Enigma Machines - Page 3




 
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January 6th, 2016  
BritinAfrica
 
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by lljadw
2) This is not a fact : it is your interpretation,which is wrong :at the end of the war the losses were virtually zero because the escots were to strong and it would be suicidal to attack a convoy .
I REALLY don't know if you are deaf, daft or stupid.

On February 1, 1942, the Kriegsmarine switched the U-boats to a completely new Enigma key (TRITON), which used special upgraded Enigma machines. This new key could not be read by codebreakers; the Allies no longer knew where the U-boat patrol lines were. This made it far more difficult to evade contact, and the wolf packs ravaged many convoys. This state persisted for ten months. To obtain information on submarine movements the Allies had to make do with HF/DF fixes and decrypts of Kriegsmarine messages encoded on earlier Enigma machines. These messages included signals from coastal forces about U-boat arrivals and departures at their bases in France, and the reports from the U-boat training command. From these clues, Commander Rodger Winn's Admiralty Submarine Tracking Room[50] supplied their best estimates of submarine movements, but this information was not enough.

Then on October 30, crewmen from HMS Petard salvaged Enigma material from German submarine U-559 as she foundered off Port Said. This allowed the codebreakers to break TRITON, a feat credited to Alan Turing. By December 1942, Enigma decrypts were again disclosing U-boat patrol positions, and shipping losses declined dramatically once more.

THEREBY PROVING THE LINK BETWEEN CONVOY LOSSES AND ENIGMA
January 6th, 2016  
I3BrigPvSk
 
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by lljadw
Wrong : you can only outmanoeuver him if you have the forces to do it .
And how will you know where to deploy your forces? Admit it now, you don't know anything about this.
January 6th, 2016  
lljadw
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by BritinAfrica
I REALLY don't know if you are deaf, daft or stupid.

On February 1, 1942, the Kriegsmarine switched the U-boats to a completely new Enigma key (TRITON), which used special upgraded Enigma machines. This new key could not be read by codebreakers; the Allies no longer knew where the U-boat patrol lines were. This made it far more difficult to evade contact, and the wolf packs ravaged many convoys. This state persisted for ten months. To obtain information on submarine movements the Allies had to make do with HF/DF fixes and decrypts of Kriegsmarine messages encoded on earlier Enigma machines. These messages included signals from coastal forces about U-boat arrivals and departures at their bases in France, and the reports from the U-boat training command. From these clues, Commander Rodger Winn's Admiralty Submarine Tracking Room[50] supplied their best estimates of submarine movements, but this information was not enough.

Then on October 30, crewmen from HMS Petard salvaged Enigma material from German submarine U-559 as she foundered off Port Said. This allowed the codebreakers to break TRITON, a feat credited to Alan Turing. By December 1942, Enigma decrypts were again disclosing U-boat patrol positions, and shipping losses declined dramatically once more.

THEREBY PROVING THE LINK BETWEEN CONVOY LOSSES AND ENIGMA
Wrong,of topic and irrelevant : you said that AT THE END OF THE WAR convoy losses were very low because of ULTRA.The exemple of 1942 (which is also wrong) has nothing to do with what happened in 1945 .

The exemple (or your interpretation) is also wrong because the shipping losses declined NOT in december,but already in october /november: the Torch convoys reached NA without losses .
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January 6th, 2016  
lljadw
 
Breaking of the code does not mean low shipping losses :

Shipping losses

december 1942 :76 ships

january 1943: 49 ships

february 1943:88

march 1943 : 132

If the low shipping losses in january were caused by the breaking of the code,how to explain the high shipping losses from february and march ?


The same for 1944 and 1945

In the first 4 months of 1944 82 ships were lost, in the first 4 months of 1945 92 : no one will pretend that in 1945 the Germans had a new code which was not broken at the end of the war .

Thus the explanation for high/low losses must be sought elsewhere .
January 6th, 2016  
BritinAfrica
 
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by lljadw
Breaking of the code does not mean low shipping losses :

Shipping losses

december 1942 :76 ships

january 1943: 49 ships

february 1943:88

march 1943 : 132

If the low shipping losses in january were caused by the breaking of the code,how to explain the high shipping losses from february and march ?


The same for 1944 and 1945

In the first 4 months of 1944 82 ships were lost, in the first 4 months of 1945 92 : no one will pretend that in 1945 the Germans had a new code which was not broken at the end of the war .

