Ashes said:
Hi Doppleganger.
Dont entirely agree with some of your arguments.............
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There are many reasons why Leningrad was never captured by the Wehrmacht. To solely attribute this to Zhukov is incorrect. Manstein's attempted capture of the city in 1942 mainly failed because he did not have the resources to do the job. The capture of Leningrad was never really seen as vital by either OKH or Hitler and in truth it was relatively easy for the Wehrmacht to put the city under siege. Something they may have considered for Stalingrad with hindsight.
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I didn't say that it was solely attributable to Zhukov, Stalin sent him to help organize the city's defences to make sure it wasn't taken.
This he did.
It might be that Leebs armies didn't have the resources, but I dont think the Russians were in top shape after the hammering they'd taken either.
At the beginning of the battle for Leningrad was the 8th, 11th and 27th Soviet Armies of Northwestern Front. Soviet forces conducted actions in Pribaltic and had taken large losses. Only seven rifle divisions from 23 were at full strength, 11 divisions have 2-3 thousand soldiers, three mechanized corps have all 332 tanks. In total at the beginning of the battle the armies of Northern and Northwestern Front totaled 45 divisions (33 divisions, seven tank divisions, five motorized), three brigades ? 8 forts,in all: 540.000 personnel, 5000 guns, 700 tanks, 235 aircraft.
Germans had 31 divisions, including 8 Finnish, in all: 810.000 men, 5300 guns, 440 tanks, 1200 aircraft.
Hitler originally wanted the city taken or destroyed, and for Leebs armies to swing against Moscow, instead of being tied down for 3 years.
Leningrad was as much a symbolic target as it was a strategic one for Hitler, who fully expected the birthplace of the Russian Revolution to be reduced to rubble quickly and with ease. The Red Army’s ferocious defense of the city, however, made that impossible.
In David Glantz's book he explains how the struggle for Leningrad impacted other theaters of operation along the Eastern Front, eventually forcing the Germans into their long and costly retreat back toward Berlin.
The Germans blindly drove into Russia, they didn't do any homework at all, but all the luck was on their side. On june 22 1941 Hitler was rolling the dice, he rolled 100 out of 12 and he still lost the war, that summarizes it all.
Hi Ashes, thanks for the intelligent and well constructed reply, which I don't always get when arguing about the Eastern Front with someone on this board.
If I recall it was also the battleships of the Soviet Baltic Fleet, used as shore batteries, that helped swing the battle in the Soviet's favour.
It is correct that the failure to capture Leningrad did affect operations and of course the Wehrmacht would much have preferred to capture it. But with hindsight I think they made the correct decision. The city was ferociously defended by the Soviets as you rightly said (like pretty much every strongpoint where the Red Army held out). It would have been very expensive in casualties to go in and take a city of that size where determined defenders are in place and Hitler made the right decision there.
You're absolutely correct to say that the Germans did not do their homework when marching into Russia. Just as well they never did because they did very well for a time.
Ashes said:
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Zhukov played a vital role at the Battle of Moscow, so I give him full credit for that. However, it must be realised that although numbers on paper may have been roughly even, the condition and combat power of the German divisions was very much less than the divisions Zhukov marshalled from Siberia. These troops were well supplied and fresh whereas the Germans were exhausted
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Yes, but Zhukov held those fresh troops back untill the Germans were fought to a standstill by equally tired Russian troops, then used the Siberian troops in a counter attack, driving the Germans back from Moscow.
I don't think you can say it was Zhukov's decision to hold them back until the German troops were fought to a standstill. The 25 Siberian divisions in question were being held there in case of a Japanese attack. When Stalin learned that no such attack would probably be taking place, it was then that he ordered Zhukov to rush them to the West. I can't see how this can be the measure of Zhukov's ability as he only followed orders and common sense.
The Russian troops may also have been tired but you don't mention the advantages of being a defender. They had ever shortening supply lines which meant they were better supplied. As you know the retreating Red Army had followed a policy of 'scorched earth' and there was very little for the Germans to salvage, meaning everything had to be brought in or captured in the field. The Red Army was adequately equipped for winter warfare unlike the Germans who were still fighting in summer uniforms in -40 degree celcius temperatures.
There is also the contention that Zhukov failed at the Battle of Moscow as he had the chance to completely smash the bulk of Army Group Centre but was unable to do so. The Wehrmacht forces around the Moscow area were utterly spent and were in a process of disruption. They were there for the taking and although Zhukov pushed them back and the Germans suffered heavy casualties (as did the Soviets) they were not smashed and the nucleus survived.
