Team Infidel
Forum Spin Doctor
Aviation Week & Space Technology
October 27, 2008
Pg. 31
TSAT program said to need more time to skirt pitfalls that doomed other efforts
By Amy Butler, Colorado Springs
The four-star commander of USAF space forces says he supports, and actually proposed, a pause to the Transformational Satellite (TSAT) in order to avoid missteps in the jam-proof communications spacecraft program that brought massive cost overruns and delays on other efforts.
Irked by what he calls inaccurate reports declaring the death of TSAT, USAF Gen. Robert Kehler appears undeterred by news that the Pentagon’s procurement chief is expected to terminate efforts to select a winner in December for the TSAT competition, which has been underway for months between Lockheed Martin and Boeing.
“When I read these articles saying that we are killing TSAT, that is not what we are doing,” says Kehler. “We . . . insisted that we step back from this until such time that we are all clear about what requirements we want to satisfy first . . . and we can issue those instructions to the competitors.”
A new request for proposals is likely to come, igniting a fresh duel between the satellite giants. And this new request will reflect changes in the requirements that will affect the designs offered by the contractors, says Col. Jim Wolf, Air Force Space Command’s lead official on military satellite communications.
After high-profile procurement errors in the combat search-and-rescue helicopter replacement and refueling tanker programs, this process is not likely to be quick. The competitors may find that some of the requirements changes disrupt their original design concepts—as in the case of the refueling tanker. And this could prompt a discussion about how much time is fair to allow them to come up with new designs.
The recent termination of the joint USAF/National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Space Radar program—an effort to field 40 X 40-meter electronically scanned array radars in space to track moving targets on the ground or at sea—is one major change affecting TSAT. Space Radar was expected to vacuum up massive amounts of data, and TSAT was designated as the primary communications relay for that task, says Wolf. Delays in Pentagon programs to field terminals capable of communicating with the TSATs, including the Joint Tactical Radio System, are also prompting Pentagon officials to extend the timing on some requirements.
Now, the Defense Dept. is exploring a concept called the “digital core,” referring to the capability of TSAT to shift military satcom away from channelized routing into an IP-router approach used by the Internet. This digital core will likely reflect capabilities in the first block of TSAT.
“Most of us have expressed some concern about are we biting off more than we can chew,” says Kehler. “We’ve got to bite [requirements] off in chunks that we can actually . . . go and manufacture.”
Questions now under discussion include how quickly to shift to an IP-router design and at what point should the system begin using laser crosslinks to shuttle information among satellites in space and, eventually, laser downlinks to aircraft or ground sites.
Now, Milstar satellites in orbit and Advanced Extremely High-Frequency (AEHF) satellites being built are designed with radio-frequency crosslinks that transmit data more slowly.
However, Kehler says the need to attain a TSAT capability, including laser links and IP routing, is valid.
With lessons from the termination of the NRO’s Future Imagery Architecture program and problems with the Space-Based-Infrared System, Kehler says the time it will take to get the TSAT requirements right upfront is a small price to pay in the short term. Often, program pauses summon the fiscal sharks at the Pentagon, who will carve up a vulnerable project’s funding. In an earlier budget cycle, TSAT took a $3.9-billion cut. But, already, $1.8 billion has been fed between the industry teams for risk reduction and technology maturation.
“The tradeoff for me personally was, do we want to risk getting the program started the wrong way or do we want to risk the programmatic backlash here—which is that people will come after your money,” says Kehler. “My view is it’s worse to not get it started the right way. Let’s get it started the right way and then I think the nightmare scenarios will not come true.”
Not all agree, however. Marine Corps Gen. James Cartwright, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a former leader of Strategic Command, is not a fan, according to numerous industry sources. He is said to be concerned that too much capability is being put on each spacecraft, increasing the likelihood of a single point of failure. Without Cartwright’s support, the program would have a tough road ahead.
There is an increased threat from directed-energy systems, ground-based jamming, and direct-ascent or co-orbital antisatellite activities. And, by the hopeful launch date of Fiscal 2019, those threats will be closer to reality.
Steven Nixon, an industry consultant and former science and technology chief for the director of national intelligence, agrees that a new approach is warranted. “We have a generation of leadership that is still caught up in the values of the cold war,” he says. Nixon influenced many budget cuts dealt to Air Force Space Command programs that were badly managed when he served as a staffer for the House Appropriations defense subcommittee. He says Pentagon planners should consider distributed architectures akin to the Iridium commercial satcom system. This could spread the development cost among more satellites and reduce the chance of a gap due to an in-orbit anomaly or attack.
The Milstar system is now in orbit and providing protected satcom for the U.S. government around the globe.
