1967:
A combination of bellicose Arab rhetoric, threatening behavior and, ultimately,
an act of war left Israel no choice but preemptive action. To do
this successfully, Israel needed the element of surprise. Had it waited for
an Arab invasion, Israel would have been at a potentially catastrophic
disadvantage.
While Nasser continued to make speeches threatening war, Arab terrorist
attacks grew more frequent. In 1965, 35 raids were conducted
against Israel. In 1966, the number increased to 41. In just the fi rst four
months of 1967, 37 attacks were launched.
Meanwhile, Syria’s attacks on Israeli kibbutzim from the Golan
Heights provoked a retaliatory strike on April 7, 1967, during which
Israeli planes shot down six Syrian MiGs. Shortly thereafter, the Soviet
Union—which had been providing military and economic aid to both
Syria and Egypt—gave Damascus information alleging a massive Israeli
military buildup in preparation for an attack. Despite Israeli denials,
Syria decided to invoke its defense treaty with Egypt.
On May 15, Israel’s Independence Day, Egyptian troops began moving
into the Sinai and massing near the Israeli border. By May 18, Syrian
troops were prepared for battle along the Golan Heights.
Nasser ordered the UN Emergency Force, stationed in the Sinai since
1956, to withdraw on May 16. Without bringing the matter to the attention
of the General Assembly, as his predecessor had promised, Secretary-
General U Thant complied with the demand. After the withdrawal
of the UNEF, the Voice of the Arabs proclaimed (May 18, 1967):
As of today, there no longer exists an international emergency
force to protect Israel. We shall exercise patience no more. We
shall not complain any more to the UN about Israel. The sole
method we shall apply against Israel is total war, which will
result in the extermination of Zionist existence.
An enthusiastic echo was heard on May 20 from Syrian Defense Minister
Hafez Assad:
Our forces are now entirely ready not only to repulse the aggression,
but to initiate the act of liberation itself, and to explode the
Zionist presence in the Arab homeland. The Syrian army, with
its fi nger on the trigger, is united. . . . I, as a military man, believe
that the time has come to enter into a battle of annihilation.
On May 22, Egypt closed the Straits of Tiran to all Israeli shipping
and all ships bound for Eilat. This blockade cut off Israel’s only supply
route with Asia and stopped the fl ow of oil from its main supplier, Iran.
President Johnson declared the blockade illegal and tried, unsuccessfully,
to organize an international fl otilla to test it.
Nasser was fully aware of the pressure he was exerting to force Israel’s
hand. The day after the blockade was set up, he said defiantly: “The
Jews threaten to make war. I reply: Welcome! We are ready for war.”
Nasser challenged Israel to fight almost daily. “Our basic objective
will be the destruction of Israel. The Arab people want to fight,” he said
on May 27.The following day, he added: “We will not accept any . . . coexistence with Israel . . . Today the issue is not the establishment of
peace between the Arab states and Israel. . . . The war with Israel is in
effect since 1948.”
King Hussein of Jordan signed a defense pact with Egypt on May 30.
Nasser then announced:
The armies of Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon are poised on
the borders of Israel . . . to face the challenge, while standing behind
us are the armies of Iraq, Algeria, Kuwait, Sudan and the
whole Arab nation. This act will astound the world. Today they
will know that the Arabs are arranged for battle, the critical
hour has arrived. We have reached the stage of serious action
and not declarations.
President Abdur Rahman Aref of Iraq joined in the war of words:
“The existence of Israel is an error which must be rectified. This is our
opportunity to wipe out the ignominy which has been with us since
1948. Our goal is clear—to wipe Israel off the map.” On June 4, Iraq
joined the military alliance with Egypt, Jordan and Syria.
The Arab rhetoric was matched by the mobilization of Arab forces.
Approximately 250,000 troops (nearly half in Sinai), more than 2,000
tanks and 700 aircraft ringed Israel.
By this time, Israeli forces had been on alert for three weeks. The
country could not remain fully mobilized indefinitely, nor could it allow
its sea lane through the Gulf of Aqaba to be interdicted. Israel’s best option
was to strike fi rst. On June 5, the order was given to attack Egypt.