Team Infidel
Forum Spin Doctor
Inside the Pentagon
October 2, 2008
The Defense Department has blessed plans to proceed with full-rate production of the Marine Corps’ UH-1Y utility helicopter despite a major deficiency that limits its flying abilities at high gross weights and high altitudes, Inside the Pentagon has learned.
Defense acquisition chief John Young approved the plans, but during a recent meeting with defense officials he expressed irritation about the deficiency and the prospect that DOD -- not prime contractor Bell Helicopter Textron -- could end up footing the bill to fix it, a Pentagon source said.
The issue was discussed when Young chaired a Sept. 17 Defense Acquisition Board meeting on the Marine Corps’ H-1 helicopter program, which involves the UH-1Y and the AH-1Z attack helicopter. The program was conceived as a way to upgrade existing utility and attack helicopters. Over the years, officials have decided that roughly two-thirds of the H-1 aircraft must be built from scratch.
The Marines declared the UH-1Y had achieved initial operational capability on Aug. 8. Service, program and Pentagon officials are celebrating Young’s decision to move ahead with full-rate production. The UH-1Y provides the Marines a big improvement in speed and nearly double the payload and range compared to the existing UH-1N.
However, the UH-1Y is not considered operationally effective at high gross weights and high altitudes due to maneuver restrictions imposed by faulty rotor blade cuffs, according to an operational testing report that DOD recently sent Congress. ITP reviewed a copy of the report. This major deficiency will not be fixed before the first deployment, so troops will have to settle for less. The maneuverability key performance parameter (KPP) calls for up to 2.5 g in all weights. But defects in the rotor cuff blade attachment devices restrict the UH-1Y to a load factor of 1.7 g at high gross weights and high altitudes (density altitudes above 6,000 feet).
The maneuver restrictions require the pilot to focus more on the UH-1Y’s displays rather than the action outside the cockpit. During high gross weight approaches to landing zones at high altitudes, the restrictions are “objectionable and may exceed the skills of inexperienced pilots,” the report says. Exceeding the maximum load requires the UH-1Y to land as soon as practical and have all four rotors replaced at a cost of $660,000. There are also maintenance concerns. The rotor cuff design flaw causes premature replacement at less than one-tenth of the planned service life of these parts. Redesigning the rotor cuffs could take a few years.
At the Sept. 17 meeting, Young commented on the likelihood that DOD would have to pay roughly $72 million to fix the UH-1Y’s major deficiency even though the problem prevents the aircraft from maneuvering as required, the source said. Another official in the meeting replied that the cost-plus structure of the contract forces DOD to pay the bill, the source said.
Nine days later, Young signed an acquisition decision memo, marked “for official use only,” codifying his decision to buy the UH-1Y in large quantities. ITP reviewed a copy of the missive. The memo also approves the continuation (meaning a fifth lot) of low-rate initial production (LRIP) for the AH-1Z, which did not complete required operational testing and could take two more years of work before it is ready for full production. The memo supports “rate procurement of 11 UH-1Ys and increases the total number of LRIP quantities from 34 to 38.”
Asked whether Bell would consider paying to fix the rotor deficiency, Bell spokesman Tom Dolney yesterday denied there is even a problem.
“There are no defects in the UH-1Y,” Dolney told ITP. “The aircraft has passed OPEVAL, reached IOC and meets all contract specifications.”
The Marines support acquiring the UH-1Y in its current design capability. Unable to immediately fix the deficiency, the Marines are asking the Joint Requirements Oversight Council to lower the bar for performance. Specifically, the Marines want a “modest reduction” in the KPP for maneuverability for the initial UH-1Y procurement lots, Young writes, noting JROC approval of the request is in progress.
The memo directs officials to document why better maneuverability is still needed and to draft plans for achieving the goal. The Marines and program officials must present to the JROC and the milestone decision authority an “analytical justification for pursuing the higher level of maneuverability KPP performance and estimates of the development and production cost and schedule to deliver this performance level,” he writes.
“I will conduct a DAB review for the enterprises to consider the JROC’s final determination on the maneuverability KPP and H-1 program office cost and schedule estimates,” he adds.
The inaccuracy of the UH-1Y’s guns must also be fixed, the test report says. This did not improve, despite a new version of the Top Owl Helmet-Mounted Sight Display. The “optimized” system’s software is supposed to enable more accurate rocket fire compared to traditional aiming techniques. Limited data conducted during tests, however, “suggest that manually aimed fire is more accurate, although both methods result in average miss distances greatly increased from that of the UH-1N using spotting and adjust fires methods.” Testers also want many human-factors problems with the Top Owl fixed before the UH-1Y’s first deployment; these issues concern situational awareness, crew coordination, passenger seats and environmental control.
The memo directs the program to fix the deficiencies outlined in the test report. The program will also work on fielding the UH-1Y. Developmental and operational testing of the AH-1Z also awaits. A full-rate production decision for the AH-1Z is slated for October 2010. Within 30 days, the Navy must submit to Young a revised acquisition strategy that addresses additional LRIP lots (VI and VII) for the AH-1Z, along with the proposed schedule and exit criteria reflecting an initial procurement of long-lead time items followed by a complete authorization of the lot buy based on operational test results.
The Navy will work with the DOD comptroller to fully fund the program to the service’s cost estimate for FY-10 to FY-15. This involves moving $240 million in FY-12 to FY-15 procurement funds from aircraft-modification to combat-aircraft accounts. DOD’s Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) has a cost estimate for the program that is about 3 percent higher than the Navy’s. If the CAIG estimate is realized in the future, the program will cut procurement quantities to pay for the cost difference, Young writes.
