Team Infidel
Forum Spin Doctor
New York Times
January 19, 2007
Pg. 6
Military Analysis
By Michael R. Gordon
WASHINGTON, Jan. 18 — When Lt. Gen. David H. Petraeus assumes his duties as the new American commander in Iraq, he will be guided by a new military doctrine on counterinsurgency that makes the security of the population a chief objective.
But a pressing question that is likely to emerge when the Senate takes up his confirmation next week is whether the administration’s new Iraq strategy will draw on enough forces to ensure security — as measured against the general’s own guidelines.
The additional five combat brigades that would be sent to Baghdad under President Bush’s strategy would roughly double the size of the American force involved in the security operation there, about 15,000 troops. But as a whole, that would still represent only a small portion of the 120,000-strong force that would be required to secure the entire capital according to the force ratios outlined in the military’s new field manual for counterinsurgency, which General Petraeus helped to draft.
Interviews with military officers suggest that the Bush administration can come close to meeting the manual’s guidelines by relying heavily on the efforts of Iraqi security forces and concentrating the effort on key neighborhoods. But this means that the strategy will depend greatly on the performance of Iraqi forces, including police units that have often been criticized as ineffectual or under the influence of Shiite militias.
The debate over the administration’s Iraq strategy involves much more than troop levels. Some who criticize the plan, like Joseph P. Hoar, a retired Marine general and former head of the Central Command, have argued that it would be foolish to consider sending additional forces until Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki follows through on his program of political reconciliation and reins in the Shiite militias.
“My view is that the Maliki government is ill-equipped to make the needed political changes that might allow the efficacious use of extra troops,” General Hoar said.
But the Bush administration has argued that it is not be possible for the Iraqis to take the needed political steps until security is improved, and, in any event, Congress is unlikely to block the deployment of additional forces. So an important question is whether there will be enough troops on hand for the strategy to work.
The goals in counterinsurgency are to protect the population, deprive the insurgents of sanctuary and generally maintain order over a broad area, making it a “manpower-intensive” approach, according to the counterinsurgency manual.
While noting that cases can vary, the manual stipulates a rough rule for determining how many troops are needed: one “counterinsurgent,” which could be an American or a soldier or policeman from the “host nation,” for every 50 inhabitants. With an estimated population of around six million, Baghdad would require a force of some 120,000 under those guidelines.
A study by John J. McGrath, published last year by the Army’s Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., noted that some counterinsurgency campaigns and postwar stability operations had succeeded when the American force level had fallen short of this standard, including the American counterinsurgency effort in the Philippines from 1899 to 1901. Even so, securing Baghdad is an especially challenging mission given the sectarian passions, multiple militias, determined insurgents, high level of crime and weak central government.
The five additional American combat brigades that are to be sent to Baghdad under Mr. Bush’s plan would enable the United States to change the nature of its operations in the capital by maintaining a regular presence in some key neighborhoods. Even with the American reinforcements, the numbers show that the effort would require a stepped-up effort by the Iraqis.
Adding the five brigades, at roughly 3,500 soldiers each, would bring the American contribution in Baghdad to about 33,000. Expanding the Iraqi Army in Baghdad by three more brigades would push the number of Iraqi soldiers to around 15,000. American officials say that there are an additional 3,000 American and Iraqi Special Operations forces in the Baghdad area who will be part of the effort. In addition, there are 13,000 Iraqi National Police officers and 22,000 local Iraqi police officers. That would bring the total number of American troops and Iraqi soldiers and policemen to about 86,000 in the capital.
American officials say that the pervasive use of separate ministry security forces and the use of contractors to protect government buildings also needs to be factored into the equation. There are thousands of such personnel, though specific numbers are hard to come by.
According to the military’s plan, the forces would also not be distributed evenly across the city but would instead be concentrated in specific sectors. Other American capabilities, like intelligence gathering, would also be enhanced in ways that are not readily quantifiable by the deployment of the additional brigades, military officials say.
Further, military officials said that the strategy should not be considered as purely a numbers game. American commanders are considering a number of steps that would help improve security, including limiting access to specific neighborhoods and establishing “no-drive areas” and weapons-free zones.
Improving the performance of the Iraqis is also an important element of the new strategy. The decision to deploy one or more American battalions with Iraqi Army and police units in each of the nine city sectors that are to be established under the plan is intended to establish the kind of partnership that will improve their performance.
A military officer involved in Iraq war planning said that given the complexity of securing Baghdad he could not say with precision how many forces would be needed to tamp down violence in the city. But the officer said he was convinced that the increase would make an important difference.
But Kalev Sepp, an assistant professor at the Naval Postgraduate School and a former Army Special Forces officer, expressed concern that the effort might be shorthanded.
“Even accounting for the idea of concentrating forces in specific neighborhoods, you still have to account for the possibility that violence will shift to other neighborhoods,” he said. “So there is something to the arithmetic that 120,000 security personnel are required. And beyond that there are the issues of quality and political reliability, particularly with the police, in trying to achieve security in the capital.”
