The Eastern Front decided WWII?

[Marcelo Jenisch]

They are called intangibles because you can not measure there value, it may have been that the bombing of Germany was the decissive action of the war but you can not place an actual value on the action therefore it is intangible.

Wel...

The impact of bombing on German morale was significant according to Professor John Buckley. Around a third of the urban population under threat of bombing had no protection at all. Some of the major cities saw 55-60 percent of dwellings destroyed. Mass evacuations were a partial answer for six million civilians, but this had a severe impact on morale as German families were split up to live in difficult conditions. By 1944 absenteeism rates of 20-25 percent were not unusual and in post-war analysis 91 percent of civilians stated bombing was the most difficult hardship to endure and was the key factor in the collapse of their own morale.[150] The United States Strategic Bombing Survey concluded that the bombing was not stiffening morale but seriously depressing it; fatalism, apathy, defeatism were apparent in bombed areas. The Luftwaffe was blamed for not warding off the attacks and confidence in the Nazi regime fell by 14 percent. Some 75 percent of Germans believed the war was lost in the spring of 1944, owing to the intensity of the bombing.[151]
Buckley argues the German war economy did indeed expand significantly following Albert Speer’s appointment as Reichsminister of Armaments, "but it is spurious to argue that because production increased then bombing had no real impact". But the bombing offensive did do serious damage to German production levels. German tank and aircraft production, though reached new records in production levels in 1944, was in particular one-third lower than planned.[17] In fact, German aircraft production for 1945 was planned at 80,000, "which gives an idea of direction Erhard Milch and the German planners were pushing", "unhindered by Allied bombing German production would have risen far higher".[

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic_bombing_during_World_War_II

And:

by September 1943, 8,876 of the deadly, dual purpose 88 mm guns were also defending the homeland with a further 25,000 light flak guns – 20/37 mm. The 88mm gun was an effective AA weapon, it was a deadly destroyer of tanks and lethal against advancing infantry. These weapons would have done much to augment German anti-tank defences on the Russian front.
To man these weapons the flak regiments in Germany required some 90,000 fit personnel, and a further 1 million were deployed in clearing up and repairing the vast bomb-damage caused by the RAF attacks. To put this into perspective General Erwin Rommel's German forces defending Normandy in 1944 comprised 50,000 men, and their resistance caused the Western Allies grave problems.
This diversion to defensive purposes of German arms and manpower was an enormous contribution made by RAF Bomber Command to winning the war. By 1944 the bombing offensive was costing Germany 30% of all artillery production, 20% of heavy shells, 33% of the output of the optical industry for sights and aiming devices and 50% of the country's electro-technical output which had to be diverted to the anti-aircraft role.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RAF_Bomber_Command

You told this is intangible, can't be measured. Ultimately it cannot (how the Germans would use such resources and the Soviets react). But, you can estimate it, yes. Economical and military aspects can be united to provide a picture of the German and Soviet potentials in such a scenario. This is exactly the same thing the folks who do war simulations about hypotetical scenarios do. So, there's no way to prove that were the Soviets who really defeat the Germans, or even less that the Germans would be defeated by the Soviets alone. This is what makes the conflict a global one.

 

[samneanderthal]

There is nothing intangible about reallistically comparing what the Germans did with extremely few resources while the Soviets were receiving lots of them and estimating what the Germans would have done with far more and better resources in the east, it's extrapolation.

 

[Marcelo Jenisch]

There is nothing intangible about reallistically comparing what the Germans did with extremely few resources while the Soviets were receiving lots of them and estimating what the Germans would have done with far more and better resources in the east, it's extrapolation.

People like a lot to say how the Germans would repulse the D-Day if was not for Russia, but apparentely the other way around doesn't seems to have the same reception.

 

[lljadw]

The Italians in Norway :a good joke,but inimaginable:the Germans would never trust them,it would mean total liberty for the British to land in Norway,and what about the Gestapo,and the REichskommisar for Norway (Terboven ?)

 

[Marcelo Jenisch]

The Italians in Norway :a good joke,but inimaginable:the Germans would never trust them,it would mean total liberty for the British to land in Norway,and what about the Gestapo,and the REichskommisar for Norway (Terboven ?)

Joke? I'm assuming here that Britain didn't remained in the war, signing peace after France (don't matter for what reason, and this would bring more problems to the Russians without the LW losses in the BoB). The Italians would be more a police force than a defending Army. And to give even more credit for what I'm saying, since Hitler really expected Britain to accept such a peace, he probably had a plan to surprise Stalin in the case. Just don't know if would work.