--Christopher J. Castelli
October 2, 2008
The Defense Department has blessed plans to proceed with full-rate production of the Marine Corps’ UH-1Y utility helicopter despite a major deficiency that limits its flying abilities at high gross weights and high altitudes, Inside the Pentagon has learned.
Defense acquisition chief John Young approved the plans, but during a recent meeting with defense officials he expressed irritation about the deficiency and the prospect that DOD -- not prime contractor Bell Helicopter Textron -- could end up footing the bill to fix it, a Pentagon source said.
The issue was discussed when Young chaired a Sept. 17 Defense Acquisition Board meeting on the Marine Corps’ H-1 helicopter program, which involves the UH-1Y and the AH-1Z attack helicopter. The program was conceived as a way to upgrade existing utility and attack helicopters. Over the years, officials have decided that roughly two-thirds of the H-1 aircraft must be built from scratch.
The Marines declared the UH-1Y had achieved initial operational capability on Aug. 8. Service, program and Pentagon officials are celebrating Young’s decision to move ahead with full-rate production. The UH-1Y provides the Marines a big improvement in speed and nearly double the payload and range compared to the existing UH-1N.
However, the UH-1Y is not considered operationally effective at high gross weights and high altitudes due to maneuver restrictions imposed by faulty rotor blade cuffs, according to an operational testing report that DOD recently sent Congress. ITP reviewed a copy of the report. This major deficiency will not be fixed before the first deployment, so troops will have to settle for less. The maneuverability key performance parameter (KPP) calls for up to 2.5 g in all weights. But defects in the rotor cuff blade attachment devices restrict the UH-1Y to a load factor of 1.7 g at high gross weights and high altitudes (density altitudes above 6,000 feet).
The maneuver restrictions require the pilot to focus more on the UH-1Y’s displays rather than the action outside the cockpit. During high gross weight approaches to landing zones at high altitudes, the restrictions are “objectionable and may exceed the skills of inexperienced pilots,” the report says. Exceeding the maximum load requires the UH-1Y to land as soon as practical and have all four rotors replaced at a cost of $660,000. There are also maintenance concerns. The rotor cuff design flaw causes premature replacement at less than one-tenth of the planned service life of these parts. Redesigning the rotor cuffs could take a few years.
At the Sept. 17 meeting, Young commented on the likelihood that DOD would have to pay roughly $72 million to fix the UH-1Y’s major deficiency even though the problem prevents the aircraft from maneuvering as required, the source said. Another official in the meeting replied that the cost-plus structure of the contract forces DOD to pay the bill, the source said.
Nine days later, Young signed an acquisition decision memo, marked “for official use only,” codifying his decision to buy the UH-1Y in large quantities. ITP reviewed a copy of the missive. The memo also approves the continuation (meaning a fifth lot) of low-rate initial production (LRIP) for the AH-1Z, which did not complete required operational testing and could take two more years of work before it is ready for full production. The memo supports “rate procurement of 11 UH-1Ys and increases the total number of LRIP quantities from 34 to 38.”
Asked whether Bell would consider paying to fix the rotor deficiency, Bell spokesman Tom Dolney yesterday denied there is even a problem.
“There are no defects in the UH-1Y,” Dolney told ITP. “The aircraft has passed OPEVAL, reached IOC and meets all contract specifications.”
The Marines support acquiring the UH-1Y in its current design capability. Unable to immediately fix the deficiency, the Marines are asking the Joint Requirements Oversight Council to lower the bar for performance. Specifically, the Marines want a “modest reduction” in the KPP for maneuverability for the initial UH-1Y procurement lots, Young writes, noting JROC approval of the request is in progress.
The memo directs officials to document why better maneuverability is still needed and to draft plans for achieving the goal. The Marines and program officials must present to the JROC and the milestone decision authority an “analytical justification for pursuing the higher level of maneuverability KPP performance and estimates of the development and production cost and schedule to deliver this performance level,” he writes.
“I will conduct a DAB review for the enterprises to consider the JROC’s final determination on the maneuverability KPP and H-1 program office cost and schedule estimates,” he adds.
The inaccuracy of the UH-1Y’s guns must also be fixed, the test report says. This did not improve, despite a new version of the Top Owl Helmet-Mounted Sight Display. The “optimized” system’s software is supposed to enable more accurate rocket fire compared to traditional aiming techniques. Limited data conducted during tests, however, “suggest that manually aimed fire is more accurate, although both methods result in average miss distances greatly increased from that of the UH-1N using spotting and adjust fires methods.” Testers also want many human-factors problems with the Top Owl fixed before the UH-1Y’s first deployment; these issues concern situational awareness, crew coordination, passenger seats and environmental control.
The memo directs the program to fix the deficiencies outlined in the test report. The program will also work on fielding the UH-1Y. Developmental and operational testing of the AH-1Z also awaits. A full-rate production decision for the AH-1Z is slated for October 2010. Within 30 days, the Navy must submit to Young a revised acquisition strategy that addresses additional LRIP lots (VI and VII) for the AH-1Z, along with the proposed schedule and exit criteria reflecting an initial procurement of long-lead time items followed by a complete authorization of the lot buy based on operational test results.
The Navy will work with the DOD comptroller to fully fund the program to the service’s cost estimate for FY-10 to FY-15. This involves moving $240 million in FY-12 to FY-15 procurement funds from aircraft-modification to combat-aircraft accounts. DOD’s Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) has a cost estimate for the program that is about 3 percent higher than the Navy’s. If the CAIG estimate is realized in the future, the program will cut procurement quantities to pay for the cost difference, Young writes.
--Christopher J. Castelli