Thus the explanation for high/low losses must be sought elsewhere .
Your really are a waste of space and my time. Quite frankly, if you had brains you would be dangerous.
January 6th, 2016  
Capt Frogman
 
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by lljadw
1)Battle does not mean victory

2) Wrong question : what you need to do is not determined by what you know of the enemy's intention, but by what you have available and by what you need to do ,by what you must protect .
Quote:
Originally Posted by lljadw
Wrong : you can only outmanoeuver him if you have the forces to do it .
This is nonsense.

You'd be a very poor military strategist/commander with "knowledge" like this.

I always thought military intelligence and reconnaissance was key to winning wars, but what do I know!
January 6th, 2016  
lljadw
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by I3BrigPvSk
And how will you know where to deploy your forces? Admit it now, you don't know anything about this.
This proves that your knowledge about WWII is limited to some articles in Wikipedia .

FYI:

the following three exemples prove that deployment did NOT depend on information about the enemy intention, but where a successfull enemy attack would be more dangerous.

May/june 1940 : the French were convinced rightly that the main German attack would happen north of the Ardennes,they sent the majority of their mobile divisions in that direction, not because they were convinced that there would be the German Schwerpunkt,but because a successfull German attack north of the Ardennes would be catastrophic .


May/june 1944 : the Germans stationned the majority of their mobile divisions south of the Seine, not because they expected an Allied landing in Normandy, but because a landing in Normandy had more chances to succeed than a landing on the Pas de Calais .

June 1944 in the East : the majority of the German mobile divisions was stationed behind AG North Ukraine, not because the Germans expected there the main Soviet attack,but because a successfull attack against AG North Ukraine was more dangerous than a successful attack against AC Center .

Thus ,in these three cases,the strategy of the defender did NOT depend on informations about what the attacker would do .
January 6th, 2016  
lljadw
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by Capt Frogman
This is nonsense.

You'd be a very poor military strategist/commander with "knowledge" like this.

I always thought military intelligence and reconnaissance was key to winning wars, but what do I know!
You thought wrongly .
January 6th, 2016  
JOC
 
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by lljadw
May/june 1940 : the French were convinced rightly that the main German attack would happen north of the Ardennes,they sent the majority of their mobile divisions in that direction, not because they were convinced that there would be the German Schwerpunkt,but because a successfull German attack north of the Ardennes would be catastrophic .

Yes and the Germans poured in thru the Ardennes soundly defeating the French. The French refused to believe the Germans could bring AFV thru the forest.

Quote:
Originally Posted by lljadw
May/june 1944 : the Germans stationned the majority of their mobile divisions south of the Seine, not because they expected an Allied landing in Normandy, but because a landing in Normandy had more chances to succeed than a landing on the Pas de Calais .

Yes and this greatly assisted the allies in taking of the Normandy beaches. “For which you should be grateful”. In the case of Normandy an elaborate disinformation scheme was created to convince the Germans the attack would occur in the Pas de Calais. General Patton himself was keep in reserve to head up these much forces along with mock AFV jeeps etc.

Quote:
Originally Posted by lljadw
June 1944 in the East : the majority of the German mobile divisions was stationed behind AG North Ukraine, not because the Germans expected there the main Soviet attack,but because a successfull attack against AG North Ukraine was more dangerous than a successful attack against AC Center .


Hitler and OKH ignored all the intelligence (what else is new) and decided the Reds would attack the Romanian oil fields despite the massive buildup.

Quote:
Originally Posted by lljadw
Thus ,in these three cases,the strategy of the defender did NOT depend on informations about what the attacker would do .


So what’s your point these are all cases where the defenders lost by either ignoring intelligence or being deceived by intelligence.
January 6th, 2016  
I3BrigPvSk
 
 
We can turn it around, if the German intelligence had been better, the Allied had lost much more ships and men. If the German intelligence had worked and had the knowledge about Normandy before it happened. The Russians might have acted differently if they had believed the warnings about the attack in June 1941. if the Americans had known about the attack in December 1944, the outcome and the losses might have been different, but they didn't. The intelligence regardless if it's Humint or signal makes the difference. During the Second world war, the communication equipment was not that good in comparison with today. There was a delay between receiving the intel, evaluate the intel and send it to the field commanders. At the same time not telling the enemy their communications are compromised.
 


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