Team Infidel
Forum Spin Doctor
Washington Times
June 26, 2008
Pg. 22
By William Hawkins
When Defense Secretary Robert Gates fired the Air Force secretary and chief of staff earlier this month, he cited problems in the nuclear weapons program. Many suspect the firings were prompted by more systemic failures, as evidenced by the mismanaged competition for the $35 billion tanker contract.
The Center for Defense Information speculated that one reason was the desire to buy more F-22 fighters, "despite the Raptor's complete irrelevance, and nonappearance, in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan." This might be dismissed as wishful thinking by the CDI, a left-wing group that opposes all new weapons programs. It is also misleading, as the F-22 is an air superiority fighter and the insurgents don't have combat aircraft to fight. But other more potent adversaries will.
Unfortunately, Mr. Gates has given some credence to the CDI view by exhibiting a narrow focus on the low end of possible threats which would work against high-end programs like the F-22, as well as aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines and heavy armor for ground forces. In a May 13 speech, he said, "Any major weapons program, in order to remain viable, will have to show some utility and relevance to ... irregular campaigns." And he appointed Gen. Norton A. Schwartz, a man with a special operations background, as the new U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff. Such one-dimensional thinking would endanger America's global strategic superiority against the most dangerous threats - rival powers with the resources to expand their international influence.
Terrorism is the tactic of the weak. Sustained, large-scale irregular warfare requires outside support for arms, training and diplomatic backing. To deter such state-sponsored terrorism requires strong U.S. conventional and strategic capabilities. Only states have the power to upset regional balances. Failed states and insurgents create violent problems, but successful states with the resources and confidence to reach for more power pose the greater challenges. The U.S. military must be prepared to fight major wars against regional powers and "peer competitor" nation-states.
The United States already has more than 45,000 special operations troops, plus several airborne and light infantry divisions. And it trains local forces around the world as the first line of defense against terrorism. It is the heavy combat units that need to be reconstituted and modernized after the massive cuts during the 1990s. Iraq has demonstrated that for both regime change and counterinsurgency, armor and firepower are still essential for victory.
New, high-performance aircraft, like the F-22, will ensure the aerial supremacy that U.S. forces have enjoyed since World War II. But so far, only 183 of the 381 F-22s the Air Forces says it needs to replace early model F-15s (designed in the 1970s) have been approved. Mr. Gates is only going to keep the F-22 production lines open, leaving it to the next administration to decide how many jets to buy.
After the firing of the Air Force leaders, Mr. Gates went on a cross-country tour to show his respect for those who serve in the ranks. In his talks, Mr. Gates said, while the focus of the military must be on the wars being fought, there must be an emphasis on future capabilities as well. "It is a matter of balance," Mr. Gates told his audiences, "We must build out the Navy. We must modernize the Air Force, in particular the aging fighter and tanker fleet. And we must prepare the Army and Marine Corps for full-spectrum conflict." High-caliber units cannot be conjured up out of thin air on short notice. They are the product of years of training and procurement, and must be funded on a steady, long-term basis.
When Mr. Gates testified recently before the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee on the 2009 budget, he addressed this balance. He spoke first of terrorism and failed states, then went said America must be prepared for dealing with nations "discontented with their role in the international order and rising and resurgent powers whose future paths are uncertain," diplomatic code for a rising China and a resurgent Russia.
There is a lesson here from history. The British were the best in the world at fighting "irregular" wars at the close of the 19th century, policing an empire that encompassed a quarter of humanity. They employed large numbers of locally recruited colonial troops. But when war broke out in Europe in 1914, London could muster only a handful of divisions to help defend France against the German invasion. The larger British forces rapidly mobilized for the 1915 campaign suffered horrendous casualties due to a lack of training and a shortage of weapons and ammunition. Despite its wealth, Great Britain was unprepared for a decisive struggle against a major rival. America cannot afford to make the same mistake.
William Hawkins is senior fellow for national security studies at the U.S. Business and Industry Council in Washington, D.C.