 

[lljadw]

The German troops in Norway could not be used on the Eastern front of the 300000 men,a lot belonged to the KM and the LW,and the others had no battle experience .

 

[lljadw]

About the Flak :as always,people are confounding between the 88 mm Flak(which was an anti aircraft weapon,and was unfit against tanks),and the 88 mm PAK,which was an anti tank weapon,and of which only 3649 were produced .

 

[samneanderthal]

The 88 mm Flak was used extensively for antitank purposes by Rommel in France and NA, etc, the 51 LW Flak batallions in Barbarossa used the 88 mm Flak. The 88 mm PAK was used by the army and SS, and like the 88 mm Flak, planes and tanks, there were never enough of them in any front after France fell.
The Germans often lured the enemy tanks within emplaced gun range, rather than moving the guns within range. the Americans took the bait in Faïd, before the Kasserine Pass and paid dearly.

 

[Der Alte]

The bottom line is that the USSR had the numbers and resources to win a war of attrition on the Eastern Front, and Germany did not. The war on the Eastern Front would eventually and inevitably bleed Germany white, as it did, adversely affecting Germany's ability to fight on all other fronts. Or even adequately defend her own airspace against the coming onslaught of Allied bombers and fighters. The USSR did not have the economic power to hammer Germany to her knees, as did the U.S. But the USSR was able to bleed Germany to death over time, perhaps analogous to the debilitating effects that a slow but fatal disease like leukemia has on the human body.

Probably Germany's best chance to defeat the USSR would have been to talk Japan into attacking the USSR from the east (and leaving the US strictly alone). Initally, I suspect that Hitler was too arrogant and overconfident to ask his Asian ally for help, even though he eventually needed it desperately. For their part, the Japanese Army had earlier been handled roughly by the Soviet Army on the northern border of Manchuria and probably wanted no more battles with the Red Army. Later, it was too late for both Germany and Japan. Also, the Japanese did not want to fight a war in Siberia that they probably could not win, especially as their Army was heavily engaged in China. They were a naval power and the IJN could not contribute much to a war against the USSR. Of course, the IJN could have contributed a lot to a war against the Royal Navy in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, but that would have almost certainly brought the US into the war, an event that Germany was trying to avoid. Ultimately, Japan had less to contribute to a German victory than the USSR had to contribute to a British victory, so any Japanese strategy would probably have failed.
Once the US entered the war on the Allied side, Germany was doomed. Even if Hitler had refrained from attacking the USSR and that power had remained neutral throughout the war, America simply had too many resources. Just as in the First World War, the US and the British Empire (plus most of the rest of the Western Hemisphere) would have eventually won a war of attrition.

Again, Germany's best hope would have involved Japan and the USSR. If Hitler had refrained from attacking the USSR (Japanese diplomats were trying to get the USSR to join the Axis when Germany attacked, thereby demonstrating that at least some in the Japanese government had a much better concept of global strategy than did Hitler), and instead convinced both Japan and the USSR to join the Axis and help Germany, Italy and their allies against the British Empire, the US and their allies, it would have been a long and bitter war indeed, perhaps another stalemate. The posibility of stalemate or Axis victory would have been enhanced if Hitler also forced Spain into the war on the Axis side, taking Gibralter, driving England from the Mediterranean and protecting Italy. In fact, of course, Hitler did open a second front by attacking the USSR and the US and UK made the European war their first priority after Japan drew the US into the war on Dec 7, 1941. Even though Germany gained Japan as an active ally, she was doubly doomed. By which I do not mean to imply that defeating Germany (and Italy and Japan) was easy. In fact, it was a long, costly, dangerous, bloody road to victory. At the time it appeared to Allied leaders and soldiers alike that the Axis powers might win the war. From their perspective, they were engaged in a death struggle that they might very well lose. But, with the benefit of hindsight, we can see that their overwhelming industrial might meant that the odds heavily favored the Allies.

