Team Infidel
Forum Spin Doctor
New York Times
April 8, 2008
Last fall, when Gen. David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker testified before Congress, the Op-Ed editors asked military and diplomatic experts to suggest questions they would like to ask America’s two top men in Iraq. Now, with General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker to appear again before the Senate today and the House tomorrow, the editors asked three of last year’s contributors to reflect on the changes of the last seven months — and to suggest new questions they would pose were they members of Congress.
Legislation’s Limits
by DOUGLAS J. FEITH
Last summer, in discussing benchmarks for Iraqi political progress, American legislators focused on whether the Iraqis were enacting legislation. But the essential issue is how well the political process in general is functioning — and new laws are only one aspect.
A key political development has been the decision of Sunni tribal leaders to change their strategy. Many who had previously allied themselves with Al Qaeda in trying to expel United States forces are now opposing anti-Shiite violence and cooperating with our troops against Al Qaeda in Iraq. This is an important success associated with the surge.
My questions:
1. Has the recent crackdown by the Shiite-dominated Iraqi government on Shiite militias contributed to consolidating and building on this success? Is it likely to promote further Sunni-Shiite cooperation within the country’s new political system?
2. Assuming that strengthening the political process is crucial to draining the energy out of the insurgency, what key actions should the American government take (and avoid taking) to support the Iraqis in that work? And would a formal American-Iraqi agreement on the status of United States forces in Iraq be helpful?
Douglas J. Feith is a former under secretary of defense for policy and the author of "War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism."
A Plan on Iran
by MAX HASTINGS
Few informed people doubt the tactical success of General Petraeus’s operations since the “surge.” Uncertainty focuses squarely where it always did: on whether, as an American officer once put it to me, there is “anything to join up to” politically. The prospect of military action against Iran by the Bush administration appears to have receded. But however great the difficulties of diplomatic engagement with Iran and Syria, some of us question whether American policy in Iraq will ever work unless it is within the framework of very different regional policies for the Middle East.
My questions:
1. Do we now acknowledge that the best hope of progress in Iraq lies through a network of “bottom-up” local deals and truces, rather than with the national government in Baghdad?
2. Why are the services provided to Iraqis by national utilities, especially electricity, still so poor after five years of occupation?
3. Can Iraq be stabilized without active assistance, or at least acquiescence, from Iran and Syria?
4. What is the message from the apparent failure of the recent offensive by the Iraqi security forces in Basra?
MAX HASTINGS is a military historian and the author of “Retribution: The Battle for Japan, 1944-45."
An Army at Risk
by ANDREW J. BACEVICH
The United States today finds itself with too much war for too few warriors. With the “surge” now giving way to a “pause,” the Iraq war has become an open-ended enterprise. American combat operations in Iraq could easily drag on for 10 more years, and a large-scale military presence might be required for decades, which may well break the Army while bankrupting the country. The pretense that there is a near-term solution to Iraq has become a pretext for ignoring the long-term disparity between military commitments and military capacity.
My questions:
1. General Petraeus, in the spring of 2003, on your first tour of duty in Iraq, you remarked to a reporter, “Tell me how this ends.” You are now on your third tour and the war is in its sixth year. Please tell us how this war ends.
2. In addition, please provide an approximation of when it will end. With the war costing the United States $3 billion per week and 30 to 40 American lives per month, how many more years (or decades) will elapse before one of your successors is able to report that the mission in Iraq has been accomplished?
3. Members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have openly expressed their concern that the Army and Marine Corps are badly overstretched. How much longer can our ground forces sustain these demands and what actions would you propose to alleviate the pressure?
ANDREW J. BACEVICH is a professor of history and international relations at Boston University.
April 8, 2008
Last fall, when Gen. David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker testified before Congress, the Op-Ed editors asked military and diplomatic experts to suggest questions they would like to ask America’s two top men in Iraq. Now, with General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker to appear again before the Senate today and the House tomorrow, the editors asked three of last year’s contributors to reflect on the changes of the last seven months — and to suggest new questions they would pose were they members of Congress.
Legislation’s Limits
by DOUGLAS J. FEITH
Last summer, in discussing benchmarks for Iraqi political progress, American legislators focused on whether the Iraqis were enacting legislation. But the essential issue is how well the political process in general is functioning — and new laws are only one aspect.
A key political development has been the decision of Sunni tribal leaders to change their strategy. Many who had previously allied themselves with Al Qaeda in trying to expel United States forces are now opposing anti-Shiite violence and cooperating with our troops against Al Qaeda in Iraq. This is an important success associated with the surge.
My questions:
1. Has the recent crackdown by the Shiite-dominated Iraqi government on Shiite militias contributed to consolidating and building on this success? Is it likely to promote further Sunni-Shiite cooperation within the country’s new political system?
2. Assuming that strengthening the political process is crucial to draining the energy out of the insurgency, what key actions should the American government take (and avoid taking) to support the Iraqis in that work? And would a formal American-Iraqi agreement on the status of United States forces in Iraq be helpful?
Douglas J. Feith is a former under secretary of defense for policy and the author of "War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism."
A Plan on Iran
by MAX HASTINGS
Few informed people doubt the tactical success of General Petraeus’s operations since the “surge.” Uncertainty focuses squarely where it always did: on whether, as an American officer once put it to me, there is “anything to join up to” politically. The prospect of military action against Iran by the Bush administration appears to have receded. But however great the difficulties of diplomatic engagement with Iran and Syria, some of us question whether American policy in Iraq will ever work unless it is within the framework of very different regional policies for the Middle East.
My questions:
1. Do we now acknowledge that the best hope of progress in Iraq lies through a network of “bottom-up” local deals and truces, rather than with the national government in Baghdad?
2. Why are the services provided to Iraqis by national utilities, especially electricity, still so poor after five years of occupation?
3. Can Iraq be stabilized without active assistance, or at least acquiescence, from Iran and Syria?
4. What is the message from the apparent failure of the recent offensive by the Iraqi security forces in Basra?
MAX HASTINGS is a military historian and the author of “Retribution: The Battle for Japan, 1944-45."
An Army at Risk
by ANDREW J. BACEVICH
The United States today finds itself with too much war for too few warriors. With the “surge” now giving way to a “pause,” the Iraq war has become an open-ended enterprise. American combat operations in Iraq could easily drag on for 10 more years, and a large-scale military presence might be required for decades, which may well break the Army while bankrupting the country. The pretense that there is a near-term solution to Iraq has become a pretext for ignoring the long-term disparity between military commitments and military capacity.
My questions:
1. General Petraeus, in the spring of 2003, on your first tour of duty in Iraq, you remarked to a reporter, “Tell me how this ends.” You are now on your third tour and the war is in its sixth year. Please tell us how this war ends.
2. In addition, please provide an approximation of when it will end. With the war costing the United States $3 billion per week and 30 to 40 American lives per month, how many more years (or decades) will elapse before one of your successors is able to report that the mission in Iraq has been accomplished?
3. Members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have openly expressed their concern that the Army and Marine Corps are badly overstretched. How much longer can our ground forces sustain these demands and what actions would you propose to alleviate the pressure?
ANDREW J. BACEVICH is a professor of history and international relations at Boston University.