A lot of nonsens
Dowding's Costly Blunder in the Battle of France
Coastal batteries is not the same as a fleet.
The number of Polish destroyers is negligible
Seehund
Banned
"The morale of the German people deteriorated under aerial attack. Fire was most effective in destroying workers dwellings and had the greatest impression on the general morale. The night raids were feared far more than daylight raids. The people lost faith in the prospect of victory, in their leaders and in the promises and propaganda to which they were subjected. Most of all, they wanted the war to end. They resorted increasingly to "black radio'' listening, to circulation of rumor and fact in opposition to the Regime; and there was some increase in active political dissidence -- in 1944 one German in every thousand was arrested for a political offense. If they had been at liberty to vote themselves out of the war, they would have done so well before the final surrender. In a determined police state, however, there is a wide difference between dissatisfaction and expressed opposition. Although examination of official records and those of individual plants shows that absenteeism increased and productivity diminished somewhat in the late stages of the war, by and large workers continued to work. However dissatisfied they were with the war, the German people lacked either the will or the means to make their dissatisfaction evident."
Albert Speer
Production during the month following the attacks was actually higher than it had been in the months preceding them. One of the main reasons for the increase in war production was the transfer of all production authority to my ministry. I mobilized unused capacity and undamaged machines, reorganized inefficient managements, reduced the number of models produced, and subdivided production into small units that were virtually immune to attack. The raids on the aircraft industry in early 1944 caused serious anxiety and doubt, however, in this case it became evident that our industry was more elastic than had been assumed and our anxieties lessoned.
Albert Speer
The Allies underestimated the effects that Speer’s reorganization had on production and slighted the impact of substitution. Information was inadequate to produce reliable macroeconomic analysis, let alone the comprehensive microeconomic analysis required for strategic interdiction by precision bombing.
The city area raids have left their mark on the German people as well as on their cities. Far more than any other military action that preceded the actual occupation of Germany itself, these attacks left the German people with a solid lesson in the disadvantages of war. It was a terrible lesson; conceivably that lesson, both in Germany and abroad, could be the most lasting single effect of the air war. The mental reaction of the German people to air attack is significant. Under ruthless Nazi control they showed surprising resistance to the terror and hardships of repeated air attack, to the destruction of their homes and belongings, and to the conditions under which they were reduced to live. Their morale, their belief in ultimate victory or satisfactory compromise, and their confidence in their leaders declined, but they continued to work efficiently as long as the physical means of production remained. The power of a police state over its people cannot be underestimated.
Strategic bombing remains controversial because of the difficulty in proving its effectiveness. Success cannot be determined simply in terms of physical damage. Evaluating the effect on vital targets requires analysis of the entire enemy system and the impact is not often immediately apparent. The invasion of Europe was the dominant element in the Allies plan. The role of strategic bombing was to establish air superiority before the invasion, and to substantially weaken the enemy’s will and capacity to resist. In this respect, bombing was successful in a complementary role by contributing to winning air supremacy, setting the conditions for an invasion, and assisting in winning land battles.
During the war, Allied military and civilian leaders conceived four strategies to defeat Germany, all of which depended heavily on strategic airpower. The first was the industrial web strategy, which would use precision attacks on key economic bottlenecks to cripple the German economy as a whole, fatally weakening the social and political cohesion needed for resistance. The second strategy, strategic interdiction, would also use precision bombing but would focus on industries critical to war production rather than seek a general economic collapse. The third strategy followed a Douhet pattern of using area incendiary bombing of population centers. All three approaches aimed to break German resistance through airpower alone, so that a cross-Channel invasion would be either unnecessary or a reasonably easy undertaking against an already beaten foe. The fourth strategy aimed at destroying the German army through the combined weight of Soviet and Western ground offensives. Strategic airpower would support this strategy through operational interdiction attacks designed to have a direct and immediate impact on ground operations.
British area bombing strategy came about as an operational necessity and in response to events. The subsequent transition to night operations required large target areas due to the lack of visibility, navigational aides, and accurate bombsights. Additionally, the British government felt pressured to retaliate against German cities for damage suffered during the Battle of Britain.
"The catastrophic losses inflicted on such cities as Cologne, Hamburg, and Dresden shocked the entire German people. The first attack on Hamburg in August 1943 made an extra-ordinary impression,” Albert Speer recalled. “We were of the opinion that a rapid repetition of this type of attack on another six German towns would inevitably cripple the will to sustain armaments manufacture and war production and might bring about a rapid end to the war. However, the raids were not repeated soon enough or with the same weight, and in the meantime it became possible for the civilian population to adapt themselves.”