I would like to make a few comments about Adolf Hitler, since he personified the Third Reich, and made most of the strategic decisions. I regard Hitler as a superb (if evil) politician with great political insight. This allowed him to gain power, re-arm Germany, and gobble-up parts of Europe with impunity. Once the war started, however, his weaknesses became evident. He had some tactical sense, probably due to his experience in WW I as a combat infantryman. But, he was a very poor strategist. As far as I can tell, he never had a "grand strategy." By which I mean a clear set of goals for the war and a plan to reach them. Hitler was, in fact, taken by surprise when England and France declared war on Germany. He had expected to partition Poland without fighting a major war, and had no plan beyond defeating Poland. Hence the period of "Phony War" after the defeat of Poland, while the German generals planned the campaign against France.

 

[Marcelo Jenisch]

For their part, the Japanese Army had earlier been handled roughly by the Soviet Army on the northern border of Manchuria and probably wanted no more battles with the Red Army.

The USSR won because Stalin and Zhukov committed themselves to this battle whereas the Kwangtung Army HQ never realized what was developing and treated the situation as more of a typical border incident vs. the major brew haha that the USSR percieved it to be. Stalin wanted to make a statement......and Zhukov, so authorized committed his forces more decisively and brought in the logistics to support his goals. It hardly went all rosy for him and his forces but in the end their side 'achieved' it's objectives. The Japanese committed primarily a new and green division (The 23rd) which also was a smaller new triangular style division which in turn committed it's forces piecemeal, including at the end a couple regimental groups from another Div. Logistics and firepower wise, committment was peacemeal.

If the Japanese didn't joined with Hitler in 1941, his signing of the pact with Stalin just as Japan was being defeated in Nomonhan was certainly of critical importance. The non-warning of the Barbarossa was also a preponderant factor.

 

[MontyB]

Probably Germany's best chance to defeat the USSR would have been to talk Japan into attacking the USSR from the east (and leaving the US strictly alone). Initally, I suspect that Hitler was too arrogant and overconfident to ask his Asian ally for help, even though he eventually needed it desperately. For their part, the Japanese Army had earlier been handled roughly by the Soviet Army on the northern border of Manchuria and probably wanted no more battles with the Red Army. Later, it was too late for both Germany and Japan. Also, the Japanese did not want to fight a war in Siberia that they probably could not win, especially as their Army was heavily engaged in China. They were a naval power and the IJN could not contribute much to a war against the USSR. Of course, the IJN could have contributed a lot to a war against the Royal Navy in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, but that would have almost certainly brought the US into the war, an event that Germany was trying to avoid. Ultimately, Japan had less to contribute to a German victory than the USSR had to contribute to a British victory, so any Japanese strategy would probably have failed.
Once the US entered the war on the Allied side, Germany was doomed. Even if Hitler had refrained from attacking the USSR and that power had remained neutral throughout the war, America simply had too many resources. Just as in the First World War, the US and the British Empire (plus most of the rest of the Western Hemisphere) would have eventually won a war of attrition.

The problem in getting Japan involved in a war with Russia is simply what was in it for them, I find it hard to imagine they would have had a great deal of interest in Siberia or at least enough of an interest to risk its army over.

However Japan did not have to attack Russia they just had to make the Russians think that an attack was a possibility to tie down vast quantities of Russian forces.

 

[Marcelo Jenisch]

The problem in getting Japan involved in a war with Russia is simply what was in it for them, I find it hard to imagine they would have had a great deal of interest in Siberia or at least enough of an interest to risk its army over.

However Japan did not have to attack Russia they just had to make the Russians think that an attack was a possibility to tie down vast quantities of Russian forces.

Since the actual oil embargo let the Army with only a 6 month fuel supply, with an attack in the Soviet Union, the oil reserves would dry even quicker had an embargo been imposed, because Roosevelt would not hesitate to "save" his new Communist friend.

I think it's hard to say the Japanese didn't helped Hitler significantly with Pearl Harbor. The Lend-Lease was already extended to the Soviet Union before the attack, and Roosevelt would sent more and more aid to all countries, including China. I belive that probably war between Germany and the US was inevitable, and the Japanese helped Hitler a lot, because if the Americans could use 100% of their power against the Fuher, he would have serious problems.

 

[Marcelo Jenisch]

Guys, my impression is that we are unanimous here, our viewpoints that are being different but have the same meaning.

Der Alte is correct, the war in the East was decisive, because when Hitler fails to obtain the so much needed resources to fight the British Impire and the US, and also acquires the Soviets as enemies, taking most of his Army, he is doomed.

