I've always assumed Greece was undefendable against a competent modern army such as what Germany possessed at that stage of the war. However, after looking at the terrain I'm not so sure. A serious strategical blunder was to attempt to defend the entire country.

In addition to fighting the Italians in Albania they had to cover a long defence line in Northern Greece or Macedonia in a futile to cover their second city Thessaloniki. This also gave the Germans the opportunity to outflank them via Yugoslavia.



Topological map here

However, the Greek terrain must have been a serious challenge to the most competent aggressor. The mountain passes on the way to Athens include the famous Thermopylae pass (of earlier Spartan fame). If the Greek army would have focussed on these, perhaps later supported by Commonwealth forces could they have held on in Southern Greece and Athens?

I'm not suggesting it was a good idea for the Commonwealth not to secure North Africa first, but using this strategy perhaps they might have held the Germans off for long enough, so both objectives could be achieved? Long term this would have given the allies air bases in Southern Greece in range of the Ploiesti Oilfields in Rumania.

The Greek Army did well holding the Italians at bay, but I think we would have done better keeping all our forces in North Africa and taking the whole of North Africa before Rommel could take part in the fighting there. I feel by stripping the North African Army of its men and equipment just to lose it in Greece and Crete was a mistake

Indeed I agree as as indicated in the last paragraph, but this distracts from the question I ask. Just considering the defence of Greece (and the adjoining countries) in isolation, could the Greeks have adopted better tactical positions to stop invasion by blockading the few key passes to the Southern half of the country?

It seems to me they made the mistake of attempting to defend the entire country like Poland did.

The invasion was also reminiscent of France, in that the armoured divisions bypassed the main defensive lines by both invading a neighbouring country, Yugoslavia in this case. It was also heavily reliant on the use of vulnerable narrow communication arteries. Both these tactics outflanked the main body of the Greek army and key positions such as the Commonwealth forces around Mt Olympus.

The more practical barriers of defence was suggested by the British, but they refused to listen and didn't even prepare the necessary defences as agreed with them.

Hm,do you say that Britain would give up Manchester,would not defend Liverpool ?

Personally I don't think Greece was defendable both the Metaxas and Allakmon lines were too far north and prone to flanking, the only area that may have been defendable was the Peloponnese but what would have been the point as by then you had given away 80% of the country anyway.

In my opinion they should have continued operation compass and driven the axis from North Africa before Rommel arrived and if they felt like tying up a few Germans perhaps defended Crete for use as a potential jumping off point to assault Greece at a later date and as a air base for attack German oil supplies.

Yes I thought of the Peloponnese first, but that sea barrier is just a wide river which can be protected by air. I was thinking a mountain barrier, from Mt Olympus West (which the Commonwealth forces eventually chose) focussing on defending the two or three narrow valleys would have been a better bet. This would have kept Athens under the Allied occupation. Panzers, can't cross mountains air power or not.

Originally Posted by lljadw

Hm,do you say that Britain would give up Manchester,would not defend Liverpool ?

I could think of some amusing replies to that, but better not!

Some info:

III. Strategic Factors

According to military doctrine the mountainous terrain of Greece would seem ideally suited for defense. The high ranges of the Rhodope, Epirus, Pindus, and Olympus Mountains offer many possibilities to stop an invader. However, the defender must have sufficient air power, if the many defiles are not to become traps for his ground forces.

Whereas an invader thrusting from Albania can be stopped with relatively small forces in the high Pindus Mountains, the northeastern part of the country is difficult to defend against an attack from the north. Eastern Macedonia and western Thrace are narrow strips of land that can be cut off from the rest of Greece by an advance following the course of the Vardar River. Salonika, the only efficient port in northern Greece, is situated within this vulnerable area. The supply system of the Greek forces fighting in Albania was based on Salonika. The capture of the port would cut their supply lines and isolate them in their exposed positions. Since a voluntary withdrawal of the Greek forces in Albania was not feasible and Salonika was practically indefensible, the Greek and British commands resigned themselves to fighting a delaying action in the northeastern part of the country.

The British fully realized the vulnerability of the Greek border defense system; it was bound to collapse in the event of a German thrust between the Strimon and Vardar Rivers. However, they let the Greeks have their way without taking the logical step of moving their forces up to the frontier into the sector west of the Metaxas Line. General Maitland Wilson, the commander of the British expeditionary force, was of the opinion that his forces were too weak to hold such an extended front line. Instead, he established a shorter position some forty miles west of the course of the Vardar. Running along the northern slopes of Olympus and Pieria Mountains and following the eastern slopes of the Vermion Range northward to the Yugoslav frontier, this position extended over approximately seventy miles. There were only four major gaps in this mountain position: one on each side of Mount Olympus, one through the Aliakmon Valley, and one at Edhessa. Almost everywhere else along the so-called Vermion Position the lower forward slopes were steep and rugged, forming a natural obstacle to attacking forces. The two main objectives in establishing this position were to maintain contact with the Greek First Army in Albania and to deny the (Germans access to central Greece. The possibility of a rapid disintegration of the Yugoslav Army and a German thrust into the rear of the Verrnion Position was not taken into consideration.

Our troops would have had to been supplied by sea and I think the U Boats and German Air Force would have played havoc with the resupply.

Originally Posted by LeEnfield

Our troops would have had to been supplied by sea and I think the U Boats and German Air Force would have played havoc with the resupply.

I am not sure I agree the Allies managed to keep Malta afloat which was in a far worse location for sea supply I don't think Crete would have been any harder to supply and given that the Med is rather shallow U-Boats would have had a rough time especially once within range of aircraft from Crete.

Greece could not be saved in my opinion however I think Crete was defensible had they had the resources that were wasted in Greece.