Enigma Machines

More evidence.

http://www.history.com/news/fooling-hitler-the-elaborate-ruse-behind-d-day



To cloak the details of the true invasion site, the Allies employed a complex web of deception to persuade the Nazis that an attack could come at any point along their Atlantic Wall—the 1,500-mile system of coastal defenses that the German High Command had constructed from the Arctic Circle to Spain’s northern border—or even as far away as the Balkans. Vital to Operation Bodyguard’s success were more than a dozen German spies in Britain who had been discovered, arrested and flipped by British intelligence officers. The Allies spoon-fed reams of faulty information to these Nazi double agents to pass along to Berlin. For instance, a pair of double agents nicknamed Mutt and Jeff relayed detailed reports about the fictitious British Fourth Army that was amassing in Scotland with plans to join with the Soviet Union in an invasion of Norway. To further the illusion, the Allies fabricated radio chatter about cold-weather issues such as ski bindings and the operation of tank engines in subzero temperatures. The ruse worked as Hitler sent one of his fighting divisions to Scandinavia just weeks before D-Day.

The most logical place in Europe for the D-Day invasion was France’s Pas de Calais region, 150 miles northeast of Normandy and the closest point to Great Britain across the English Channel. The Allies had passed over the region as a landing spot because it was the most heavily fortified section of the Atlantic Wall, but they wanted to delude the Nazis into thinking they were taking the shortest route across the channel.

Since Allied code-breakers had been successful in deciphering Germany’s secret communications, they knew that the Nazis had fallen for the deception as D-Day approached. In the weeks leading up to the invasion, the Allies stepped up their aerial attacks on Pas de Calais to throw the Nazis off the scent. They even employed Lieutenant M.E. Clifton James, a bit Australian actor who bore a striking resemblance to Bernard Montgomery, to impersonate the British general. After James spent time with Montgomery to study his mannerisms, he donned one of the general’s uniforms and black berets and flew to Gibraltar on May 26, 1944, and then to Algiers where German intelligence was sure to spot him and surmise that no attack across the English Channel could be imminent with the Allied general scouting the Mediterranean.

As the D-Day assault on Normandy began, the deception continued. Allied aircraft flying toward Pas de Calais dropped clouds of aluminum strips to give false radar readings that made it appear as if a large fleet was approaching. Other aircraft far away from Normandy dropped hundreds of dummy paratroopers that were wired to simulate the sounds of rifle fire and grenades when they hit the ground. British special operations forces also landed amid the dummies and operated phonographs to broadcast the sounds of soldiers’ voices and combat fire.

In spite of the success of the initial landing, Operation Bodyguard did not end on June 6, 1944. Three days later, Spanish businessman Juan Pujol Garcia, who was one of Britain’s most valuable double agents, fed information to Berlin that the Normandy landing was merely a “red herring” and that the most critical attack was yet to come with the First Army poised to strike at Pas de Calais. As proof he pointed out that Patton had yet to move from England. So trusted was Garcia that Hitler delayed releasing reinforcements from Pas de Calais to Normandy for seven weeks after D-Day as the Allies gained the toehold they needed to achieve victory in Europe, a result that may not have been possible without the audacious scheme to fool the Nazis.
 
"D-Day: June 6, 1944: The Climactic Battle of World War II" by Stephen E. Ambrose


First, German surprise was complete. The Fortitude operation had fixed German attention on the Pas-de-Calais. They were certain it would be the site of the battle, and they had placed the bulk of their panzer divisions north and east of the Seine River, where they were unavailable for counterattack in Normandy.
Second, German confusion was extensive. Without air reconnaissance, with Allied airborne troops dropping here, there, everywhere, with their telephone lines cut by the Resistance, with their army, corps, division, and some regimental commanders at the war game in Rennes, the Germans were all but blind and leaderless. The commander who was most missed was Rommel, who spent the day on the road driving to La Roche-Guyonan -- another price the Germans paid for having lost control of the air; Rommel dared not fly. Third, the German command structure was a disaster. Hitler's mistrust of his generals and the generals' mistrust of Hitler were worth a king's ransom to the Allies. So were Hitler's sleeping habits.

A German PzD north of the Seine : in the Channel ? :roll:

Only one PzD was located east of the Seine : 2 Pz.

Ambrose is as reliable as the Christian Science Monitor,which is as reliable as the Omaha Observer and the Rapid City Chronicle .

The German command structure was no more disaster than the allied one .
 
A German PzD north of the Seine : in the Channel ? :roll:

Only one PzD was located east of the Seine : 2 Pz.

Ambrose is as reliable as the Christian Science Monitor,which is as reliable as the Omaha Observer and the Rapid City Chronicle .

The German command structure was no more disaster than the allied one .

Again you know more than the historians. These facts have been so well presented as to be as plain as the nose on your face, yet you continue in your revisionism.
 
Again you know more than the historians. These facts have been so well presented as to be as plain as the nose on your face, yet you continue in your revisionism.

Ah : you call Stephen Ambrose a historian ?:shock:
 
Again you know more than the historians. These facts have been so well presented as to be as plain as the nose on your face, yet you continue in your revisionism.

There is so much evidence out there that refutes numbnut lljadw over and over, yet he still continues with his rediculous inane prattling.
 
3 sources said that Hitler was not sleeping

von Below : Hitler's LW adjudant

Hubert Meyer: History of the HJ PzD : P97

Winston Ramsey : D Day Then and Now Volume II : P 316 :between 8 and 9 AM Hitler was in the hall of Berchtesgaden ready to leave for Schloss Klessheim .


