Biggest Blunders in Military History

Charge_7 said:
Speculation now is that Hitler's health issues are what "forced" his hand. Parkinson's disease was much more deadly in the '40s than it is now and Hitler knew his life expectancy was limited. He had to rush his plans of conquest accordingly.

Did a quick search and found the following link. I'm not sure about how much of a hold Parkinson's had on him but if it is true it would go some way in explaining why Hitler went so downhill as the war progressed.

http://www.abc.net.au/science/news/health/HealthRepublish_40131.htm
 
But they probably couldn't, even if they had won the Battle of Britain. Besides, I think a war between Germany & the USSR was inevitable. Even so, I agree that ultimately Barbarossa was a major blunder, if only because Hitler completely underestimated the USSR and its will to resist.

I dont entire agree, a theory I have had for quite a while is that the Italians did as much to defeat Germany as the allies did.

Lets face it:
- The entire balkans campaign had to be carried out because of Italy's failed attacks on Albania and Greece which dumped British troops in Greece thus making it a priority German intervention. This delayed Barbarosa by at least six weeks (in summer) and depleted the reserves available to the Russian campaign.

- The North African campaign was another Italian fiasco which cost Germany a good 200-300000 troops which if available on the Russian front through 1942-43 may have made a noticable difference especially in the Staligrad area where oddly enough the Russian counter offensive ran right through the middle of an Italian/Spanish division and ended in the destruction of the 6th Army.

Basically the Italian war effort killed more Germans (approx 700000) than it killed Allies.
 
MontyB said:
But they probably couldn't, even if they had won the Battle of Britain. Besides, I think a war between Germany & the USSR was inevitable. Even so, I agree that ultimately Barbarossa was a major blunder, if only because Hitler completely underestimated the USSR and its will to resist.

I dont entire agree, a theory I have had for quite a while is that the Italians did as much to defeat Germany as the allies did.

Lets face it:
- The entire balkans campaign had to be carried out because of Italy's failed attacks on Albania and Greece which dumped British troops in Greece thus making it a priority German intervention. This delayed Barbarosa by at least six weeks (in summer) and depleted the reserves available to the Russian campaign.

- The North African campaign was another Italian fiasco which cost Germany a good 200-300000 troops which if available on the Russian front through 1942-43 may have made a noticable difference especially in the Staligrad area where oddly enough the Russian counter offensive ran right through the middle of an Italian/Spanish division and ended in the destruction of the 6th Army.

Basically the Italian war effort killed more Germans (approx 700000) than it killed Allies.

you can not blame only italians for stalingrad. german lines would be run over anyway. it is not italians fault but hitler stupid orders.

on the other hand, german balkan campaign was not caused only by situation in grece. germans had to atack yugoslavia anyway because they refused to join germans.
 
on the other hand, german balkan campaign was not caused only by situation in grece. germans had to atack yugoslavia anyway because they refused to join germans.

Thats true however the Greece/Crete section that extended the campaign was purely Italian driven.


you can not blame only italians for stalingrad. german lines would be run over anyway. it is not italians fault but hitler stupid orders.

No doubt but my point is that bailing the Italians out in Greece and North Africa essentially cost the Germans the 6th Army and the Africa Corps.

The main problem with the theory is that it is pure "what if" work ie If Germany had had 6 extra weeks at the start of Barbarosa and before winter would it have allowed the capture of Moscow, had the Africa Corps been available for service on the eastern front would it have sped up the advance in that 6 weeks to avoid a Stalingrad altogether.
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MontyB said:
on the other hand, german balkan campaign was not caused only by situation in grece. germans had to atack yugoslavia anyway because they refused to join germans.

Thats true however the Greece/Crete section that extended the campaign was purely Italian driven.


you can not blame only italians for stalingrad. german lines would be run over anyway. it is not italians fault but hitler stupid orders.

No doubt but my point is that bailing the Italians out in Greece and North Africa essentially cost the Germans the 6th Army and the Africa Corps.

The main problem with the theory is that it is pure "what if" work ie If Germany had had 6 extra weeks at the start of Barbarosa and before winter would it have allowed the capture of Moscow, had the Africa Corps been available for service on the eastern front would it have sped up the advance in that 6 weeks to avoid a Stalingrad altogether.
[/quote]


there is some logic, but I think there is too much `if`. what if stalin believed to informations he recieved from west about german atack, what if he left his best generals and CO in comand...
 
Re: Biggest Blunders

Doppleganger said:
The Other Guy said:
To y I also heard that the popular story of the Charge of the Light Brigade was a myth and it was actually more successful than is commonly accepted.
Recent research has shown that it was far less costly in casualties for the Light Brigade than had been assumed, with around 150 killed out of approximately 600 cavalrymen.

