Hard power, soft power and smart power
The current theoretical framework for conceptualising CT has its origins in the
school of thought of international relations and politics where approaches have been
understood in terms of the exercise of power to “affect others to obtain the outcomes
you want” (Nye Jr., 2009, p. 160). Nye defines power as the ability to influence
others to get them to behave in ways that you want them to behave by either
coercion and/or payment (hard power), or through attraction (soft power).
Hard power instruments include military, financial incentives, economic sanctions
and legal options. Soft power on the other hand encompasses a rather broader
range of instruments that either directly or indirectly improve relations between
nations or bring about desired social change. Most governments possess soft power
diplomatic tools. Beyond government, soft power also resides in the institutions that
promote cultural or educational exchange. For Nye (2003), soft power encompasses
the range of civil society instruments. Speaking in the context of the USA he cites
Hollywood movies as an example of soft power. Although the cultural concepts and
understandings of US values and ideals that are exported by Hollywood can also do
damage to the image of the USA in countries it wishes to influence, such negative
soft power effects can often be neutralised or negated through other soft power tools
such as cultural exchange, education and the active promotion of democracy. Nye
argues that the instruments of civil society—films, higher education and cultural
exchange—are far more effective in presenting the USA to other nations. He
contends that the government should not try to stymie exports of popular culture,
but should use cultural exchange as a vehicle for communicating the positive aspects
of American values and culture (Nye, 2003). Despite growing anti-American
sentiment across the Arab world, Nye (2003) cautions against the use of concerted
propaganda campaigns as soft power:
Attraction depends on credibility, something a Pentagon propaganda campaign would
clearly lack. On the contrary, by arousing broad suspicions about the credibility of what
the American government says, such a program would squander soft power.
Hard and soft forms of power are not neutrally wielded, as Wilson (2008) notes each
form of power is constituted by “… separate and distinct institutions and
institutional cultures …” which regulate member’s “… attitudes, incentives, and
anticipated career paths” (p. 116). As a consequence, hard and soft power is often
seen to be in opposition to each other, with proponents vying for resources and
influence:
[N]either the advocates of soft power nor the proponents of hard power have adequately
integrated their positions into a single framework … Advocates of soft power and public
diplomacy tend to frame their arguments poorly; their positions are often politically
naive and institutionally weak. Meanwhile, hard power proponents, who are politically
and institutionally powerful, frequently frame their arguments inadequately because
they either overlook or believe that they can incorporate the soft elements of national
power that lie outside their traditional purview. (Wilson, 2008, p. 110)
4 A. Aly et al.
Hard power advocates argue that hard power is the most effective means of
achieving desired results particularly when dealing with rogue states. Coronado
(2005, p. 322) suggests that the reasons why hard power might be preferred to soft
power lie in the short term, often immediate results that hard power offers in
contrast to the long term more diffuse results of social change approaches: “For
some, it [hard power] is a ‘swifter’ and more efficient method to attain objectives,
bypassing the formal and substantive legitimacy of consensus building required by
international law and institutions”.
Soft power proponents on the other hand, argue that it is a more ethical
approach providing an “alternative to raw power politics” (Nye, 2011, p. 81). Soft
power, not only limited to government, can be employed by NGOs, corporations,
institutions and transnational networks. Unlike hard power tactics, soft power
measures are much harder to quantify and often take years to implement before any
measurable results become evident.
Hard power and soft power are far more nuanced than simple definitions of
coercion versus attraction. Soft instruments can be used in hard ways and vice versa.
It is instead, more useful to think of hard power as being purposeful in its application
and finite in its effect. Soft power can be both purposeful and non-purposeful and
potentially infinite in its effect. Neither soft power nor hard power alone is very
effective in achieving the goals of foreign policy. As Wilson (2008) suggests the
integration of these two approaches into a single framework that effectively balances
hard and soft power is challenged by the institutions and contexts which govern each
form of power. Armitage and Nye (2007) refer to the combination of hard and soft
measures as “smart power”: “by complementing US military and economic might
with greater investments in soft power, America can build the framework it needs to
tackle tough global challenges” (p. 1). Their recommended approach calls for a shift
in the way the US Government thinks about security. Although Nye recognises the
significance of coercive tools, he contends that the US Government must develop
ways in which to grow the US soft power to harness the dynamism found within civil
society and the private sector.
Hard and soft are comparisons that are also made in the CT space. Hard CT
most commonly refers to defensive measures such as target hardening, military
intervention, intelligence and punitive measures. Soft CT is proactive, designed to
address root causes and support for terrorism. More recently, soft CT has come to be
referred to as CVE—encompassing measures as varied as de-radicalisation programmes,
education, development programmes, conflict management, community
empowerment and counter narratives. In the CT arena, the disconnection between
hard and soft measures is also evident. Punitive measures introduced in Australia,
Canada, the UK and elsewhere respond to the phenomenon of foreign fighters in
ways that reflect hard power. The confiscation of travel documents of those
suspected to be planning to travel to Iraq and Syria in support of the Islamic State
is implemented by State institutions and law enforcement agencies who have limited
authority or interest in prevention and intervention. Meanwhile, broad-based
prevention initiatives that have the potential to interrupt radicalisation in the early
stages are reliant on the capacity of the non-government sector.