A story from today’s Yediot Aharonot, the largest circulating paper in Israel. I have cut some of it out because it is long, but the main ideas are in it. The story is actually an interview with Colonel Ilan Malcha, commander of the Givati infantry brigade. This brigade fought in Gaza during the last round of violence, a.k.a “Cast Lead”. It somthing to think about.
“I sleep well” says Colonel Malcha, “My conscious is quiet and I can answer any claim or criticism against what we have done. I would like to explain once and for to all the critics, what happened in Gaza, how it happened, and maybe than their reactions will change”.
In the last few weeks Malcha and his subordinates found themselves under attack by human rights organizations such as “Shovrim Shtika”(Breaking the Silence- an organization which encourages IDF troops to tell of wrong doings by the IDF), who blame the IDF for un-proportional damage to civilians during “cast Lead”. Malcha is outraged. In this interview given a few weeks before he leaves the brigade following 2 years of constant action, he defends his troops and confronts hard questions…….
…During the operation the Givati Brigade operated in the Zitun Neighborhood located in the sector of Gala, and received praises from many in the IDF for its performance. Malcha was in the field constantly, close to the troops. “The enemy chose the field of battle”, says Malcha. “In a ‘playing field’ that has civilians, the basic assumption is that there will be casualties in innocent civilians. Not because we want it, not because we raise our weapon to fire at them, but because that is the nature of war. It’s a battlefield When the enemy chooses to fight in urban terrain it has a heavy price.”
Q: Wasent there a way to cut down on casualties among Palestinian civilians?
“There is no doubt it is complex, you can’t ignore it. You can’t say ‘Boys, there are no civilians, shoot in all directions’. You really can’t. There were company commanders that entered a building under fire, saw families inside and stopped shooting. In other cases you see insurgents going in and out of houses. What do you say to a company commander? ‘Don’t shoot at the house’? ‘Don’t use cover fire to protect yourself’? What do you tell him? And what will you tell his mother if he does not shoot? Or suddenly you get RPGs from a nearby house. There is a family inside but there is also someone firing RPGs at our troops. Wouldn’t you fire back? You do fire back and civilians get hurt. Whoever is firing that RPG at our forces has to understand he will be fired back at. What, if there is a family in the same building we won’t fire back?”
Q: Perhaps the volume of fire you used was too powerful?
“If we used less firepower we would have paid a very high price. In the end you can’t tell a force to attack ‘dry’, if you know the enemy is there. During the operation a compay commander walks into a building and sees an AK-47 and a hand grenade on the floor. What does that tell you? You don’t need to be an expert to know it means the house has insurgents in it. But then you hear screams and you know there is a family in there too. So what do you do, fire or not fire selectively?”
These hard questions, says Malcha, are the price of urban warfare. “Maybe you can mitigate it, but you have to understand that at the moment you are fired upon you have to react by doing whatever is needed to neutralize the source of fire and prevent casualties to your force. That’s what we are taught from day one”…”I have seen civilian hurt there. You think it was a happy sight? No. It’s a terrible price. But you know if you haven’t opened fire your own men would be dead and that is worse”
…A Squad Leader from Givati described an incident that happened in Gaza(In a meeting of soldiers from the same school after the war): “One of our officers, a Company Commander, saw someone walking on a path. An old lady. She was quite far but close enough to be taken down. If she was suspicious or not I don’t know. He put marksman up on the roof and told them to shoot her. I felt like its cold blooded murder”.
Malcha knows this story well. As far as he is considered, the Squad Leader did not see the whole picture and tells a half a story. “The Company Commander was on the roof with the Marksman,” Says Malcha. “It was daylight and she was walking off the path dressed in black. The Company Commander preformed the full suspect arrest procedure (Stop-Stop or I will Shoot-Etc) and she did not stop. He ordered the marksman to fire a shot in the air. She continued advancing towards them, off the path, without a child, and in the meantime they received reports of female suicide bombers attacking other forces. They also received warnings about possible female suicide bombers in their sector. They fired near her, and finally when she did not stop they shot her. The soldier that was in the house next door did not see the whole event. He only saw a woman being shot and that what he told. As far as he is considered that is what happened. In retrospective we should have talked to those soldiers and explain that event to them.”
Malcha is worried that the criticism will affect the actions of commanders in future conflicts. “I feel that in future battles our company commanders will start thinking deeply about whom they are firing at, who they are not firing at, what they should do, and what they should not do.”
Q: What’s bad about them giving deep thought to who they shooting at?
“I think this public debate and the attacks on them will cause them to stop acting as they have in ‘Cast Lead’. That must not happen. I saw my commanders in the field, they had confidence. They trusted themselves and the troops, They made decisions.”….
…”I am saying, these lines, you cannot draw them in orders. You can’t say go in to a house like this and like that. You need to give your subordinates a ‘toolbox’ and let them use their own judgment.”…
…”I expect the people criticizing us to come up with solutions…Let me take them to meet the soldier who was injured by female suicide bomber, what will they say then?”