About Rundstedt and the utilization of the OKW reserves : ONLY at 4.45 (when it was already almost day) did he ask to have 12 SS and PzL (without adding what he would do with them) : OKW (Jodl ) refused, because the situation was still unclear,and the refusal was justified : the 2 divisions could only move during the night and earlier, Rundstedt told the OKW that there was no proof for a big landing .

Whatever, OKW agreed to the request of Rundstedt at 14.32 and the 2 divisions moved to the front during the night of 6/7 june .

The whole story and its importance were invented for The Longest Day by Blumentritt ,chief of staff of Rundstedt ,and who had been proved before to be economical with the truth .

You don't think there is a bias problem with your sources? Can you tell about Ramsey's academic credentials? I cannot find his resume. Furthermore, when Ramsey says Hitler was awake, what source is he referring too?

Stephen Ambrose was a historian, he had a PhD in history.

You have never served and you aren't an academic, that's for sure
 
You don't think there is a bias problem with your sources? Can you tell about Ramsey's academic credentials? I cannot find his resume. Furthermore, when Ramsey says Hitler was awake, what source is he referring too?

Stephen Ambrose was a historian, he had a PhD in history.

You have never served and you aren't an academic, that's for sure

He was not a historian ,but he was plagiarising and writing fiction as A band of brothers .He was also biased : see his insulting attitude to the British .

Ambrose was at the level of Cornelius Ryan : both wrote fictional propaganda for the US army .

Besides, why should one use a American source about what was happening in Berchtesgaden the night of 5/6 june 1944 ?

Do you consult a German source to know what happened in Washington on 7 december 1941 ?
 
He was not a historian ,but he was plagiarising and writing fiction as A band of brothers .He was also biased : see his insulting attitude to the British .

Ambrose was at the level of Cornelius Ryan : both wrote fictional propaganda for the US army .

Besides, why should one use a American source about what was happening in Berchtesgaden the night of 5/6 june 1944 ?

Do you consult a German source to know what happened in Washington on 7 december 1941 ?

Yes, he was a historian. You aren't answer the questions.
 
I will leave you ; you can continue to impress each other with your knowledge of WWII founded on The Longest Day, A Bridge to far, the Man who never was ,a Band of Brothers, Private Ryan ,Ambrose, etc, .

I have other things to do with my time .
 
You’re as imaginative as you are ridicules with these Hollywood distractions. Neither I, Brit or 13 quoted any of your accused stated sources "except Ambrose". All other sources provided to you were bypassed. Yet you cannot verify your own sources when in question.

You have stated incorrect data on: Normandy vs. the Pas de Calais, Operation Fortitude, The benefits of Bleckley Park and Enigma towards the war efforts and why Germany was ill prepared for Operation Bagration.

This appears to makes you the polar opposite of a historian, a revisionist.
 
I will leave you ; you can continue to impress each other with your knowledge of WWII founded on The Longest Day, A Bridge to far, the Man who never was ,a Band of Brothers, Private Ryan ,Ambrose, etc, .

I have other things to do with my time .

Coward! When it heats up, you leave. But I am not surprised. Your lack of education and training will be exposed if you stay. Finish elementary school and get some experience before you return
 
I will leave you ; you can continue to impress each other with your knowledge of WWII founded on The Longest Day, A Bridge to far, the Man who never was ,a Band of Brothers, Private Ryan ,Ambrose, etc, .

I have other things to do with my time .

Quite frankly not only are you a coward, you are a cowardly idiot.
 
A German PzD north of the Seine : in the Channel ? :roll:

Only one PzD was located east of the Seine : 2 Pz.

Ambrose is as reliable as the Christian Science Monitor,which is as reliable as the Omaha Observer and the Rapid City Chronicle .

The German command structure was no more disaster than the allied one .

116 PD was located just east of Rouen on D-Day along with 2 PD at Amiens and 1SS PD was in Antwerp.
So there was 2 Panzer Divisions in France east of the Seine and one in Belgium.

However I agree about the Allied views of what was happening at Berchtesgaden are at best anecdotal rehashes of genuine German sources developed after the war which I would consider unreliable.
 
116 PzD was not operational, neither was the LSS : it was only a shade of itself .The only operational was 2 Pz and a week after DDay,it was committed in Normandy ,not because the Germans thought Normandy was the main landing,but because there was a crisis in Normandy : without reinforcements, the Allies would be very soon in Paris .
 
116 PzD was not operational, neither was the LSS : it was only a shade of itself .The only operational was 2 Pz and a week after DDay,it was committed in Normandy ,not because the Germans thought Normandy was the main landing,but because there was a crisis in Normandy : without reinforcements, the Allies would be very soon in Paris .

It was equipped and positioned on the Seine to counter an expected Allied landing in the Pas-de-Calais and and moved to engage the Normandy landings in July.

Initially assigned to Rommel's Armee Group B and was rated as “Kampfwert I”, indicating it was ready for any and all duties.

Sounds operational to me although it was on a training exercise at the time of the invasion.
 
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I know this and the source,but I am not convinced at all : 116 PzD was formed on 28 march 1944 from the remainings of the 16 Mot .Div. and of the 179 PzD (a training unit) ;it would be a miracle if after 2 months the new unit would already be operational.

On 1 april,the first Zustandsbericht (operational report) of the new division mentioned the following :

personnel strength :5442

operational tanks : 70 (which does not mean that there were crews for 70 tanks)

artillery : 7 pieces

AG : 7

and ,very important,combat ready trucks : 53 ,with a transport capacity of 131 ton . normally a PzD needed at least 1000 trucks with a ransport capacity of 2500 ton .

Source = Forum Panzer-archiv : Zustandsberichte der Gepanzerte Verbände 1943/1945 P 5 of 26
 
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