Ashes said:
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Zhukov was nowhere near Stalingrad at the end of 1942 so whatever you've read is incorrect and he cannot be given much credit for that victory. He was a thousand miles or so North near Moscow, conducting the Soviet military offensive code-named Operation Mars against German Army Group Centre. It was General A. M. Vasilevsky who was in charge of Operation Uranus, the offensive to capture Stalingrad and destroy the German 6th Army. Operation Mars has rightly been called Zhukov' greatest defeat by the noted military historian David Glantz. This defeat was deliberately hid and covered up by the Soviet Union for decades after WW2 had ended.
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But it was a joint plan by both of them according to Antony Beaver, author of Stalingrad, and historian David Glantz..........
Glantz shows that Zhukov spent far more time preparing Operation Uranus than Operation Mars. According to Glantz's timetable, from September 26 (when Stalin made Zhukov the Stavka coordinator for Operation Mars) until October 12, Zhukov was in fact visiting the army commanders on the "Stalingrad axis" and studying the ground for Operation Uranus. He was simply not in a position to oversee plans for Mars, especially since the operational orders for it were issued by the Stavka on October 1 and the revised orders on October 10, both during his absence near Stalingrad.
While Vasilevsky visited Eremenko's armies to the south of the city, Zhukov toured forward positions on the northern side of the Stalingrad salient. Zhukov's involvement in the planning of Uranus continued up until its launch. He returned to the "Stalingrad axis" with Vasilevsky yet again just before the final meeting in Moscow in November which took place less than forty-eight hours before Uranus's opening bombardment.
Glantz himself acknowledges that "Uranus was Zhukov's operation as well as Vasilevsky's."
And as for Operation "Mars" - Was it a large disaster, or a part of the victory in Stalingrad?
it was necessary at any price to hold the main forces of the Army Group "Center" and to prevent Germans to redeploy reserves from the Western to a Southern direction.
Army Group "Center" had 79 divisions, it was 30% of all Axis divisions in the Soviet-German Front, or 41% of German only divisions, it was a setback for the Russians, but it made sure no German reinforcements would be helping on the Stalingrad front.
While causing heavy Soviet casualties, the German divisions themselves were fought to a frazzle. It was no coincidence that several months later Model asked for and received permission to abandon the Rzhev salient. He and his army could ill afford another such victory.
You cannot seriously argue that Operation Mars was anything other than a crushing defeat for Zhukov. Operation Mars was not an operation to prevent Army Group Centre from redeploying reserves southwards nor was it an operation just to contain it. It was designed to smash said Army Group as a viable fighting force in the field and speed up the end of the war and in this it utterly failed. It's true that Model's Army Group suffered too and it was a close run thing but the casualty figures tell all.
BTW you should really reference any passages because I can tell you've lifted some of your passages directly from the website I linked to you.
Well almost anyway. For some reason in your last paragraph above you substituted the original word 'catastrophic' with your word 'heavy'. Why?
Catastrophic casualties indicates a decisive failure to me, no?
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Ashes said:
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You mention Kursk, but again I cannot give Zhukov any credit for that eventual slight Soviet victory. It was the German's 2nd biggest strategic blunder of the war (after the delay of Operation Typhoon in 1941) and it was doomed to failure simply because the Soviets knew it was coming and had weeks to build up massive defences. The numbers were not even and in almost every major battle on the Eastern Front the Soviets maintained some kind of numerical superiority. In any case, the Germans played into the Red Army's hands and although they inflicted much higher casualties on the Soviets, they did not achieve their objectives and Hitler called off the attack in July when he heard the Allies had landed in Sicily.
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'Slight Soviet victory' Well, in casualties maybe, but it was the last great offensive by the Germans and was a vital battle for them.
As you said 'Once Kursk was over the Germans no longer had any way to regain the strategic initiative.'
Although outnumbered, they had one of the most formidible forces they'd ever put on the field; nearly 1 million men.
In one sector they had 3rd panzer, gros deutschland, 11th panzer, ss leibstandarte, ss das reich, ss totenkopf, 6th panzer, 19th panzer, 7th panzer, 9 of the best German divisions, all shoulder to shoulder on a narrow 30 mile front.
Led by commanders like Manstein and Model,and equipped with Tigers and Panthers.
But this time, instead of poor defensive positions and pathetic commanders like early in the war, the Russians had superb defences and great commanders in control like Zhukov and Vatutin.
