Team Infidel
Forum Spin Doctor
New York Times
March 24, 2008
Pg. 22
To the Editor:
Re “Mission Still Not Accomplished” (editorial, March 20):
I take strong exception to your assertion that I “overrode” President Bush’s national security team on disbanding the Iraqi Army. Whatever one’s view on the issue, there should be no confusion about the process leading to this decision. President Bush’s instructions to me were to report to him through Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld. I did.
There was no Iraqi Army left to disband after the fall of Baghdad in 2003. Given the role the army had played in Saddam Hussein’s tyranny, recalling it would been both impractical and a major political mistake. So we had to create a new all-volunteer army. My colleagues and I discussed this issue regularly with senior American civilian and military leaders.
On May 9, two weeks before the decision was made, I sent a draft order based on these discussions to Mr. Rumsfeld, copied to Gen. Tommy Franks, head of the Central Command, and other senior defense officials. A copy went to Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and to the commander of the coalition forces in Iraq.
All had ample opportunity to comment on this and subsequent drafts of the order before it was issued on May 23. Defense Department civilian leaders and military staffs provided only minor suggested revisions.
On May 22, I briefed the president at a National Security Council meeting attended by Condoleezza Rice, then the national security adviser; Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage; Secretary Rumsfeld; and General Myers. No one raised concerns or objections.
Colin L. Powell, then secretary of state, says he was unaware of the plan; that is regrettable. But this suggests a problem with the interagency process in Washington.
General Myers told The New York Times (front page, March 17) that there had been no “robust debate” about the draft decree. If any top officials felt strongly at the time that the decision was misguided, as some of them now claim, they had every opportunity, and the responsibility, to make those concerns known to the Pentagon’s leadership, or directly to the commander in chief.
L. Paul Bremer III, Chevy Chase, Md., March 20, 2008
The writer was head of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, 2003-4.
The front-page article by Michael R. Gordon appeared March 17, 2008
March 24, 2008
Pg. 22
To the Editor:
Re “Mission Still Not Accomplished” (editorial, March 20):
I take strong exception to your assertion that I “overrode” President Bush’s national security team on disbanding the Iraqi Army. Whatever one’s view on the issue, there should be no confusion about the process leading to this decision. President Bush’s instructions to me were to report to him through Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld. I did.
There was no Iraqi Army left to disband after the fall of Baghdad in 2003. Given the role the army had played in Saddam Hussein’s tyranny, recalling it would been both impractical and a major political mistake. So we had to create a new all-volunteer army. My colleagues and I discussed this issue regularly with senior American civilian and military leaders.
On May 9, two weeks before the decision was made, I sent a draft order based on these discussions to Mr. Rumsfeld, copied to Gen. Tommy Franks, head of the Central Command, and other senior defense officials. A copy went to Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and to the commander of the coalition forces in Iraq.
All had ample opportunity to comment on this and subsequent drafts of the order before it was issued on May 23. Defense Department civilian leaders and military staffs provided only minor suggested revisions.
On May 22, I briefed the president at a National Security Council meeting attended by Condoleezza Rice, then the national security adviser; Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage; Secretary Rumsfeld; and General Myers. No one raised concerns or objections.
Colin L. Powell, then secretary of state, says he was unaware of the plan; that is regrettable. But this suggests a problem with the interagency process in Washington.
General Myers told The New York Times (front page, March 17) that there had been no “robust debate” about the draft decree. If any top officials felt strongly at the time that the decision was misguided, as some of them now claim, they had every opportunity, and the responsibility, to make those concerns known to the Pentagon’s leadership, or directly to the commander in chief.
L. Paul Bremer III, Chevy Chase, Md., March 20, 2008
The writer was head of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, 2003-4.
The front-page article by Michael R. Gordon appeared March 17, 2008