In summary, the city attacks by the RAF alone did not substantially affect the course of the war. However, one cannot dismiss the direct and indirect effects of the British area bombing offensive quite so easily. The raids on oil facilities helped clear the skies of German aircraft and its contribution to the transportation offensive paved the way for the successful allied invasion and continued push toward Germany. The indirect effects caused changes in the conduct of the German lives and brought the horror of modern war to their doorsteps. It brought about a change in German production requirements that required a shift to an increased emphasis on fighters and the attempt to develop new technologies in the form of the V-2 bombs and jet aircraft to combat the assault. It forced the diversion of a large segment of Germany’s work force to the unending task of reconstruction of bombed factories and public utilities, engaging a million and a half workers. The bombing served to open a second front in the West. Together with the American bomber effort, the British Bomber Command forced the Luftwaffe to keep the bulk of its strength in Germany for defense, thus limiting German airpower on the Russian front and weakening the German army effectiveness. British area bombing then undoubtedly hampered the German effort in much more than a marginal way.
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This is the "strength" of the Polish navy on 1 september 1939
4 destroyers
5 submarines (of which 3 were interned in Sueden)
7 mine layers and mine sweepers .
Some of these ships were lost in september.
If someone is saying that these ships were a big reinforcement for the British Navy,he is talking nonsens .
4 destroyers
5 submarines (of which 3 were interned in Sueden)
7 mine layers and mine sweepers .
Some of these ships were lost in september.
If someone is saying that these ships were a big reinforcement for the British Navy,he is talking nonsens .
Another exemple of crap (it seems it is crap time) 
ost 27:
only the daytime bombing with escort planes in 1944 made any sense.
This is implying,that,before 1944,there were no daytime bombings with escort planes.
Eagle in flame II(by Hooton ) P 278
Allied DAY operations against Western Europe in 1943
8 AF bombers :7147 sorties
Bomber Command :6578 sorties
Escort fighters :
Fighter Command (Fighters and Bombers) :80.384
USAAF:12749
ost 27:only the daytime bombing with escort planes in 1944 made any sense.
This is implying,that,before 1944,there were no daytime bombings with escort planes.
Eagle in flame II(by Hooton ) P 278
Allied DAY operations against Western Europe in 1943
8 AF bombers :7147 sorties
Bomber Command :6578 sorties
Escort fighters :
Fighter Command (Fighters and Bombers) :80.384
USAAF:12749
BritinBritain
Per Ardua Ad Astra
From what I understand Bader was arrogant and obnoxious till the end of his life. Not a very nice chap at all.
As it was, it was a close run thing, I very much doubt if Britain could have done it without the help of those from outside Britain.
I would say it this way : every help was welcome.
BritinBritain
Per Ardua Ad Astra
Bloody right it was.
samneanderthal
Active member
The red bulbs to which Churchill refers during the attack on 15 September, 1940 showed the planes in the sector under Parks control, not all the planes in Britain. Of course all the few planes in the sector were engaged intercepting the German bombers. However, Dowding always kept at least half the planes in Britain in reserve, whether they were in North or West West Anglia, Wales or Scotland.
You do not go into battle with everything you got unless it is necessary.
Do not forget that they were expecting a German invasion in which case they had to throw everything they got at it.
BritinBritain
Per Ardua Ad Astra
Any cretin should understand that one does not leave other sectors undefended.
Again you are talking complete and utter rubbish.
samneanderthal
Active member
Any cretin knows that if you have hundreds of planes bombing London day in and day out in September 1940, it is not very smart to have a few pilots facing them and hundreds protecting unthreatened areas.
But forget it, you have your stupid heroes and since they got lucky thanks to Polish, Czech, NZ, SA, Canadian, etc, pilots and to Hitler's and Göring's stupidity won the battle of Britain, they did everything brilliantly.
You can continue worshipping these idiots, while I continue learning from their stupid mistakes.
But forget it, you have your stupid heroes and since they got lucky thanks to Polish, Czech, NZ, SA, Canadian, etc, pilots and to Hitler's and Göring's stupidity won the battle of Britain, they did everything brilliantly.
You can continue worshipping these idiots, while I continue learning from their stupid mistakes.
a lot of nonsens
MontyB
All-Blacks Supporter
There are a number of things you seem to be continually overlooking here as well:
1) Many of the RAF's pilots were inexperienced and were assigned to "quieter" areas to gain experience in operational aircraft.
2) There simply was not the capacity at forward airfields to take the massed squadrons of the RAF approach you seem to be advocating, I am assuming you are a supporter of Leigh-Mallory's Big Wing theory?