October 27, 2008
Pg. 31
TSAT program said to need more time to skirt pitfalls that doomed other efforts
By Amy Butler, Colorado Springs
The four-star commander of USAF space forces says he supports, and actually proposed, a pause to the Transformational Satellite (TSAT) in order to avoid missteps in the jam-proof communications spacecraft program that brought massive cost overruns and delays on other efforts.
Irked by what he calls inaccurate reports declaring the death of TSAT, USAF Gen. Robert Kehler appears undeterred by news that the Pentagon’s procurement chief is expected to terminate efforts to select a winner in December for the TSAT competition, which has been underway for months between Lockheed Martin and Boeing.
“When I read these articles saying that we are killing TSAT, that is not what we are doing,” says Kehler. “We . . . insisted that we step back from this until such time that we are all clear about what requirements we want to satisfy first . . . and we can issue those instructions to the competitors.”
A new request for proposals is likely to come, igniting a fresh duel between the satellite giants. And this new request will reflect changes in the requirements that will affect the designs offered by the contractors, says Col. Jim Wolf, Air Force Space Command’s lead official on military satellite communications.
After high-profile procurement errors in the combat search-and-rescue helicopter replacement and refueling tanker programs, this process is not likely to be quick. The competitors may find that some of the requirements changes disrupt their original design concepts—as in the case of the refueling tanker. And this could prompt a discussion about how much time is fair to allow them to come up with new designs.
The recent termination of the joint USAF/National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Space Radar program—an effort to field 40 X 40-meter electronically scanned array radars in space to track moving targets on the ground or at sea—is one major change affecting TSAT. Space Radar was expected to vacuum up massive amounts of data, and TSAT was designated as the primary communications relay for that task, says Wolf. Delays in Pentagon programs to field terminals capable of communicating with the TSATs, including the Joint Tactical Radio System, are also prompting Pentagon officials to extend the timing on some requirements.
Now, the Defense Dept. is exploring a concept called the “digital core,” referring to the capability of TSAT to shift military satcom away from channelized routing into an IP-router approach used by the Internet. This digital core will likely reflect capabilities in the first block of TSAT.
“Most of us have expressed some concern about are we biting off more than we can chew,” says Kehler. “We’ve got to bite [requirements] off in chunks that we can actually . . . go and manufacture.”
Questions now under discussion include how quickly to shift to an IP-router design and at what point should the system begin using laser crosslinks to shuttle information among satellites in space and, eventually, laser downlinks to aircraft or ground sites.
Now, Milstar satellites in orbit and Advanced Extremely High-Frequency (AEHF) satellites being built are designed with radio-frequency crosslinks that transmit data more slowly.
However, Kehler says the need to attain a TSAT capability, including laser links and IP routing, is valid.
With lessons from the termination of the NRO’s Future Imagery Architecture program and problems with the Space-Based-Infrared System, Kehler says the time it will take to get the TSAT requirements right upfront is a small price to pay in the short term. Often, program pauses summon the fiscal sharks at the Pentagon, who will carve up a vulnerable project’s funding. In an earlier budget cycle, TSAT took a $3.9-billion cut. But, already, $1.8 billion has been fed between the industry teams for risk reduction and technology maturation.
“The tradeoff for me personally was, do we want to risk getting the program started the wrong way or do we want to risk the programmatic backlash here—which is that people will come after your money,” says Kehler. “My view is it’s worse to not get it started the right way. Let’s get it started the right way and then I think the nightmare scenarios will not come true.”
Not all agree, however. Marine Corps Gen. James Cartwright, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a former leader of Strategic Command, is not a fan, according to numerous industry sources. He is said to be concerned that too much capability is being put on each spacecraft, increasing the likelihood of a single point of failure. Without Cartwright’s support, the program would have a tough road ahead.
There is an increased threat from directed-energy systems, ground-based jamming, and direct-ascent or co-orbital antisatellite activities. And, by the hopeful launch date of Fiscal 2019, those threats will be closer to reality.
Steven Nixon, an industry consultant and former science and technology chief for the director of national intelligence, agrees that a new approach is warranted. “We have a generation of leadership that is still caught up in the values of the cold war,” he says. Nixon influenced many budget cuts dealt to Air Force Space Command programs that were badly managed when he served as a staffer for the House Appropriations defense subcommittee. He says Pentagon planners should consider distributed architectures akin to the Iridium commercial satcom system. This could spread the development cost among more satellites and reduce the chance of a gap due to an in-orbit anomaly or attack.
The Milstar system is now in orbit and providing protected satcom for the U.S. government around the globe.