Did Operation Citadel fail through lack of ambition?

Sorry friend. I think you misunderstood me. I meant an additional 20 divisions for the start of Operation Citadel. Throughout 1943 I think they was averaging around 150 divisions on the Ostfront. The best option they should of carried out which is easy to say with hindsight would of been to conserve strentgh. Time was all the Germans needed. I would say the outcome of the operation shortened the war by at least 2 years.
Even 20 divisions would not be enough :the Soviet strength was overwhelming .
About time :no :Time was all the Soviets needed:time was running again the Germans,the longer the war,the stronger the Soviets .
About the outcome of the operation :no:the importance of Citadel was marginal .German and Soviet losses were almost neglectable (55000 to 170000):Germany lost 1.6 million men in 1943,the SU :6.5 million.
 
I am sorry maybe I am missing something here but Citadel seems like the most "un-German" battle of the war, the idea of attacking a heavily defended position with no ultimate benefit seems so out of character from the war up to that date.

I am wondering whether the commanders on the ground had lost confidence by that stage as I am of the impression that sending the northern pince on a line of Orel - Livny - Voronezh and the Southern pincer on a line of Voroshilovgrad - Voronezh should have been the most logical drive as it:
a) Would have missed the entire Kursk defence lines and if successful opened up the entire southern front thus forcing massive reorganisation of Russian forces and relieving pressure on German lines everywhere.

b) Shortened German lines between Orel and Voroshilovgrad, even had the Kursk offensive succeeded there still would have been a large salient between these points.

Now I accept that Voronezh may well have been too far but a more easterly meeting point would have given them a better and shorter defensive line along the Donets river.

Obviously nothing we say here will change anything and hindsight is always 20/20 so I find it interesting to discuss this battle as the more I look at the battle the less it makes sense based on German offensives to that point in the war.
You're right Monty, Zitadelle harked back to tactics the Germans used in WW1 and earlier wars. It was a massed attack against an obvious weak point in the Soviet lines. The German General Staff appeared to lose confidence in earlier, more mobile operations and seemed to revert back to the instincts that many of them were trained in and had experience of. It's impossible to say for sure but I get the impression that many of the German planners were going through the motions, already believing the war to be lost, which of course it was.

The only hope for Germany was to force an eventual stalemate by adopting elastic defence tactics to bleed the Red Army white. Like the 3rd Battle of Kharkov on a larger scale. Manstein wanted to do this when he proposed his 'Backhand blow, but Hitler, by this time cautious and suffering more and more from Parkinsons did not approve.

Coming back to Kursk, from the German perspective it was a colossal waste of time and effort right from the start. German losses were not prohibitive but by this time they really had to maximize everything they had. As for the operation itself, there is substantial documentation regarding Manstein's belief that he was close to a breakthrough on the southern flank. We will never know for sure and I'm not sure how beneficial it would have been anyway.
 
The whole of the Russian fronts were a quagmire, not only were the Germans fighting at Kursk they had a huge battle going on in the Crimea. It revolves around the Germans trying to do to much with not enough men or equipment. When you factor in all the places the were fighting or trying to garrison then there could only be one out come.
 
You're right Monty, Zitadelle harked back to tactics the Germans used in WW1 and earlier wars. It was a massed attack against an obvious weak point in the Soviet lines. The German General Staff appeared to lose confidence in earlier, more mobile operations and seemed to revert back to the instincts that many of them were trained in and had experience of. It's impossible to say for sure but I get the impression that many of the German planners were going through the motions, already believing the war to be lost, which of course it was.

The only hope for Germany was to force an eventual stalemate by adopting elastic defence tactics to bleed the Red Army white. Like the 3rd Battle of Kharkov on a larger scale. Manstein wanted to do this when he proposed his 'Backhand blow, but Hitler, by this time cautious and suffering more and more from Parkinsons did not approve.

Coming back to Kursk, from the German perspective it was a colossal waste of time and effort right from the start. German losses were not prohibitive but by this time they really had to maximize everything they had. As for the operation itself, there is substantial documentation regarding Manstein's belief that he was close to a breakthrough on the southern flank. We will never know for sure and I'm not sure how beneficial it would have been anyway.

Agrred but a lot of Kursk makes no sense to me, if we are to believe the plan the objective was to pinch off the salient trapping a sizable number of Russians and shortening the German line however:

1) The Luftwaffe had claimed to have photographed every inch of the battlefield and despite the failings of German intelligence throughout WW2 even a blind man would have had trouble missing the scale of Russian defenses.