In the end, everyone was important, and even the word decisive is sometimes misiinterpreted:

Colin Gray defined an operational decisive victory as "a victory which decides the outcome to a campaign, though not necessarily to the war as a whole".

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Decisive_victory

People confuse the Soviets being decisive as an Allied nation, with the Soviets defeating the Germans alone, which is another (and alternative) history.

 

[samneanderthal]

The Imperial army's original plan included invading the USSR, but conditioned its offensive on Moscow falling to the Germans. Richard Sorge in Japan notified Stalin of this condition and knowing that the USSR was safe as long as Moscow held, Stalin mobilized Zhukov's fresh Siberian troops with nearly 1,000 tanks and planes and stopped and repelled the Germans from Moscow, precluding Japanese involvement. Moreover, unknowingly Roosevelt helped to dissuade the Japs from attacking the USSR by depriving them of oil and scrap iron with an embargo and induced them to follow the backup imperial navy plan of expansion in the Pacific and thus to attack the US.

Hitler made indeed a huge mistake by ignoring Stalin's request to join the axis late in 1940. Stalin could have easily invaded Persia early in 1941, depriving Britain of Persian oil and helping to defeat Germany's only remaining enemy. Hitler also made a huge mistake by declaring war on the US, after Japan refused to attack Britain before Dec 7, 1941 or the USSR ever.

Japan made a huge mistake by forcing the US into the war, instead of attacking Britain in 1940, before Germany was involved in the USSR.

In 1941 Germany bled the USSR much more than the USSR bled Germany, it was the west that bled the LW, the crux of the matter.
In Barbarossa Germany captured nearly 1/3 of the USSR population, a lot of its industry and 10 million horses and even more cattle and destroyed 20,000 tanks and the same number of planes in 7 months. Had similar progress been made throughout 1942, Stalin would have been left without resources. The only reason it didn't was the German resources facing the west and the western resources arriving in the USSR.

Had Churchill sued for peace after France fell (the reasonable thing to do, since lonely Britain could not defeat Germany and Italy) and Germany not lost nearly 3,000 planes and many experienced pilots, tanks, cannon, men, etc, between the fall of France and Barbarossa Stalin would have promptly capitulated.

 

[Marcelo Jenisch]

Roosevelt helped the Soviets unknowingly? I'm skeptical about this. Roosevelt knew that Japan was an ally of Hitler, and if Japan joined the war with him after the Barbarossa started, this could have been the critical factor for the Soviet capitulation. This happening, with all the Soviet resources, Hitler would pose a serious treat to the Britain Roosevelt so wanted to protect.

 

[samneanderthal]

Roosevelt didn't know the Japs were going to attack the USSR if Moscow fell, but couldn't without American oil and he didn't know Japan would bomb Pearl Harbor and sink his fleet and the British fleet instead of attacking Stalin because of his actions.

 

[Marcelo Jenisch]

Roosevelt didn't know the Japs were going to attack the USSR if Moscow fell, but couldn't without American oil and he didn't know Japan would bomb Pearl Harbor instead of attacking Stalin because of his actions.

Roosevelt know the Japanese were allies of Hitler, and were signatories of the Anti-Comintern and Axis pacts. The possibillity of a Japanese attack in the USSR was very plausible therefore.

Since the Japanese imported most of their oil, I don't think it was a great mystery they need of the American product to conduct their military campaigns. Also, Roosevelt placed the embargo after the Japanese occupation of Southern Indo-China just to stop any attempt of agression in the Pacific and elsewhere.

About Roosevelt and Pearl Harbor, in fact the Americans were considerating a Japanese attack, but most likely in the Dutch East Indies or Thailand.

 

[AVON]

