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Topic: Bay of Pigs Invasion


On the 17th of April, 1961, Brigade 2506, comprised of Cuban exiles, landed at the Bay of Pigs on the southern-central coast of Cuba. They were mostly young men who came from all sectors of society and regions of the island with one common goal: to overthrow the growing communism led by Fidel Castro who was imposing a rigid totalitarian system on this largest island of the Antilles. In three days of hard fighting they were defeated by highly superior forces. Almost 40 years after this event we must ask ourselves about the factors that determined the creation of the Brigade, the causes of their defeat, and its consequences for Cuba and the rest of the world.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
By early 1960 it was evident that the promises made by Castro about the restoration of democracy at the beginning of his government after the flight of dictator Fulgencio Batista on January 1st, 1959, had vanished. By that time the promise of general elections was discarded along with key men in the government who were truly prodemocratic. Also almost gone was the free press (nearly wiped out by mid-1960). There was a growing trend of confiscations of private property, while unions and student associations had been controlled through trickery. To make the picture more clear, members of the old and unpopular communist party were increasingly entering positions of power, while an effective repressive apparatus was being constructed under the model of those of Eastern Europe. By 1961, Castro had also intervened militarily in four Caribbean and Central American
Presiding over this process was the figure of a leader who, like no other one before in Cuba, had awakened enormous faith and trust from the people. He himself denied many times that his government had communist leanings, but its actions increasingly indicated that it was heading towards a new dictatorship of a totalitarian communist nature Resulting from those realities, inside as well as outside Cuba, preparations were being made to fight the new order by those who felt betrayed by it and by those who did not desire a regime of that nature clandestine urban groups were creating a growing anti-Castro movement, potentially very threatening to the incipient dictatorship. Through lliance with the USSR Castro. Because of this, many thought that only through the help of the United States was it possible to rid themselves of the new dictatorship that was developing around the most charismatic and unscrupulous leader ever produced in Cuba. Near the end of 1960, the dissatisfaction of the powerful and unbeaten northern neighbor and important members of the Cuban democratic leadership came together in a special way in an effort to overthrow Castro via military means, the only way possible due to his closure of peaceful alternatives
DEVELOPMENT OF THE MILITARY OPERATION
The initial military strategy outlined by the United States--in which many of the Cuban leaders placed an extreme confidence--consisted of the development of guerrilla warfare, which would be promoted by exiles that would land on various strategic points throughout the island. This plan was later changed in favor of a massive landing by a conventional expeditionary force also comprised of exiles. This was later known as Brigade 2506, honoring the number of the first person who gave his life in this process. The reasons for this change were due to the enormous quantity of weapons received by Castro from the USSR, especially MiG fighter aircraft, which would become operational by mid-1961. This situation required a conventional force to defeat such development. Another reason was the alleged lack of effectiveness of those who were carrying on the fight against Castro inside Cuba, although the fact that there was a lack of security within these clandestine movements due to government infiltration was also mentioned. The strategy of a massive landing undermined the internal effort to eliminate Castro from within the revolutionary ranks. In any event, today there is evidence that there was little effective cooperation between the rural guerrillas, that noticeably sprung up throughout the country, and the American agencies.
The military operation against Castro was the product of an American plan. This was prepared without adequate participation on the part of the exiled leaders, both civilian and military. This leadership was centered in the Revolutionary Council, directed by Dr. José Miró Cardona, former prime minister of Cuba in 1959. The military plan was the object of great debate in the cabinet of president Kennedy because of his preoccupation with keeping the flagrant intervention by the United States. This was a rather naïve worry because the information already revealed by the press regarding the training of the exiles left little room for doubt.
For these reasons the White House vetoed the landing at Trinidad-Casilda, on the southern-central coast. This was an ideal location selected by the American military officials who planned the operation. But it was perceived as too "revealing" of the presence of the U.S. and was changed, to the west, in the same area, in favor of the Bay of Pigs and adjacent Girón Beach, which was tactically and strategically inferior. The plan consisted of the landing of some 1,400 heavily armed exiles from Brigade 2506. This invasion was to be preceded by three days of aerial attacks from vintage World War II B-26 aircraft flown by Cuban pilots from bases in Nicaragua which were to destroy Castro's air force on the ground. This was comprised of faster and more modern aircraft left by the Batista regime. These planes had to be destroyed in order to achieve the crucial aerial supremacy without which the operation could not succeed. This premise was repeated many times by the instructors to the exiles who were worried about their blatant numerical inferiority. They were assured that "the sky would be theirs."
Upon establishing a beachhead, and with the continued support of the exile air force who would be based in that zone, the troops would advance, counting on internal support by way of uprisings and desertions and further support from abroad. The total power which the U.S. held over the military operation, based on its absolute logistical contribution, turned out to be fatal to the goal of overthrowing Castro. The Revolutionary Council, in practice, had no other alternative but to subordinate itself to the direction of the U.S., at the same time thinking about the invincibility and reliability of this powerful ally. However, the refusal on the part of president Kennedy to guarantee victory once the operation was launched, condemned to failure the actions of the exiles before their landing on the 17th of April, 1961. As a result of the naive fear of making too evident the American support (already well known) and of the public promise made by president Kennedy that he would not intervene in Cuba--a point that has been debated--the first aerial attack is partially conducted on April 15th on several air bases. This was carried out with half of the planes originally designated due to a presidential decision, since the attacks were to be presented as uprisings of Castro's air force. Those bombings don't destroy the enemy planes. Furthermore, due to the scandal generated, the two remaining planned air raids were canceled. After that moment, the operation was doomed due to the lack of fulfillment of its main premise.
PART 1
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