2) Assuming the plan had worked the Russian reserve would have plugged the gap quickly especially since there was no plan to advance and take advantage of the breech.

3) The number of Russian troops cut off would have posed a huge threat given that the ring of encirclement would have been incredibly weak primarily because there was no plan to exploit any breech.

4) Given Luftwaffe claims surely they must have known or had a reasonable idea what they were going up against why did they pick the heaviest defenses to attack.

Therefore it is unlikely in my opinion that the encirclement could have been maintained so I am stumped as to what over all gain the Germans would have made even had the pincers met.
 
That's the thing Monty. I think the Germans by this stage were kind of going through the motions to a certain degree. Some of the more positive German commanders might have felt confident about maintaining the encirclement but the more pragmatic ones must have realised that this would have been very difficult in practice. The Red Army was still in strength and had a large operational reserve that the Germans lacked. The Germans did not have the numbers to exploit any breakthrough and the Red Army reserves would likely have broken open the encirclement, even if it was closed in time by the Germans.

By this time, the superiority in panzer tactics and training enjoyed by the Germans had generally been negated. The real advantage that the Germans still held was in their mission-based orders doctrine (Auftragstaktik) and their vastly superior infantry squad tactics. From being a great offensive army in the first 3 years of war, the Wehrmacht had to change into a great defensive army. Unfortunately in the East, operational decision-making would not allow the Germans to properly exploit the one true advantage they still enjoyed over the Soviets.
 
That's the thing Monty. I think the Germans by this stage were kind of going through the motions to a certain degree. Some of the more positive German commanders might have felt confident about maintaining the encirclement but the more pragmatic ones must have realised that this would have been very difficult in practice. The Red Army was still in strength and had a large operational reserve that the Germans lacked. The Germans did not have the numbers to exploit any breakthrough and the Red Army reserves would likely have broken open the encirclement, even if it was closed in time by the Germans.

By this time, the superiority in panzer tactics and training enjoyed by the Germans had generally been negated. The real advantage that the Germans still held was in their mission-based orders doctrine (Auftragstaktik) and their vastly superior infantry squad tactics. From being a great offensive army in the first 3 years of war, the Wehrmacht had to change into a great defensive army. Unfortunately in the East, operational decision-making would not allow the Germans to properly exploit the one true advantage they still enjoyed over the Soviets.

Then why did they go ahead with it?

Seems that no one was really in favour of it hell even Hitler was uneasy about it from what I read in various sources it probably would not have taken much to convince him to take a year off and rebuild some of Germany's lost strength yet for some odd reason they chose to embark on a nostalgic trip back to the days of WW1.
 
Kursk

It was a doomed effort that denied the Germans all their typical war winning tactics and mobility as they became bogged down in the 9 concentric rings of Red defensives. The Kurst bulge was bristling with countess land mines, anti tank traps, hidden armor and artillery. All waiting for the German attack by the time July rolled around. The Soviets had known the German battle plan and played their card right. The spy ring Lucy gave them intelligence as well as other sources so they were confident of the German offensive battle plan. The Soviets had months to build up the Kurst Bulge. The Soviets started the buildup in spring. By the time of the attack in July the Soviets had including reserves 1.6 million men 3,400 tanks and 2,700 planes in the Kursk bulge. The Germans had 900,000 men 2,700 tanks 2000 planes. So they were outnumbered going against strong well prepared - entrenched defensives.

In the North despite viscous battles Models forces quickly became bogged down after very small gains. However in the South in a larger battle Mansteins forces broke through and had the Red army was on the run. Hausser continued his advance onto Prokhorovka. Zhukov had to call in Rotmistrov 5th Guards tank army which was being held in reserve. They meet Haussers SS panzer divions at Prokhorovka. Here an epic armor clash took place with the Germans. Germans lost > 300 tanks and the Soviets > 700 that day with no clear cut winner. Hitler called off the offensive and stripped the Panzers of tanks for the invasion of Sicily. Manstein claims he could have given the Soviet army enough of a beating as to delay - eliminate their ability to go on the offensive that summer if allowed to continue. Not the initial goal but an alternate partial victory. That’s speculation however and the Soviets did go on the offensive. They won back what they lost and went back on the offensive and immediately retook the cities of Belgorod and Orel. The Germans and Soviets were both highly motivated as Hitler made known t the troops “you are taking part in a battle that can alter the course of the war” which it did.