Lend Lease (LL) to the USSR was significant in assisting the USSR to defeat Germany! (I know the two sides do not nor will never agree on what contributions were made.) But, LL contributed over 50% of the aluminum the USSR used during the war. ALCOA (NOTE), taught the Soviets how to refine the aluminum better. The USA provided 62,000 miles of railroad tracks, over a million pair of combat boots. Soviet fighters had real performance problems above 15,000-ft (4,573-m) altitude, the USA taught those in the refining process how to make more pure gasoline gas, diesel and aviation fuel. That would allow the Soviet Air Force to design engines that performed well above 30,000-ft. (9,150-m) The M-4s allowed the T-34s to concentrate on kill German armor. The Soviet Army used the M-4 the way the American designers had designed it for -infantry support not tank to tank combat!
While the M-4 tank and the P-39 Aircobra made contributions, the Soviet Army found uses in which the strengths of these weapons. The P-39 could handle itself below 5,000-ft (1,545-m) against the Me-109 and its big 30mm cannon tore into German ground forces.
As for as LL goes the greatest amount of goods were shipped in 1943 and 1944 in the artic convoys. In the early months of 1945 the lend least supplies were ended. The USCGC sent four ice breakers to the USSR to keep all the ports open year around
Seldom made mention of is the Luftwaffe using around one million men as AAA crew members! That is one million men that could have been used for ground forces... to make what fifty to seventy-five additional divisions? How much of an impact would that have made at Stalingrad
As the Allied bombers continued to hit targets deeper in Germany, the Luftwaffe shipped more and more fighters from the eastern front to the western front to fight the RAF and the USAAF bombers. This made aerial combat against the Soviet AF easier.
So the West Allies contributed to the Soviet victory over Germany in many ways often overlooked.

NOTE;
ALCOA -Aluminum Company of America refined over 54% of the world's aluminum!

I do feel if the D-Day invasion had failed, by the time the western Allies had recovered enough to attempt a second invasion on the European continent, the Soviet forces would have conquered almost or all the European continent!
No matter what the Allies did when the war started in Poland, Germany was doomed if the war lasted more than few months. Germany needed 7.25 million barrels of oil per year but, Germany's production was only 5.35 million barrels of oil per year! Prewar estimates of what amount of oil that could be used from captured and allied countries were greatly over estimated!

 

[lljadw]

As always,people continue to fall for the 88 mm myth
There is a big difference between the 88mm Flak and the 88 mm PAK
the 88 mm Flak was used to give indirect fire on an object that was moving on a speed of 1000 km,and on a height of 2 km (to eliminate an aircraft,the Flak needed thousands of shells),this object could not fire on the Flak
the 88 mm Pak was used to give direct fire at an object that was moving on a speed of 10 km,at a distance of 2 km,and that could fire on the PAK
The 88 mm Pak was seldom used(only 2200 were produced),the standard German PAK was the 75 mm gun(of which 23000 were produced)
Why were that few 88 mm Pak produced ? Maybe that they were not that efficient .
The 88 mm Flak was seldom used and produced(only 13000),the standard German Flak was the 20 mm gun (yes!) of which 120000 were produced.
Why were only 13000 88 mm Flak produced ? Maybe that they were not that efficient .
Whatever,given the few number of 88 mm Flak,it is obvious that they were only exceptionally used as anti-tank weapon (the LW committed 956 88 mm guns for Barbarossa of which 17 were lost in 1941,against 3400 37 cm PAK),as there are no figures of the number of Soviet tanks destroyed by the 88 mm Flak,all the claims about the 88 mm Flak being a tank kiler,are unproved/exagerated .

 

[samneanderthal]

Throughout WW II the Soviets received half the aluminum they used, about 2,050 Hurricanes, 1,020 Spitfires, 4,700 Airacobras, 2,100 P-40s, 2,400 Kingcobras, 203 P-47s, 5,000 Douglas A-20s, 866 B-25 Mitchells (18,339 planes in total), 2,000 Railroad engines, 3,485 Valentine tanks, 4,100 Sherman tanks (especially made with Diesel engines for the USSR), 832 Matilda tanks, 301 Churchill tanks, some Lee tanks, etc, (over 13,000 tanks in all), 360,000 Studebaker, Ford and Dodge trucks, 51,000 Willys MB jeeps, 8,000 Ford GPA amphibious vehicles (over 450,000 vehicles in all), 11,000 railroad cars, 62,000 miles of railroad tracks, millions of tons of high octane aviation fuel, food, steel, explosives, boots, tires, rubber, medical supplies, etc, The Iranian railroad alone transported 5 million metric tons of supplies to the USSR. In total the USSR received 178 million metric tons. In contrast, the Germans had to relocate many Luftwaffe units from the USSR to North Africa in the winter of 1942 (during the Battle of Stalingrad), then to Italy and France, keep a huge air defence force over Germany and lost over 25,000 airplanes on the western front and their factories, rail road centers, power plants and cities were consistently bombed, which greatly contributed to the defeat of Germany in the USSR.

Imagine what the German industry, army and air force could have done with similar resources and how the red army would have fought without them, had Patton and the German generals got their way in 1945 and invaded the USSR.