very close now.

This is the full quote
Those heroes that shed their blood
And lost their lives:
You are now lying in the soil of a friendly country,
Therefore rest in peace.
There is no difference between the Johnnies
And the Mehmets to us where they lie side by side,
Here in this country of ours.
You, the mothers,
Who sent your sons to faraway countries,
Wipe away your tears.
Your sons are now lying in our bosom
And are now at peace.
After having lost their lives on this land they have
Become our sons as well.
 
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Just to invade your thread for a minute, has anyone here actually been to Gallipoli? if so what kind of thing are there, any meuseums etc
 
Just read that the Gallipoli campaign included the first supply drop from the air to cut off troops.
Always thought that wasnt untill WW2
 
Churchill is always ridiculed and made the whipping boy for Gallipoli, but the real ridicule should be reserved for anyone who thinks the campaign could have succeeded , it was not intended to apart from say a more secure foothold inside the edges of Turkey.
All of the British involvment initially in ww1 was to erode the axis powers inch by inch to relieve pressure on the massive French army taking massive casualties eg Verdum.
Gallipoli was just another pinprick designed to divert resources.
One hundred thousand British casualties Thirty three thousand Aussie casualties thats about the number needed to very slightly erode the enemys war machine.
It was intended as a quick fix quick penetration route but come on look at the logistics of invading and holding Turkey and then moving on through it is absurd so absurd anyone can see it was not that at all.
 
Umm the guy that thought the campaign could have succeeded was Churchill in fact after the evacuation he still complained that "they never gave his plan a fair chance" hence the reason people ridicule him over the incident.
 
A few thoughts

3 ANZAC divisions fought at Gallipoli- 1st and 2nd Australian and the Australian and New Zealand Division.
Hamilton was widely regarded as being one of the brighter generals in the British Army- a trait that led many of his fellow officers to distrust him. But it should also be remembered that even in the Australian and New Zealand forces it was felt that an officer had to be a gentleman with all that entailed. This meant that he 'put up' with officers which his diary makes clear he did not trust- Hunter-Weston, Stopford, Braithwaite, Bridges; all had good reputations he could not argue with but were poorly suited to modern warfare. The subsequent career of Hunter- Weston makes it clear how difficult it would have been to gotten rid of these men without solid justification- two mental breakdowns and a habit of losing grip in the heat of battle were not sufficient justification for Haig to have him removed! Hamilton arrived to find the RN dumping the operation in his lap when his Mediterranean Expeditionary Force consisted of him and his staff- and the government then gave him a month to organise an invasion. And the one man who might have been able to tell him what the peninsular was actually like was reassigned before the planning began. To suggest that Hamilton had no understanding of warfare overlooks his Victoria Cross in the 1st Anglo- Boer war and his conduct in the 2nd Anglo- Boer War. That his intelligence led his fellow officers to distrust him did not mean that he didn't know what he was doing. That the campaign came so close to succeeding so many times whilst being undermanned and short supplied should be a tribute to his efforts rather than an indictment.
Go to the peninsular today and look up from the beach and it looks like a clear sprint to the top- then walk up and find out what it is really like! Without accurate maps you just don't see it.
The landing on the wrong beach is a myth- there was a slight drift which stranded the 7th (Vic) Battalion out in the open but the bulk of the forces went ashore where they were supposed to. Birdwood had planned the details of the landing and seeing it going so wrong presented the 'drift theory' to defend his reputation.
The New Zealanders were the best of the troops engaged- most were ex-servicemen from a militia system widely regarded as the best in the world. By contrast the Australians were thought to be 'recklessly brave' which led to tactical errors and unnecessary risks. The British of the Regular Army (29th Division) were thought to be too rigid for the campaign (and let down by their Divisional Commander Hunter- Weston). The French were always half hearted towards the campaign and the repeated problems with the Senegalese troops (general and battlefield discipline) who formed the bulk of their forces left them somewhat ineffective. The British Territorial Divisions were 'quite adequate', but the Kitchener Divisions were woefully unprepared for what they were about to face. New Foundlanders, Ghurkas and Sikhs were in small numbers and unlikely to affect the outcome of the campaign.
The moral effect of the retreat of the RN after the loss of the Majestic was but one consequence of the poorly run naval campaign. None of the initial British and Imperial divisions had their assignment of heavy artillery- the campaign was predicated on the availability of the heavy guns of the battleships. Had the navy advanced up the straits in conjunction with a ground advance it might have worked- Attaturk's division which thwarted the ANZAC landings was provisionally assigned to defend the inner straights.
Ultimately the British system of command was to blame- but this had as much to do with the British character as it did with the system itself. Unwilling to fund a proper army it was unable to raise the status of the army to attract the right officers. All of the British and Imperial landings and operations throughout the campaign were marred by a lack of initiative in the officer group as a whole. Australian and New Zealand officers failed to restrain their men; British officers failed to inspire theirs. More officers of the calibre of Cox (Ghurkas), Leane (11th (WA) Battalion) and Malone (Wellingtons) would have made all the difference.
Churchill is the current scapegoat for the operation. It is difficult, given the results of his interferences in WW2, that he would have performed any better in pushing the generals in the campaign. It was his pushing that led to the truncated timeline for the invasion in the first place. But it remains the great what if of the war; the reason the Ottomans lasted so long was that they retained a great deal of loyalty from their Arab divisions. A third of the defenders at Gallipoli were Arabs. The lauding of these men led to an upsurge in Arab pride and pride in the Ottoman Empire. With the Armenians and Kurds already close to rebellion, the fall of Constantinople might have led the Arabs into open revolt earlier. This would have left Townshend and his forces at Kut el Marra free to advance into the heart of the Ottoman Empire; and the Russian forces in the Caucasus to advance south. Though the British failed to gamble enough, it was worth the gamble.
finally i would like to point out that the landings on the 25th April were contiguous with the 2nd Battle of Ypres- the total casualties of the few days of that battle were almost equal to those of the entire Gallipoli Campaign. The difference in the success of the Germans at Ypres and the failure of the Allies at Gallipoli might be put down to the fact that the Germans used poison gas at Ypres.
 