The problem was the Germans waited too long to attack (July). As they waited for the new panther tanks and Ferdinand’s. Both had teething issues and played but a small role in the battle.
This allowed for the above mentioned buildup that proved virtually insurmountable and didn’t allow the Germans to fight in a manner that typically resulted in victory
 
When the people you are fighting know exactly what your plans are and have both the man and fire power to stop you then the battle can only go one way.
 
When the people you are fighting know exactly what your plans are and have both the man and fire power to stop you then the battle can only go one way.

Yes but this shows what I was saying at the start, it was not a "typical" German attack plan, if it was it would have simply skirted the defense lines by pressing further to the east before converging yet when they ran into heavy resistance they reduced the aims further and adjusted the plan in a north-south direction ie less ambitious.

The Germans must have known what they were getting into as the Luftwaffe claimed to have photographed every inch of the battlefield prior to the assault and even though the Russians could hide troop and material numbers in the salient they could not have hidden the depth and magnitude of the defense lines.

Had this have been earlier in the war they would have seen the defenses that were built and gone around them which would have immediately thrown the Russians onto the defensive and forced them to redeploy defenses or withdraw units from the salient, however even had a more ambitious plan been successful in cutting off the bulge they still would not have had the manpower to prevent a Russian breakout so at best all they could have achieved is a far higher Russian casualty rate.
 
It was a doomed effort that denied the Germans all their typical war winning tactics and mobility as they became bogged down in the 9 concentric rings of Red defensives. The Kurst bulge was bristling with countess land mines, anti tank traps, hidden armor and artillery. All waiting for the German attack by the time July rolled around. The Soviets had known the German battle plan and played their card right. The spy ring Lucy gave them intelligence as well as other sources so they were confident of the German offensive battle plan. The Soviets had months to build up the Kurst Bulge. The Soviets started the buildup in spring. By the time of the attack in July the Soviets had including reserves 1.6 million men 3,400 tanks and 2,700 planes in the Kursk bulge. The Germans had 900,000 men 2,700 tanks 2000 planes. So they were outnumbered going against strong well prepared - entrenched defensives.

In the North despite viscous battles Models forces quickly became bogged down after very small gains. However in the South in a larger battle Mansteins forces broke through and had the Red army was on the run. Hausser continued his advance onto Prokhorovka. Zhukov had to call in Rotmistrov 5th Guards tank army which was being held in reserve. They meet Haussers SS panzer divions at Prokhorovka. Here an epic armor clash took place with the Germans. Germans lost > 300 tanks and the Soviets > 700 that day with no clear cut winner. Hitler called off the offensive and stripped the Panzers of tanks for the invasion of Sicily. Manstein claims he could have given the Soviet army enough of a beating as to delay - eliminate their ability to go on the offensive that summer if allowed to continue. Not the initial goal but an alternate partial victory. That’s speculation however and the Soviets did go on the offensive. They won back what they lost and went back on the offensive and immediately retook the cities of Belgorod and Orel. The Germans and Soviets were both highly motivated as Hitler made known t the troops “you are taking part in a battle that can alter the course of the war” which it did.

The problem was the Germans waited too long to attack (July). As they waited for the new panther tanks and Ferdinand’s. Both had teething issues and played but a small role in the battle.
This allowed for the above mentioned buildup that proved virtually insurmountable and didn’t allow the Germans to fight in a manner that typically resulted in victory

Some corrections:

1)The Germans did not wait to long,because this is implying they could attack earlier,which is not so : the SS PzK was committed,although it had in july only 50 % of its tanks :the second Pz batallion of the divisions still was in Germany .
2) the time of the war winning tactics was over : in fact : these never existed

3) The role of the Lucy spyring is mostly a post war myth

4)your strength figures are inflated and incomplet:

SU:1.425.000 men,4900 tanks and StuG,artillery:31000,aircraft :3600

Germany:625000,2700 tanks and STuG,artillery:9500,aircraft : 1350

Source of these rough figures : Germany and WWII Tome VIII

5)There was NOTHING special on Prokhorovka ,the importance of which has been deliberatedly inflated by both parties after the war ; it was a Soviet attack,which failed,with considerable losses,because of the incompetence of the Soviet commander .But,it had no influence on the outcome of Citadelle .

The Germans committed 2 divisions with 186 Pz and StuG and lost 235 men and a few tanks.

The Soviets committed 838 tanks and lost 522 tanks and 3563 men .

There was nothing epic on Prokhorovka.

