Did Operation Citadel fail through lack of ambition?

MontyB

MontyB

All-Blacks Supporter
This is a question I have been asking myself for quite a while now and since the forums are quiet I figured I may as well ask it here.

When you look at the maps of the Kursk Salient and read all the books you can find on the matter it strikes me that it was a doomed plan from day one but the thing I do not understand about the Battle of Kursk is why its goals were so small and continually made smaller as the battle unfolded.

Basically it seemed for some reason the Germans had decided to attack the strongest sections of a massive defensive position instead of following the more standard approach of going around the strong points and the way to achieve this in my opinion not to continually move the axis of advance north south but rather in an easterly direction, another words rather than having the pincers meet at Kursk they could have avoided the entire defensive position by meeting in the area of Voronezh.

Surely Manstein knew what he was facing as the Luftwaffe had air superiority at the time and was claiming to have photographed every inch of the battlefield and even if you take into account camouflage and deception the size and nature of the defences must have been obvious.
 
No I don't think that the battle at Ku risk failed due to lack of ambition by the Germans. They did attack from both sides to try and pinch this salient off. The problems was that the Russians knew that they were coming and when, also the Russian by now were better organised better equipped and better trained and led. They had also learnt about aerial reconnaissance had adapted camouflage tactics tho hide what they were doing. The Russian also had moved a huge number of troops from Siberia to defeat Hitlers latest scheme and with the casualties that the Germans suffered on this added to what they had lost in Stalingrad broke them in Russia. The attack there was doomed form the start
 
The reason for the failure was that the Soviets already were to strong :they committed 14 million men in 1943;they had (on the frontline!) in july 1943:8 million men and 13000 tanks.
Already on 12 july (during Citadelle),they started operation Kutuzov .
 
While I don't disagree with you these are things that the Germans would not have known (including things like the Lucy Spy Ring) and therefore would not have figured in the planning for Citadel.

My interest is in what appears to be a fundamental change in direction for this attack as up until Kursk the plan had been to avoid strong points, cut them off and drive deep into the rear of the enemy yet at Kursk the plan seemed to be "Charge" into the biggest pile of Russians you can find and when that fails adjust you attack into an even denser pile of Russians.

And when you think about it Citadel really was an odd attack because even had it been successful the Germans would have gained nothing but a shorter line of defence as just pinching off the salient would not have broken the Russian lines hence the lack of ambition comment.
 
through my understanding of the operation, the germans pushed the start date back and that gave the russians extra time to prepare.
 
although if hitler tried to micro-manage the troops as he liked to do, that would have been a reason
 
If the attack at Kursk succeeded then the Russians would have had a vast number of troops cut off and lost. There loss would have been far higher than the German losses at Stalingrad.
 
LeEnfield said:
If the attack at Kursk succeeded then the Russians would have had a vast number of troops cut off and lost. There loss would have been far higher than the German losses at Stalingrad.
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While true in part there are some debatable aspects...
1) The Russian lines would not have been broken despite the amount of troops cut off because the decision to pinch off the salient would have left the bulk of the Russian reserves safely on the Russian side of the new lines.

This would have left a very weak line separating the trapped armies from safety.

2) The Germans pretty much stripped the other German armies of there reserves so they were committing a huge proportion of there available resources to the one campaign that was never designed to do anything but shorten their own defensive lines.

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This is why I believe the campaign was doomed from the start as its lack of ambition allowed the Russians to concentrate enough force to stop them without fear of having to redeploy troops to counter a breakthrough as no breakthrough was planned consequently the Russians were able to begin offensives against weakened German forces north and south of the salient almost immediately.
 
Operation Citadel was one last attempt by the Germans to ease the threatening pressure in the East before the British and Americans mounted a Second Front. To be sufficiently prepared for this threat, Hitler knew the campaign had to avoid another battle of attrition with Russia. However, the German delays, caused by the conflicting interpretations Hitler received, gave Russia plenty of time to adequately prepare for the offensive. Moreover, after two years of continuous warfare with Germany, Russia had become very familiar with their opponent's tactics and this was evident in the way the battle played out. Germany had to fight for every inch of ground they covered and this proved incredibly costly to both. While the Russians could afford these incredible losses, Germany could not, and, as a result, they had been effectively exhausted to the point where they would never regain the momentum they previously had.

There was one obvious target for the German army, that of Kursk. The Russian advance had left a bulge to the south of Orel and to the north of Kharkov. Kursk lied at the center of the bulge, and so it became the primary target of Operation Citadel. If Kursk was taken, then the German army could potentially have advanced further eastwards, and the fall of Kursk would also have ensured the flanks of the German armies at Orel and Kharkov.