3) You also seem to be ignoring the efforts of both Luftflotte 3 (Western France) and 5 (Norway) now I accept Luftflotte 5 did not commit greatly to the battle but its presence had to countered and 13 Group had a huge area to defend so the only real reserve the RAF had was Mallory's 12 Group and they were tasked with protecting 11 Groups bases and plugging any gaps.
So all in all you are just plain wrong on this one as the aircraft you seem to think were "reserves" were in fact performing their assigned role as I have said before I think you have a one dimensional view of warfare (if A does B then C loses, it just isn't as simple or black and white as you seem to make it).
Probably the only area of contention here were 11 Groups complaints that 12 Group taking too long to form up when they persisted with the big wing idea and 11 Groups airfields were left unprotected.
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samneanderthal
Active member
Then the situation was indeed dire, if all the aerodromes of South and East Anglia cannot accomodate 500 fighters, fewer planes than were involved in some battles by US carriers (Operation Hailstorm, the attack on Truk involved 589 planes from 8 fleet and 4 light carriers). Preposterous arguments defending absurd decisions.
No pilots could have been less experienced flying British planes than many of the foreigners at the front. They gained experience or died quickly and would have had a better chance to gain experience had there been more planes on their side.
No pilots could have been less experienced flying British planes than many of the foreigners at the front. They gained experience or died quickly and would have had a better chance to gain experience had there been more planes on their side.
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MontyB
All-Blacks Supporter
Umm as I understand it Truk is surrounded by what 1000 miles of water, the flight time from a Luftwaffe base in France to a RAF base in Southern England was what 25 minutes?
You try getting an extra 500 fighters off the ground, directed to targets then back down, refuelled, rearmed and back in the air to meet a challenge that close to your bases.
Hell why stop at 500 extra fighters they could have easily given every man and his bulldog a spitfire to go up and fight the Hun, its not like ammunition, fuel, trained ground crew, operational airfields or spare parts were important the British could have just blocked out the sun with Spitfires and Hurricanes and the war would have been over in minutes.
Seriously it is time you stopped the tunnel vision and started understanding logistics, training and the actual manpower required to keep just one spitfire in the air or one soldier in the field then you might understand how silly the argument you are trying to make is.
There is no doubt that the war could have been fought better but it was far from the cluster f**k you are portraying it as.
samneanderthal
Active member
You are right it's definitely impossible for the British empire to supply ammo, spares, etc, for 500 stupid planes, much better to use 250 and lose 35 a day and 21 pilots.
Nobody spoke about an extra 500, there were only 500 and half of them in reserve, I am talking about using all the serviceable planes all the time, the sensible thing to do when you are losing your few pilots and planes attacked by large waves.
Only years of British and Soviet cluster f. can account for Germany being able to fight for years with a tiny fraction of the population, resources, etc, on several fronts, while the huge British empire and USSR fought on basically one front at a time (I don't count British activity in the Pacific before Germany capitulated as fighting, the Japs captured more in Rangoon, Singapore, etc, than they spent conquering them, hell they even recruited 30,000 Indians in Singapore, more than the men they lost conquering it).
Nobody spoke about an extra 500, there were only 500 and half of them in reserve, I am talking about using all the serviceable planes all the time, the sensible thing to do when you are losing your few pilots and planes attacked by large waves.
Only years of British and Soviet cluster f. can account for Germany being able to fight for years with a tiny fraction of the population, resources, etc, on several fronts, while the huge British empire and USSR fought on basically one front at a time (I don't count British activity in the Pacific before Germany capitulated as fighting, the Japs captured more in Rangoon, Singapore, etc, than they spent conquering them, hell they even recruited 30,000 Indians in Singapore, more than the men they lost conquering it).
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samneanderthal
Active member
About 500 times fewer than it takes to build one. So it really pays to keep them flying.
How many millions were sitting on their asses while the few at the front fought?
Saying that the British could not keep flying 500 stupid planes a few hours away from the factories, most of them Hurricanes (which used a similar Merlin to that of the Spits) is an insult to the British people, much worse than the ones I direct at Dowding or Churchill.
How many millions were sitting on their asses while the few at the front fought?
Saying that the British could not keep flying 500 stupid planes a few hours away from the factories, most of them Hurricanes (which used a similar Merlin to that of the Spits) is an insult to the British people, much worse than the ones I direct at Dowding or Churchill.
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84RFK
Active member
Now I can't possibly tell what the situation was like for the foreigners from Poland, France, Belgium, The Netherlands, Denmark, etc..
But what I know is that the Norwegian volunteers, like my Grand-uncle, was shipped from UK to Canada and recieved their training there.
Then they spendt weeks and months on operational training in the northern UK and Scotland before they were sendt out on their missions.
Sometimes with less than perfect equipment, but well trained and motivated for their task.