June 26, 2008
Pg. 22
By William Hawkins
When Defense Secretary Robert Gates fired the Air Force secretary and chief of staff earlier this month, he cited problems in the nuclear weapons program. Many suspect the firings were prompted by more systemic failures, as evidenced by the mismanaged competition for the $35 billion tanker contract.
The Center for Defense Information speculated that one reason was the desire to buy more F-22 fighters, "despite the Raptor's complete irrelevance, and nonappearance, in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan." This might be dismissed as wishful thinking by the CDI, a left-wing group that opposes all new weapons programs. It is also misleading, as the F-22 is an air superiority fighter and the insurgents don't have combat aircraft to fight. But other more potent adversaries will.
Unfortunately, Mr. Gates has given some credence to the CDI view by exhibiting a narrow focus on the low end of possible threats which would work against high-end programs like the F-22, as well as aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines and heavy armor for ground forces. In a May 13 speech, he said, "Any major weapons program, in order to remain viable, will have to show some utility and relevance to ... irregular campaigns." And he appointed Gen. Norton A. Schwartz, a man with a special operations background, as the new U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff. Such one-dimensional thinking would endanger America's global strategic superiority against the most dangerous threats - rival powers with the resources to expand their international influence.
Terrorism is the tactic of the weak. Sustained, large-scale irregular warfare requires outside support for arms, training and diplomatic backing. To deter such state-sponsored terrorism requires strong U.S. conventional and strategic capabilities. Only states have the power to upset regional balances. Failed states and insurgents create violent problems, but successful states with the resources and confidence to reach for more power pose the greater challenges. The U.S. military must be prepared to fight major wars against regional powers and "peer competitor" nation-states.
The United States already has more than 45,000 special operations troops, plus several airborne and light infantry divisions. And it trains local forces around the world as the first line of defense against terrorism. It is the heavy combat units that need to be reconstituted and modernized after the massive cuts during the 1990s. Iraq has demonstrated that for both regime change and counterinsurgency, armor and firepower are still essential for victory.
New, high-performance aircraft, like the F-22, will ensure the aerial supremacy that U.S. forces have enjoyed since World War II. But so far, only 183 of the 381 F-22s the Air Forces says it needs to replace early model F-15s (designed in the 1970s) have been approved. Mr. Gates is only going to keep the F-22 production lines open, leaving it to the next administration to decide how many jets to buy.
After the firing of the Air Force leaders, Mr. Gates went on a cross-country tour to show his respect for those who serve in the ranks. In his talks, Mr. Gates said, while the focus of the military must be on the wars being fought, there must be an emphasis on future capabilities as well. "It is a matter of balance," Mr. Gates told his audiences, "We must build out the Navy. We must modernize the Air Force, in particular the aging fighter and tanker fleet. And we must prepare the Army and Marine Corps for full-spectrum conflict." High-caliber units cannot be conjured up out of thin air on short notice. They are the product of years of training and procurement, and must be funded on a steady, long-term basis.
When Mr. Gates testified recently before the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee on the 2009 budget, he addressed this balance. He spoke first of terrorism and failed states, then went said America must be prepared for dealing with nations "discontented with their role in the international order and rising and resurgent powers whose future paths are uncertain," diplomatic code for a rising China and a resurgent Russia.
There is a lesson here from history. The British were the best in the world at fighting "irregular" wars at the close of the 19th century, policing an empire that encompassed a quarter of humanity. They employed large numbers of locally recruited colonial troops. But when war broke out in Europe in 1914, London could muster only a handful of divisions to help defend France against the German invasion. The larger British forces rapidly mobilized for the 1915 campaign suffered horrendous casualties due to a lack of training and a shortage of weapons and ammunition. Despite its wealth, Great Britain was unprepared for a decisive struggle against a major rival. America cannot afford to make the same mistake.
William Hawkins is senior fellow for national security studies at the U.S. Business and Industry Council in Washington, D.C.