January 19, 2007
Pg. 6
Military Analysis
By Michael R. Gordon
WASHINGTON, Jan. 18 — When Lt. Gen. David H. Petraeus assumes his duties as the new American commander in Iraq, he will be guided by a new military doctrine on counterinsurgency that makes the security of the population a chief objective.
But a pressing question that is likely to emerge when the Senate takes up his confirmation next week is whether the administration’s new Iraq strategy will draw on enough forces to ensure security — as measured against the general’s own guidelines.
The additional five combat brigades that would be sent to Baghdad under President Bush’s strategy would roughly double the size of the American force involved in the security operation there, about 15,000 troops. But as a whole, that would still represent only a small portion of the 120,000-strong force that would be required to secure the entire capital according to the force ratios outlined in the military’s new field manual for counterinsurgency, which General Petraeus helped to draft.
Interviews with military officers suggest that the Bush administration can come close to meeting the manual’s guidelines by relying heavily on the efforts of Iraqi security forces and concentrating the effort on key neighborhoods. But this means that the strategy will depend greatly on the performance of Iraqi forces, including police units that have often been criticized as ineffectual or under the influence of Shiite militias.
The debate over the administration’s Iraq strategy involves much more than troop levels. Some who criticize the plan, like Joseph P. Hoar, a retired Marine general and former head of the Central Command, have argued that it would be foolish to consider sending additional forces until Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki follows through on his program of political reconciliation and reins in the Shiite militias.
“My view is that the Maliki government is ill-equipped to make the needed political changes that might allow the efficacious use of extra troops,” General Hoar said.
But the Bush administration has argued that it is not be possible for the Iraqis to take the needed political steps until security is improved, and, in any event, Congress is unlikely to block the deployment of additional forces. So an important question is whether there will be enough troops on hand for the strategy to work.
The goals in counterinsurgency are to protect the population, deprive the insurgents of sanctuary and generally maintain order over a broad area, making it a “manpower-intensive” approach, according to the counterinsurgency manual.
While noting that cases can vary, the manual stipulates a rough rule for determining how many troops are needed: one “counterinsurgent,” which could be an American or a soldier or policeman from the “host nation,” for every 50 inhabitants. With an estimated population of around six million, Baghdad would require a force of some 120,000 under those guidelines.
A study by John J. McGrath, published last year by the Army’s Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., noted that some counterinsurgency campaigns and postwar stability operations had succeeded when the American force level had fallen short of this standard, including the American counterinsurgency effort in the Philippines from 1899 to 1901. Even so, securing Baghdad is an especially challenging mission given the sectarian passions, multiple militias, determined insurgents, high level of crime and weak central government.
The five additional American combat brigades that are to be sent to Baghdad under Mr. Bush’s plan would enable the United States to change the nature of its operations in the capital by maintaining a regular presence in some key neighborhoods. Even with the American reinforcements, the numbers show that the effort would require a stepped-up effort by the Iraqis.
Adding the five brigades, at roughly 3,500 soldiers each, would bring the American contribution in Baghdad to about 33,000. Expanding the Iraqi Army in Baghdad by three more brigades would push the number of Iraqi soldiers to around 15,000. American officials say that there are an additional 3,000 American and Iraqi Special Operations forces in the Baghdad area who will be part of the effort. In addition, there are 13,000 Iraqi National Police officers and 22,000 local Iraqi police officers. That would bring the total number of American troops and Iraqi soldiers and policemen to about 86,000 in the capital.
American officials say that the pervasive use of separate ministry security forces and the use of contractors to protect government buildings also needs to be factored into the equation. There are thousands of such personnel, though specific numbers are hard to come by.
According to the military’s plan, the forces would also not be distributed evenly across the city but would instead be concentrated in specific sectors. Other American capabilities, like intelligence gathering, would also be enhanced in ways that are not readily quantifiable by the deployment of the additional brigades, military officials say.
Further, military officials said that the strategy should not be considered as purely a numbers game. American commanders are considering a number of steps that would help improve security, including limiting access to specific neighborhoods and establishing “no-drive areas” and weapons-free zones.
Improving the performance of the Iraqis is also an important element of the new strategy. The decision to deploy one or more American battalions with Iraqi Army and police units in each of the nine city sectors that are to be established under the plan is intended to establish the kind of partnership that will improve their performance.
A military officer involved in Iraq war planning said that given the complexity of securing Baghdad he could not say with precision how many forces would be needed to tamp down violence in the city. But the officer said he was convinced that the increase would make an important difference.
But Kalev Sepp, an assistant professor at the Naval Postgraduate School and a former Army Special Forces officer, expressed concern that the effort might be shorthanded.
“Even accounting for the idea of concentrating forces in specific neighborhoods, you still have to account for the possibility that violence will shift to other neighborhoods,” he said. “So there is something to the arithmetic that 120,000 security personnel are required. And beyond that there are the issues of quality and political reliability, particularly with the police, in trying to achieve security in the capital.”