Missileer
Active member
North Korea has yet to allow open and uncontrolled access to all of it's nuclear facilities. Each time an agreement was reached with the IAEA, NK has backed out.
http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/94-470f.htm
CRS Report for Congress, CRS94-470F
June 1, 1994
By Richard P. Cronin, Coordinator
Specialist, Asian Affairs, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division
"During a series of negotiations with senior State Department officials last June and July, North Korea agreed to "suspend" its withdrawal from the NPT in exchange for U.S. "assurances against the use of force, including nuclear weapons," and an American commitment not to interfere in North Korea's "internal affairs." Subsequent negotiations between senior State Department officials and North Korean representatives in December 1993 and early January 1994 appeared to open the way for a one-time inspection of Pyongyang's seven declared sites to replace film and batteries in cameras and reestablish the continuity of the inspections regime."
For reasons that remain a matter of differing U.S. and North Korean interpretations, the U.S. North Korean agreement broke down.(15) The North initially balked at conditions laid down by the IAEA for the inspections and charged that these went beyond what had been agreed upon with U.S. negotiators.(16) On February 15, 1993, however, faced with the impending prospect that the IAEA Board of Governors would report to the UN Security Council that the continuity of the inspection system had completely broken down, Pyongyang agreed in writing to an IAEA checklist of procedures and facilities for a one-time inspection. These included the collection of samples from a "glove box" connected to a reprocessing "hot cell" and gamma ray scans. After further acrimony, Pyongyang eventually issued visas to the IAEA's inspectors.
As in many earlier negotiations, the apparent breakthrough quickly proved illusory. The North Koreans heaped abuse on the Southern delegation at the bilateral talks, (18) and at the Yongbyon reprocessing facility, they refused to let the inspectors take the necessary "glove box" samples and gamma ray scans at the reprocessing facility. Moreover, the IAEA team found evidence of tampering with seals on the "hot cell" in the reprocessing facility and the aforementioned evidence of the construction of a second, unsafeguarded reprocessing line. As a result, the IAEA inspectors declared that they were unable to verify that North Korea had not diverted material since February 1993, when the facility was last inspected. (19)
North Korea's refusal to allow free access to the IAEA inspectors and evidence of forced entry into the hot cell area lent new urgency to the issue and underscored Pyongyang's unreliability as a negotiating partner. Administration officials reportedly declared on March 16, "this time the North went too far . . . there are no more carrots."
http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/94-470f.htm
CRS Report for Congress, CRS94-470F
June 1, 1994
By Richard P. Cronin, Coordinator
Specialist, Asian Affairs, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division
"During a series of negotiations with senior State Department officials last June and July, North Korea agreed to "suspend" its withdrawal from the NPT in exchange for U.S. "assurances against the use of force, including nuclear weapons," and an American commitment not to interfere in North Korea's "internal affairs." Subsequent negotiations between senior State Department officials and North Korean representatives in December 1993 and early January 1994 appeared to open the way for a one-time inspection of Pyongyang's seven declared sites to replace film and batteries in cameras and reestablish the continuity of the inspections regime."
For reasons that remain a matter of differing U.S. and North Korean interpretations, the U.S. North Korean agreement broke down.(15) The North initially balked at conditions laid down by the IAEA for the inspections and charged that these went beyond what had been agreed upon with U.S. negotiators.(16) On February 15, 1993, however, faced with the impending prospect that the IAEA Board of Governors would report to the UN Security Council that the continuity of the inspection system had completely broken down, Pyongyang agreed in writing to an IAEA checklist of procedures and facilities for a one-time inspection. These included the collection of samples from a "glove box" connected to a reprocessing "hot cell" and gamma ray scans. After further acrimony, Pyongyang eventually issued visas to the IAEA's inspectors.
As in many earlier negotiations, the apparent breakthrough quickly proved illusory. The North Koreans heaped abuse on the Southern delegation at the bilateral talks, (18) and at the Yongbyon reprocessing facility, they refused to let the inspectors take the necessary "glove box" samples and gamma ray scans at the reprocessing facility. Moreover, the IAEA team found evidence of tampering with seals on the "hot cell" in the reprocessing facility and the aforementioned evidence of the construction of a second, unsafeguarded reprocessing line. As a result, the IAEA inspectors declared that they were unable to verify that North Korea had not diverted material since February 1993, when the facility was last inspected. (19)
North Korea's refusal to allow free access to the IAEA inspectors and evidence of forced entry into the hot cell area lent new urgency to the issue and underscored Pyongyang's unreliability as a negotiating partner. Administration officials reportedly declared on March 16, "this time the North went too far . . . there are no more carrots."