The strategy was simple: the Germans planned to use a gigantic pincer movement involving two army groups Army Group North and Army Group Center to cut into the neck of the Kursk salient. Army Group North (under Field Marshal von Kluge) which comprised of General Model's 9 Army consisting of armoured and mechanized infantry divisions was to attack from the north, while Army Group South (under Field Marshal von Manstein) comprising of General Hoth's 4 Panzer Army was to attack from the south of the salient. In the process, the German High Command hoped to level off the "bulge" and destroy the Soviet forces within the Kursk salient.

Unfortunately for the Germans, the Russians possessed superior military intelligence just prior to the battle and were able to anticipate the German strike. But what sealed the German army's fate was Zhukov's and Vasilevsky's decisive counter-attacks immediately after the initial German pincer attack by Model and Hoth. The Battle of Kursk was a gamble that had failed miserably; a gamble that ultimately changed the roles of power.
 
Der Alte said:
Operation Citadel was one last attempt by the Germans to ease the threatening pressure in the East before the British and Americans mounted a Second Front. To be sufficiently prepared for this threat, Hitler knew the campaign had to avoid another battle of attrition with Russia. However, the German delays, caused by the conflicting interpretations Hitler received, gave Russia plenty of time to adequately prepare for the offensive. Moreover, after two years of continuous warfare with Germany, Russia had become very familiar with their opponent's tactics and this was evident in the way the battle played out. Germany had to fight for every inch of ground they covered and this proved incredibly costly to both. While the Russians could afford these incredible losses, Germany could not, and, as a result, they had been effectively exhausted to the point where they would never regain the momentum they previously had.

There was one obvious target for the German army, that of Kursk. The Russian advance had left a bulge to the south of Orel and to the north of Kharkov. Kursk lied at the center of the bulge, and so it became the primary target of Operation Citadel. If Kursk was taken, then the German army could potentially have advanced further eastwards, and the fall of Kursk would also have ensured the flanks of the German armies at Orel and Kharkov.

The strategy was simple: the Germans planned to use a gigantic pincer movement involving two army groups Army Group North and Army Group Center to cut into the neck of the Kursk salient. Army Group North (under Field Marshal von Kluge) which comprised of General Model's 9 Army consisting of armoured and mechanized infantry divisions was to attack from the north, while Army Group South (under Field Marshal von Manstein) comprising of General Hoth's 4 Panzer Army was to attack from the south of the salient. In the process, the German High Command hoped to level off the "bulge" and destroy the Soviet forces within the Kursk salient.

Unfortunately for the Germans, the Russians possessed superior military intelligence just prior to the battle and were able to anticipate the German strike. But what sealed the German army's fate was Zhukov's and Vasilevsky's decisive counter-attacks immediately after the initial German pincer attack by Model and Hoth. The Battle of Kursk was a gamble that had failed miserably; a gamble that ultimately changed the roles of power.
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I don't disagree with any of this but it still leaves me with several questions:
A) Why did they proceed along the restrictive lines they did given that they must have seen the Luftwaffe's reconnaissance of the area, I am prepared to accept the Russians were good at camouflage but it did not hide the massive nature of the defenses being prepared.

B) Why when things were not going well for the northern pincer did Model change his line of attack further west into stronger defenses instead of east into lighter defense lines, he must have known at that point that Russian defense lines further east were going to be lighter especially when southern pincer had headed in a more eastward direction and made good progress.
 
LeEnfield said:
Model did what Hitler told him to do and that is why he did not change the direction of his attack
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I am sorry maybe I am missing something here but Citadel seems like the most "un-German" battle of the war, the idea of attacking a heavily defended position with no ultimate benefit seems so out of character from the war up to that date.

I am wondering whether the commanders on the ground had lost confidence by that stage as I am of the impression that sending the northern pince on a line of Orel - Livny - Voronezh and the Southern pincer on a line of Voroshilovgrad - Voronezh should have been the most logical drive as it:
a) Would have missed the entire Kursk defence lines and if successful opened up the entire southern front thus forcing massive reorganisation of Russian forces and relieving pressure on German lines everywhere.

b) Shortened German lines between Orel and Voroshilovgrad, even had the Kursk offensive succeeded there still would have been a large salient between these points.

Now I accept that Voronezh may well have been too far but a more easterly meeting point would have given them a better and shorter defensive line along the Donets river.

Obviously nothing we say here will change anything and hindsight is always 20/20 so I find it interesting to discuss this battle as the more I look at the battle the less it makes sense based on German offensives to that point in the war.
 
Hello all. I was wondering if any of you could shed any light on this. I recently read that Von Manstein begged Hitler to be able to continue the offensive in the south thrust as he was vehement that the Russians had thrown in all their strategic reserves, however, due to the coordinated landings in Sicily Hitler wasn't willing to take any further gambles.

Reading on some of the threads I take it the general opinion was the operation would never succeed and was doomed from the beginning, however, there is a minority that believe that had Von Manstein had his way the operation would have succeeded. Your opinions and comments on this would be greatly appreciated.
 
