Team Infidel
Forum Spin Doctor
USA Today
August 1, 2008
Pg. 11
When President Bush launched the "war on terrorism" after the 9/11 attacks, few Americans needed much explanation of its purpose. Al-Qaeda suicide attackers, in a plot hatched in safe havens in Afghanistan, had killed thousands by flying planes into buildings in New York and Washington, and a field in Pennsylvania. Those responsible had to be killed or captured. The threat had to be eradicated.
Seven years later, after a disorienting detour into Iraq, that clarity is gone. But with the Iraq war now winding down, two questions need re-asking. What is the goal of the war on terror? How will we know if we've won?
The first step should be to reclaim the original focus. Al-Qaeda must be routed — in Afghanistan, in Pakistan (where its leadership has retreated to) and anywhere else it has appeared, including Iraq. The unmistakable message must be that anyone who dares attack the United States will be destroyed. That by itself would constitute success and unlike the Iraq war, draws broad and deep support.
A secondary goal is to erode the strength and appeal of radical Islam to at least pre- 9/11 levels, when it was a regional problem.
But how?
A new report by RAND Corp. offers some insight. The report examines the demise of various terrorism groups since 1968. Most commonly, they abandoned terrorism after they were brought into the political process, but RAND is skeptical that such tactics would work against al-Qaeda with its sweeping international goals and religious fervor. Instead, the report recommends that the U.S. effort be centered on policing and intelligence activities, which have ended 40% of all insurgencies, largely by apprehending or killing key leaders. That, RAND says, should be supplemented with military action where there are large, well-armed insurgencies, and not always by U.S. forces. Military force was effective in only 7% of cases RAND studied.
Those findings won't surprise U.S. military commanders. They have long agreed that the war won't be won solely on any battlefield. Nor would it surprise Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who is proposing that U.S. strategy should make military action subordinate to political and economic efforts.
It is even consistent with the pre-Iraq Bush administration approach, which was to employ a balanced five-pronged attack: diplomatic, political, economic, financial and military.
Some good news from the RAND study is that financial tightening has been effective. So, plainly, have measures to protect the United States, given that there has been no new attack on U.S. soil since 9/11. That effort, still far from complete, must not be orphaned as time makes 9/11 seem distant.
The best news from the study, though, is this: No religious terrorist group since 1968 has won. If the end of the Iraq war revives the singular focus Americans shared after9/11, al-Qaeda's fate should be no different.
August 1, 2008
Pg. 11
When President Bush launched the "war on terrorism" after the 9/11 attacks, few Americans needed much explanation of its purpose. Al-Qaeda suicide attackers, in a plot hatched in safe havens in Afghanistan, had killed thousands by flying planes into buildings in New York and Washington, and a field in Pennsylvania. Those responsible had to be killed or captured. The threat had to be eradicated.
Seven years later, after a disorienting detour into Iraq, that clarity is gone. But with the Iraq war now winding down, two questions need re-asking. What is the goal of the war on terror? How will we know if we've won?
The first step should be to reclaim the original focus. Al-Qaeda must be routed — in Afghanistan, in Pakistan (where its leadership has retreated to) and anywhere else it has appeared, including Iraq. The unmistakable message must be that anyone who dares attack the United States will be destroyed. That by itself would constitute success and unlike the Iraq war, draws broad and deep support.
A secondary goal is to erode the strength and appeal of radical Islam to at least pre- 9/11 levels, when it was a regional problem.
But how?
A new report by RAND Corp. offers some insight. The report examines the demise of various terrorism groups since 1968. Most commonly, they abandoned terrorism after they were brought into the political process, but RAND is skeptical that such tactics would work against al-Qaeda with its sweeping international goals and religious fervor. Instead, the report recommends that the U.S. effort be centered on policing and intelligence activities, which have ended 40% of all insurgencies, largely by apprehending or killing key leaders. That, RAND says, should be supplemented with military action where there are large, well-armed insurgencies, and not always by U.S. forces. Military force was effective in only 7% of cases RAND studied.
Those findings won't surprise U.S. military commanders. They have long agreed that the war won't be won solely on any battlefield. Nor would it surprise Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who is proposing that U.S. strategy should make military action subordinate to political and economic efforts.
It is even consistent with the pre-Iraq Bush administration approach, which was to employ a balanced five-pronged attack: diplomatic, political, economic, financial and military.
Some good news from the RAND study is that financial tightening has been effective. So, plainly, have measures to protect the United States, given that there has been no new attack on U.S. soil since 9/11. That effort, still far from complete, must not be orphaned as time makes 9/11 seem distant.
The best news from the study, though, is this: No religious terrorist group since 1968 has won. If the end of the Iraq war revives the singular focus Americans shared after9/11, al-Qaeda's fate should be no different.