Team Infidel
Forum Spin Doctor
Aerospace Daily & Defense Report
December 17, 2008
The two most pressing technology needs of U.S. forces in combat remain precision close-air support and counter-IED capabilities, according to Navy Vice Adm. Robert Harward, the new deputy commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command.
Moreover, the sequence of combat involvement may be flipped on its head, with conventional forces learning how to support special operations forces (SOF), instead of the current practice of using SOF to support conventional warfare, Harward told defense reporters at a breakfast Dec. 16.
Harward is a SEAL and former director of special reconnaissance and direct-action missions, first in Afghanistan and later in Iraq. He was in Washington discussing the newly issued Joint Operations Environment (JOE) report from the command that states problems U.S. forces in combat are facing now. A companion report, the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, looks at how those problems may be solved for future conflicts.
Describing the JOE report as a "hard turn away from the classic theater warfare focus to emphasizing irregular warfare" — including increasing dependence on unmanned sensors and aircraft, small fighting units, directed-energy weapons and cyberwarfare — "is very accurate," Harward says. He describes the new realm of hybrid warfare as "a very dynamic, uncertain environment" that produces a lot of change and persistent conflict.
"Were focusing a lot on the training method...in the joint, interagency and multinational environment," he said. "That’s probably where [JFCOM] has its strongest influence across the spectrum."
To that effect, planners want to have a high-fidelity, fighter-pilot-like simulator for ground soldiers so that training and response to attacks, ambushes and other actions are well rehearsed before anyone is thrust into a combat situation. Moreover, the latest lessons learned from irregular warfare — such as recent fighting in Baghdad and the Second Lebanon War — will be fed back into the training.
"We see an environment that is very much focused on [producing] distributed, decentralized, leader-centric and network-enabled structures and then placing [them] throughout the joint force," Harward said. That sounds much like the construct used by SOF. "And they have the ability to operate with the commander’s intent when systems fail and they can’t get information."
Meanwhile, electronic fires like jamming, directed energy and network attack are capabilities that ought to be bought, maintained and developed, according to Harward. "It’s part of the technology advantage that we have right now and our ability to expand it will pay dividends," he said. "But it’s also one of those capabilities that hasn’t been fully developed. We’re looking at it in the experimentation phase and how we might move forward."
Harward pointed out that the impact of insurgents’ information operations is far greater than the equivalent U.S. effort. For instance, insurgents make claims of heavy civilian casualties that are taken as truth in the anti-U.S. world, despite evidence to the contrary.
-- David A. Fulghum
December 17, 2008
The two most pressing technology needs of U.S. forces in combat remain precision close-air support and counter-IED capabilities, according to Navy Vice Adm. Robert Harward, the new deputy commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command.
Moreover, the sequence of combat involvement may be flipped on its head, with conventional forces learning how to support special operations forces (SOF), instead of the current practice of using SOF to support conventional warfare, Harward told defense reporters at a breakfast Dec. 16.
Harward is a SEAL and former director of special reconnaissance and direct-action missions, first in Afghanistan and later in Iraq. He was in Washington discussing the newly issued Joint Operations Environment (JOE) report from the command that states problems U.S. forces in combat are facing now. A companion report, the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, looks at how those problems may be solved for future conflicts.
Describing the JOE report as a "hard turn away from the classic theater warfare focus to emphasizing irregular warfare" — including increasing dependence on unmanned sensors and aircraft, small fighting units, directed-energy weapons and cyberwarfare — "is very accurate," Harward says. He describes the new realm of hybrid warfare as "a very dynamic, uncertain environment" that produces a lot of change and persistent conflict.
"Were focusing a lot on the training method...in the joint, interagency and multinational environment," he said. "That’s probably where [JFCOM] has its strongest influence across the spectrum."
To that effect, planners want to have a high-fidelity, fighter-pilot-like simulator for ground soldiers so that training and response to attacks, ambushes and other actions are well rehearsed before anyone is thrust into a combat situation. Moreover, the latest lessons learned from irregular warfare — such as recent fighting in Baghdad and the Second Lebanon War — will be fed back into the training.
"We see an environment that is very much focused on [producing] distributed, decentralized, leader-centric and network-enabled structures and then placing [them] throughout the joint force," Harward said. That sounds much like the construct used by SOF. "And they have the ability to operate with the commander’s intent when systems fail and they can’t get information."
Meanwhile, electronic fires like jamming, directed energy and network attack are capabilities that ought to be bought, maintained and developed, according to Harward. "It’s part of the technology advantage that we have right now and our ability to expand it will pay dividends," he said. "But it’s also one of those capabilities that hasn’t been fully developed. We’re looking at it in the experimentation phase and how we might move forward."
Harward pointed out that the impact of insurgents’ information operations is far greater than the equivalent U.S. effort. For instance, insurgents make claims of heavy civilian casualties that are taken as truth in the anti-U.S. world, despite evidence to the contrary.
-- David A. Fulghum