6 )Already during Citadelle,the Soviets started their counter-offensives,and,this caused the abandonment of Citadelle : not the landing on Sicily


7)Citadelle did not alter the course of the war:the German losses were marginal,the Soviet losses were higher,but they could afford them easily .
 
I can see where this is going

Some corrections:

1)The Germans did not wait to long,because this is implying they could attack earlier,which is not so : the SS PzK was committed,although it had in july only 50 % of its tanks :the second Pz batallion of the divisions still was in Germany .
2) the time of the war winning tactics was over : in fact : these never existed

3) The role of the Lucy spyring is mostly a post war myth

4)your strength figures are inflated and incomplet:

SU:1.425.000 men,4900 tanks and StuG,artillery:31000,aircraft :3600

Germany:625000,2700 tanks and STuG,artillery:9500,aircraft : 1350

Source of these rough figures : Germany and WWII Tome VIII

5)There was NOTHING special on Prokhorovka ,the importance of which has been deliberatedly inflated by both parties after the war ; it was a Soviet attack,which failed,with considerable losses,because of the incompetence of the Soviet commander .But,it had no influence on the outcome of Citadelle .

The Germans committed 2 divisions with 186 Pz and StuG and lost 235 men and a few tanks.

The Soviets committed 838 tanks and lost 522 tanks and 3563 men .

There was nothing epic on Prokhorovka.

6 )Already during Citadelle,the Soviets started their counter-offensives,and,this caused the abandonment of Citadelle : not the landing on Sicily


7)Citadelle did not alter the course of the war:the German losses were marginal,the Soviet losses were higher,but they could afford them easily .

I can't understand this historical perspective, which is fine I'm not about to argue. I will add that the last major action on the eastern front prior to Kurst was a major German victory in retaking much of the territory lost during the Soviet winter offensive of 43. This made Stavka very apprehensive about the upcoming summer.
 
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It was a quqmire

The whole of the Russian fronts were a quagmire, not only were the Germans fighting at Kursk they had a huge battle going on in the Crimea. It revolves around the Germans trying to do to much with not enough men or equipment. When you factor in all the places the were fighting or trying to garrison then there could only be one out come.

The battle for the Crimea took place a little later in the war 44. However German forces was stretched to cover a front that was often > 1000 miles. This was a bigger issue when you are on the defensive with > 1/2 the amount of men and equipment. This was made particularly difficult as Hitler issues his no retreat commands (as he lost faith in the ability and loyalty of his commanders). Resulting in disasters such as occurred at Korsun, Courland, Crimea, Minsk to name a few.
 
A typical

Yes but this shows what I was saying at the start, it was not a "typical" German attack plan, if it was it would have simply skirted the defense lines by pressing further to the east before converging yet when they ran into heavy resistance they reduced the aims further and adjusted the plan in a north-south direction ie less ambitious.

The Germans must have known what they were getting into as the Luftwaffe claimed to have photographed every inch of the battlefield prior to the assault and even though the Russians could hide troop and material numbers in the salient they could not have hidden the depth and magnitude of the defense lines.

Had this have been earlier in the war they would have seen the defenses that were built and gone around them which would have immediately thrown the Russians onto the defensive and forced them to redeploy defenses or withdraw units from the salient, however even had a more ambitious plan been successful in cutting off the bulge they still would not have had the manpower to prevent a Russian breakout so at best all they could have achieved is a far higher Russian casualty rate.

It was a suicide attack. It pretty much insured that they would lose on the Eastern front since they would never be able to make up for the losses at a rate that the Soviets could produce new equipment. The Germans lost ~ 100 Tigers at Prokhorovka alone. These were lose they could ill afford. It's claimed that if they attacked earlier (with less armor but before most of the massive Soviet build up occurred ) they may have fared better?
 
The Germans lost ~ 100 Tigers at Prokhorovka alone.



NONSENS:

1) Tiger production on 1 july 1943 : 292 ,thus 100 lost at Prochorovka :nonsens

2)Number of operational Tigers at the start of Citadelle : 146 (source : Zetterling and Frankson:Kursk,a statistical analyse) :thus 100 lost at Prochorovka : nonsens

3)Number of Tigers of the 2 SS PzD at Prochorovka : 24/27 ,thus a loss of 100 at Prochorovka : nonsens

4)Number of Tigers for the whole AGSouth : 102 (source :Germany and WWII P 91),thus a loss of 100 at Prochorovka : nonsens

5) Number of Tigers lost during Citadelle : 10(source : Germany and WWII P152),thus a loss of 100 at Prochorovka :nonsens .
 