Its still one of the most stupid cavalry charges in military history though
:roll:
 
here is some logic, but I think there is too much `if`. what if stalin believed to informations he recieved from west about german atack, what if he left his best generals and CO in comand...

Completely agree it is a huge "IF" and you can apply an "IF" to almost anything ie what if the counter attack at Arras had suceeded France may have not fallen and the war would have been over by 1941.
 
I think that a discussion about military blunders should include the American Civil War battles of Fredericksburg (Burnside), Chancellorsville (Hooker), Chickamauga (Rosecrans), and Cold Harbor (Grant).

Of the four I think that Fredericksburg was the worst followed by Chickamauga, Chancellorsville and then Cold Harbor.

I know that in terms of casualties Cold Harbor was worse, but Grant did not lose command (as the other three all did) and the AOTP stayed in contact with the ANV and continued the attack. Having said that, Grant always said after the war that Cold Harbor was the one attack that he always regretted.
 
Is fredricksburg the one where the norther troops surrounded lee, just to stop, regroup, and get desroyed by the Confederates led by "Stonewall" Jackson?
 
The fall of Singapore and the loss of Force Z. I put them together because they are part of the same British debacle.

Even with poor equipment Percevil could've done so much more than he did and Yamashita was almost completely out of ammo and supplies when surrender talks were called for, indeed, at first he thought the British were demanding _his_ surrender.

Admiral Tom Philips clung to the idea that battleships could hold their own against airpower simply because no battleship had yet been sunk while at sea by airplanes. He ignored the lessons of his _own_ navy at Taranto let alone those at Pearl Harbor just days earlier. Historians still quander his behavior in not calling for fighter cover over Kuantan. Only Captain Tennant of the Repulse did so and belatedly as he had assumed that Philips had already done so. RAF Buffaloes arrived only to see a bottom-up battleship disappear beneath the waves. Percevil's errors only added to the agony of the survivors of Force Z as they marched off to Japanese captivity.
 
Charge_7 said:
The fall of Singapore and the loss of Force Z. I put them together because they are part of the same British debacle.

Even with poor equipment Percevil could've done so much more than he did and Yamashita was almost completely out of ammo and supplies when surrender talks were called for, indeed, at first he thought the British were demanding _his_ surrender.

Admiral Tom Philips clung to the idea that battleships could hold their own against airpower simply because no battleship had yet been sunk while at sea by airplanes. He ignored the lessons of his _own_ navy at Taranto let alone those at Pearl Harbor just days earlier. Historians still quander his behavior in not calling for fighter cover over Kuantan. Only Captain Tennant of the Repulse did so and belatedly as he had assumed that Philips had already done so. RAF Buffaloes arrived only to see a bottom-up battleship disappear beneath the waves. Percevil's errors only added to the agony of the survivors of Force Z as they marched off to Japanese captivity.

at that stage i don't think the fighters that the british had in the pacific would've been anything other than target practice for the japanese.

zero's Vs buffaloes & gladiators = fish in a barrel.

but the point is taken, lessons weren't learn't because of the stubborn belief that a battleship was in some way impervious to air attack. even the belief that they could be MADE to be effective against aircraft...by that i mean the admiral yamamoto fielded toward the end of the war
 
Charge_7 said:
Admiral Tom Philips clung to the idea that battleships could hold their own against airpower simply because no battleship had yet been sunk while at sea by airplanes. He ignored the lessons of his _own_ navy at Taranto let alone those at Pearl Harbor just days earlier. .
Like you said, no battleship had yet been sunk by airpower while at sea. At Taranto and Pearl the ships were moored in harbour, in effect 'sitting ducks'. Britain had already been at war for over two years, and had not suffered a major ship loss to the Luftwaffe, so against the Japanese whose airforce capability the Allies had no knowledge of, but tended to greatly underestimate, the sending of these two ships without aircover was a risk, but in the circumstances it would have seemed a risk worth taking.
Admiral Tom Phillips took a risk, as commanders often have to do in war in order to win. But luck wasn't with him. :(
 
Force Z was hit by bombers, not fighters. Even old Buffaloes would've decimated them.

Endless tracts of open ocean. Twist and turn all you want but where are you going to hide? They may as well have been at anchor for all the good being at sea did them. Also, the British kept all their ships larger than a destroyer out of the channel. With the limited range of the Luftwaffe, their capital ships never came up against it.
 
Charge_7 said:
Force Z was hit by bombers, not fighters. Even old Buffaloes would've decimated them.

Endless tracts of open ocean. Twist and turn all you want but where are you going to hide? They may as well have been at anchor for all the good being at sea did them. Also, the British kept all their ships larger than a destroyer out of the channel. With the limited range of the Luftwaffe, their capital ships never came up against it.

good points charge...thanks
 
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