Michael86 said:
Hello all. I was wondering if any of you could shed any light on this. I recently read that Von Manstein begged Hitler to be able to continue the offensive in the south thrust as he was vehement that the Russians had thrown in all their strategic reserves, however, due to the coordinated landings in Sicily Hitler wasn't willing to take any further gambles.

Reading on some of the threads I take it the general opinion was the operation would never succeed and was doomed from the beginning, however, there is a minority that believe that had Von Manstein had his way the operation would have succeeded. Your opinions and comments on this would be greatly appreciated.
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From the book Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories: The War Memoirs of Hitler’s Most Brilliant General page 449...

Von Manstein felt that he could still have achieved victory in his sector. Territory did not interest the field marshal; indeed, the capture of additional Soviet territory would probably have only worsened the German position. What he wanted was to continue attacking in order to smash the enemy's armored reserves and consequently to prevent their use in new offensives.
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The problem is not really so much in what von Manstein could have achieved but more a question of what would renewed attacks have accomplished and what were the German forces available to him capable of achieving.

Here is a segment of a thesis written by Jonathan P. Klug, United States Military Academy, 1995.

The Germans could not have attained the outcome they needed to bring Operation CITADEL to a successful conclusion. They could no longer pinch off the Kursk salient due to the local pressure of the Orel offensive, the threat of an impending offensive on the Mius River, and the remaining commitment of additional reserves. The Allied invasion of Sicily also took Hitler’s attention away from Kursk, and he made units redeploy to Italy. This, of course, weakened the effort at Kursk.

The German units were also too exhausted and too damaged to contemplate driving deeper into Soviet territory, or to take all the territory south of the Psel River, as von Manstein advocated, would not have been possible. Holding the German position on the southern portion of the Kursk salient without removal of forces, however, would have improved the situation. If von Manstein had forced the surrounded Red Army units to surrender, it would have weakened the Soviet counteroffensive plans to some degree. For example, reducing the Gostishchevo-Liski pocket would have eliminated the 69th Army.

The Second Tank Corps and the Second Guards Tank Corps were also in the same pocket. Destroying these two experienced Soviet tank corps, which together were approximately equal in numbers of tanks to four panzer divisions, and an entire infantry army, which had an approximate strength of 50,000 men, would have greatly weakened overall Soviet strength. In fact, the Soviet General Staff Study on the Battle of Kursk stated that if the Germans had accomplished this, it would have set the conditions to successfully extricate the German Fourth Panzer Army from the battle.

Eliminating these units would have helped the German cause, but would not have produced victory. Moreover, the German Army would have had to accomplish this shortly after Prokhorovka as the Stavka ordered those forces fight their way out on July 16 in order to avoid encirclement.

The Wehrmacht should have also placed greater emphasis on retaining possession of the battlefield to recover more damaged vehicles. After previous engagements, the German forces controlled the battlefields after the fighting and had consequently managed to keep their available tank strength at a relatively constant level by recovering and repairing damaged
vehicles. In fact, the Germans had returned over 600 damaged tanks back into the fight over the period of July 5 to 18, so holding the battlefield would have given them the chance to recover or cannibalize many more.

Stronger emphasis in this area would have also kept the Red Army from doing the same thing. Because the Soviets had possessed the battlefields where the majority of the armor battles had occurred, they were able to double their available tank strength.
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Much appreciated and very informative. I have always been under the impression that to achieve victory in the east Hitler would have needed about another 10-20 divisions to overcome the sheer weight of the Red army.

This is a bit off the subject but I have another question. Could you shed any light on Operation Typhoon and how it may have succeeded had Hitler's plans not been altered. This among other things is what led to Hitler's distrust of the Officer class. Thanks.
 
Personally I think in order to beat the Russians Germany had to have defeated them before the end of 1941 after that it was always going to become a war of attrition that Germany could not win.

As for Typhoon that is an interesting question and we have a couple of people here who can probably answer your question without having to resort to books like I do I suspect much of the argument will center around the Lotzen decision though.
:)
 
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Ahh, yes. Just had to Google that, haha. Again, another strong debate with historians. Many agree that he was correct to swing south encircling and destroying several Russian Armies around Kiev. This, however, broke up the momentum of the initial thrusts while the Panzergruppes/Armees regrouped.

Marshall Zhukov was quoted as saying that the decision to swing south was indeed correct.
 
20 divisions never would be enough to obtain victory before september 1941:what would be needed was a doubling of the ostheer :6 million men,6000 tanks,4000 aircraft.
But,of course,this was impossible .
 
Sorry friend. I think you misunderstood me. I meant an additional 20 divisions for the start of Operation Citadel. Throughout 1943 I think they was averaging around 150 divisions on the Ostfront. The best option they should of carried out which is easy to say with hindsight would of been to conserve strentgh. Time was all the Germans needed. I would say the outcome of the operation shortened the war by at least 2 years.
 
I also believe that had Hitler's grand strategy not been so diluted by the General staff, they would of prevailed in 1941.
 
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