Wrong

NONSENS:

1) Tiger production on 1 july 1943 : 292 ,thus 100 lost at Prochorovka :nonsens

2)Number of operational Tigers at the start of Citadelle : 146 (source : Zetterling and Frankson:Kursk,a statistical analyse) :thus 100 lost at Prochorovka : nonsens

3)Number of Tigers of the 2 SS PzD at Prochorovka : 24/27 ,thus a loss of 100 at Prochorovka : nonsens

4)Number of Tigers for the whole AGSouth : 102 (source :Germany and WWII P 91),thus a loss of 100 at Prochorovka : nonsense

5) Number of Tigers lost during Citadelle : 10(source : Germany and WWII P152),thus a loss of 100 at Prochorovka :nonsens .

read for starters:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Kursk
Check the facts, prior to your nonsense comments. Yes I know a certain ambiguity exist for operations on the Eastern front particularly for the Reds (their record keeping was not always the best).
 
The problem with Wikipedia is that it is for the most part written by people parroting the accepted view of WW2 that has developed over the last 70 years however that history is not as accurate as it should be and many of the more modern military historians are discovering a markedly different story.

As far as sources go it is going to be very hard to counter the likes of Niklas Zetterling, Anders Frankson, David Stahel, David M Glantz or Wolfgang Schneider with Wikipedia.
 
I don't disagree with any of this but it still leaves me with several questions:
A) Why did they proceed along the restrictive lines they did given that they must have seen the Luftwaffe's reconnaissance of the area, I am prepared to accept the Russians were good at camouflage but it did not hide the massive nature of the defenses being prepared.

JOC: Manstein knew the they were digging in as early as May of 43. Some of the German General staff and field commanders suggested to Hitler that they.call the whole thing off. I believe it was one of those things that once the momentum started they stayed blindly obedient to the plan, much as the Soviets did in the winter offensive of 42. It was claimed Hitler has concerns about the offensive despite approving it.

B) Why when things were not going well for the northern pincer did Model change his line of attack further west into stronger defenses instead of east into lighter defense lines, he must have known at that point that Russian defense lines further east were going to be lighter especially when southern pincer had headed in a more eastward direction and made good progress.

Model who proved a capable "general - later field Marshal" commander in other battles (the retreat from Leningrad) but seemed to have his sights on a couple of towns that were key railroad centers. He ground the northern army into the ground attacking these positions which were defended to the hilt. Why he didn't realize that this doomed the northern attack to a rapid failure is counter intuitive as he continued using WW1 type tactics. The whole northern attack didn't use any of the typical German mobile movements and deployments that typically allowed them to fight a larger force.
 
At the start of Citadelle 299 Tigers had been built : 70 in 1942 and 229 in 1943 (source :Jentz and Doyle : Tiger I Heavy tank 42-45 ,P 13).

Of those,133 were available for Citadelle (Production PzKpfw VI, Tiger I),between 35/38 had been lost in NA,the others were in Germany for basic and advanced training .


PzAbt 503 :45 Tigers

PzAbt 505: 31

The SS divisions:

LSS:13

DR: 14

TT :15

GD: 15

During Citadelle 19 replacement Tigers were delivered : LSS : 5; PzAbt 505 :14

Lost (total writeoff) : 13

PzAbt 503 : 4

PzAbt 505 : 6

LSS: 1

DR : 1

TT : 1

The whole story about the Tigers at Citadelle is a myth .
 
This is true

The problem with Wikipedia is that it is for the most part written by people parroting the accepted view of WW2 that has developed over the last 70 years however that history is not as accurate as it should be and many of the more modern military historians are discovering a markedly different story.

As far as sources go it is going to be very hard to counter the likes of Niklas Zetterling, Anders Frankson, David Stahel, David M Glantz or Wolfgang Schneider with Wikipedia.



This is particularly true for the Soviets. Stalin downplayed casualties so as to avoid a sense of personal responsibility for the high looses incurred as well as Soviet propaganda reasons. Perhaps this was true of Germany also; if so I haven't heard about it? When Mikhail Gorbachev allowed the records to be examined without communist party bias the true nature of the deaths, suffering and destruction that took place in the USSR was supposedly made known. The west used an accepted number of Soviets deaths to be 20 million up to that time. According to research done during Gorbachev’s era they approached 30 million. Gorbachev’s stated the losses were 29 million. Due to poor record keeping the true number is likely an educated guess. I don’t have the numbers that Stalin admitted to, but they were low in comparison.
 
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