a correction to my pevious post regarding the site of the landing. it has been pointed out to me that whilst my information is essentially correct, that the troops came ashore where they were supposed to, it is not substantially correct. the landing was to occur in two places along the same stretch of beach- the 3rd brigade some distance down the coast. as events transpired, the 3rd brigade actually landed where 2nd brigade's beaches were located and that much of the ensuing muddle came about because in determining where they were supposed to be and go, the 3rd brigade was largely still on the beaches when the 2nd brigade arrived at it's correct beaches. further i suggested that 7th battalion drifted north- my informant tells me that this is one explanation but given it's order in the landing sequence and the congestion on the beach it is possible that 7th battalion turned north; as the sun was well up by this stage it does seem a plausible explanation.
 
As far as tactics were concerned, as I understood it from a survivor minus one leg, the troops expected to arrive on an undefended beach, but instead came off the landing craft to find themselves entangled in barbed wire defences, under fire from the Turks on high, and struggling desperately to make it to shelter under the cliffs. They certainly did not have the benefit of surprise. Those who could not make the cliffs alive were lost at once.
 
Landings were made on the Asiatic side of the straits by the French as a feint; at Bulair a proposed feint by the Royal Naval Division did not go ahead...exactly. i am not entirely sure why this decision was made but then Lt Freyberg volunteered to land with a small force and create a distraction using 'firepots'. even given the fog of war i do not see how this could possibly have worked but apparently it did and the defending division remained in place for some time. the ANZACs went ashore as described below but, and here we get a bit sensitive, owing to inexperience and poor direction from all levels the assault did not reach the objectives outlined and were then forced backwards by counter attacking Turks. depending on your view of the Turkish military and when it appeared on the scene, on whether the untried ANZACS were able to follow a screening order, and whether as senior officer ashore Sinclair- McLagan had the right to alter the plan, his decision to stop either saved the landing or doomed the campaign. either way the initial landings were opposed by one artillery piece, one or two machine guns, and two platoons of riflemen spread along several miles of coast.
the british landings at the foot of the peninsular- Cape Helles- which seem to be the ones you are referring to- were on five beaches and at varying strengths and defended by varying forces. the landing at Y beach was initially unopposed but as the assault force moved inland it incurred heavy casualties and was forced to withdraw. X and S beach were opposed landings similar to the ANZAC landings, S forces beat off several counter attacks whilst X forces were able to widen their lodgement and take pressure off the other beaches.
these were W (Lancashire Landing) and V. W was heavily opposed with the defences you described, but the right most line of boats were caught by a swell and landed one company in the wrong place- though it proved perfect for outflanking the Turks and ejecting them from the defences. Nevertheless the attacking Lancashire Fusiliers had taken heavy losses and the follow on forces were required to aid in clearing the beach and establishing a beachhead instead of following through to attack in depth and link up with the other beaches.
at V beach it was decided that in order to overcome the defences that a crude infantry landing ship would be constructed out of the mv River Clyde, from which 2000 men were expected to go ashore in one rush, supported by a battalion to be landed, as elsewhwere, in ship's boats. in the event the Clyde landed too far out and after an epic struggle by its crew to keep lighters in place to facilitate the landing, it was discovered that not enough troops could exit the doors of the vessel and rush for shore to beat the fire of the machine guns. similarly the open boats were treated to heavy machine gun fire and several foundered with all in them shot. throughout the day attempts were made to leave the Clyde but it was not until troops advancing from W beach forced the Turks to abandon the defence was V Beach secured.
many men were awarded the Victoria Cross though my references to exactly how many is not at hand. i think it was 6 at W beach and 5 at V beach. those awarded at W beach were selected by ballot from amongst the surviving soldiers of the Lancashires- to my knowledge the only time the award has been given in such circumstances.
 
AussieNick said:
What do mean exception. The lads of the light horse fought the battle of the Nek like bloody tigers, what more on foot (they were cavalry), with empty magazines (because they were ordered to go unloaded) and only bayonets and grenades. They ran through a space the size of a few tennis courts into massed Turkish machine guns. Pure discipline and self sacrifice, thats all there is to it. Brave as they bloody come, full of the same bravado that won the charge at Beersheeba. How can you call that an exception?
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One in the interests of accuracy mate..... Light Horse weren't cavalry (if you go into the definitions of the roles). They were mounted infantry. IE, they rode to the battle, dismounted, and fought on foot. That's why it was no big thing for them to leave their horses in Egypt and go to Gallipoli in the infantry role. They didn't even get issued swords (as carried by the Cavalry) until late in the war on the Western Front. How do I know all this? My Grandfather was with the 13th Light Horse at Gallipoli and the Western Front.

Also, the reason the charge at Beersheba succeeded was because the Turks and Germans identified them as Light Horse and were waiting for them to stop and dismount (which they didn't do) so that they would be easier to hit.
 
I seem to remember that we once had some good pics of these Light Horse guys in action here on the forum.:salute2:
 
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