By all accounts Hitler sent orders to Army group centre to begin Citadel ''within the first 5 days from April 28th'', but Model in conference with Hitler persuaded him that it would be better to stay in defensive lines and to let the Russians attack first, Hitler, not confident of Citadel, agreed to pospone the attack until the 'wonder tanks' were ready.
So Model must take a share of the blame for the late start.
Glantz and House's book demolish many of the myths that suggest Hitler might have triumphed if Operation Citadel had been conducted differently.
As for the numbers, later in the war it favoured the Russians but in '41 when Russia was on it's knees, it was Zhukov who Stalin turned to, to stabilize the front against the odds.
This he did.
Firstly, you'll never see me say that it was possible for Germany to win the war decisively at this stage. It wasn't. However before Kursk it was still possible for Germany to force Stalin to the negotiating table and win a limited victory.
Kursk was a slight 'operational' Soviet victory in that although they had blunted the German offensive, their own counter offensive was only marginally successful. In casualty terms the Soviets had much the heavier as would be the pattern all the way through to Berlin. Looking at the following reliable link will confirm this.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Kursk
The delay of Operation Zitadelle so that the new Panther and Elefant tanks were ready was mainly Hitler's decision. What evidence do you have that Model was also instrumental in this? Please provide links or sources because I'd be surprised if Model had anything to do with that decision. And why would Hitler listen to Model more than Manstein? After all Manstein won him 2 brilliant victories.
Manstein and Guderian did not want to pursue Zitadelle at all. Manstein's alternate 'backhand' plan called for feigned retreats all the way along the southern defensive line to lure the Soviet South and Southwestern Fronts in and then trap them against the Sea of Azov. It was a brilliant audacious plan but Hitler didn't like it because it called for retreat. I see no evidence whatsoever of Zhukov ever having come up with a plan like that or even 'Fall Gelb', the masterplan that defeated France, another Manstein effort. Unless you can provide it?
The wonder tanks were not ready and most of them broke down at various points. Guderian, who by this time was Inspector General of Panzer Troops, unsuccessfully argued to focus on production of the latest variant of the Panzer IV instead as they were utterly reliable, many more could be made and the crews knew how to fix them in their sleep.
Ashes said:
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Manstein was dismissed on March 30th, 1944 and so played no part in the final battles of the Eastern Front.
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The germans could have had a dozen Mansteins at that stage, all it would have meant was more dead people, by this stage Germany was kaput.
I wonder how the first 6 months of Barbarossa would have turned out if Zhukov was in command from the beginning.
For starters the Germans probably would'nt have trapped the Russians at Kiev, Zhukov got into hot water with Stalin when he strongly argued they pull back before they were encircled, that would have saved about 650,000 men.
And lend lease, although helpful was not deciesive IMO.
Plus what's often overlooked is Zhukovs thrashing of the Japanese at Gorkum Kol in 1938.
When Hitler pressed the Japanese to attack Russia, its probable that the Japanese diden't fancy any more tank warfare and thought that a jungle campaign South was more their style.
Regards Ashes.
The 2nd World War's best strategic commander was not around for the last year of the war. Yes it was too late but earlier you had implied that Manstein was around to the end. Had Hitler given control of OKH operations to Manstein I guarantee that Kursk or the Battle of Bagration in June 1944 would not have been allowed to unfold the way they did.
It's only speculation what Zhukov may or may not have done differently. In truth he may not have allowed himself to be outflanked and encircled at Kiev but this was Stalin's decision to hold Kiev at all costs. Do you think at that stage of the war he'd have listened to Zhukov? Doubtful IMO.
Lend-Lease was absolutely vital IMO for 4 big reasons. This being the supply of locomotives, railroad tracks, radios and trucks. Without this aid being received by the red Army they would have been unable to:
1. Deliver enough supplies to the one place to conduct large scale operations
2. Move enough troops around for the same reason as above
3. Properly coordinate their tank crews and respond to tactical situations in the field as they arose
Without the above there would have been no counteroffensive at Moscow, no counteroffensive at Stalingrad and no counteroffensive at Kursk. The Soviet Rifle Divisions would have been largely reduced to trudging it on foot. In short, it would have been very difficult for the Red Army to fight effectively against the Wehrmacht and they would have lost the war in the East.
http://orbat.com/site/sturmvogel/SovLendLease.html
In short, you haven't provided any information I did not know already and nothing where Zhukov could be compared favorably to Manstein, the best commander of WW2.
